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Case Study 2: Territorial Governance to achieve resource efficient urban development in Stockholm: good practices without consistency?

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
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## 1 Introduction to the case

In this case study resource efficiency is defined within an urban context. In doing so, a number of factors, including the built form, infrastructure for vehicles, public transit, the extent to which residences, jobs and services are mixed and the energy efficiency of buildings are considered while evaluating resource efficiency in Stockholm. The built form, and population density in particular, can have a significant impact on urban resource efficiency through the size of living spaces, reaching viability thresholds for public transit and proximity to jobs and services (SUME, 2011). The built form can also be influenced by stakeholder actions. Infrastructure for vehicles and public transit both relate to the amount of energy consumed for commuting and other journeys. Usability and access to high level public transit (lines that are distinct from the private car) has a considerable influence on public transit ridership and the consumption of energy for transportation. Further, in building in a less dense manner, more resources need to be expended on the construction of roads and associated infrastructure (SUME, 2011). Mixed use areas allow for shorter distance access to many services, goods and jobs. In contemporary urban planning, such areas are considered to be more resource efficient than their single use counterparts. Finally, buildings account for 40% of final energy consumption in Europe (Jaeger et al., 2011). This can be influenced by building standards and retrofitting activities, both of which have become increasingly energy efficient in recent years.

In considering how territorial governance promotes resource efficient urban development, we have focused on the City of Stockholm in general and the development of a new neighborhood within its boundaries, Stockholm Royal Seaport, known in Swedish as *Norra Djurgårdsstaden*. This is an environmental flagship initiative for the city, which builds upon its eco-district predecessor Hammarby Sjöstad, and as such illustrates the City's promotion efforts and its inclusion in the Clinton Climate Initiative's Climate Positive Development Program (Clinton Climate Initiative, 2012). Construction formally began during the winter of 2010 and the project has a tentative completion date of 2025. Once completed, it will offer 12 000 new apartments, 35 000 office spaces and 600 000 m<sup>2</sup> of commercial space, thereby having a considerable impact on growth in the inner city (Stockholm Royal Seaport, 2013). Throughout the case study, the City of Stockholm, as well as references to the City, refers to the City of Stockholm administration, unless otherwise noted.

# CASE STUDY AREA 2: CITY OF STOCKHOLM



Map 1: The City of Stockholm & Stockholm Royal Seaport



Figure 1: Stockholm Royal Seaport

Source: Stockholms stad, 2009

Fig. 1: Stockholm Royal Seaport, Source: Stockholms stad, 2009

This case study relates primarily to the Europe 2020 priority of sustainable growth. It focuses on the flagship initiative of a resource efficient Europe, in this case in the built environment, through efforts to integrate a wider range of relevant stakeholders into the development process. In doing so, strategic efforts at densification and transit oriented development (TOD) are considered. Further, in mobilising the private sector to help achieve greater levels of resource efficiency through building standards and innovation, the Stockholm case also correlates with the Europe 2020 priority for smart growth. Here, R&D investments and a transition towards a green economy are central.

This case study is taking place at the stage of policy and project implementation, with some ongoing policy formulation. The City of Stockholm is interested in learning about the strengths and weaknesses in their efforts at fostering good territorial governance and has been a valuable source of information thus far.

### **Key policy documents**

The city's policies towards the environment and resource efficiency are well developed. The guiding document for development in the city is *Vision 2030: A Guide to the Future* (2007). All urban development should be in line with the general strategies outlined here. It includes an emphasis on ensuring that Stockholm's bodies of water and green areas remain clean and sites of recreation. There is also a focus on innovations as a way of resolving many environmental challenges. It is stated that the city should be fossil free by 2050 through reductions in energy consumption, smart transit solutions and energy efficient buildings; solutions that are developed in concert with companies working in Stockholm. Further, the plan highlights the importance of regional cooperation, cooperation with the business community and international cooperation.

*The Walkable City: Stockholm City Plan* (2010) is the comprehensive plan for the city. It also contains guidelines for how Stockholm should develop but is more specific, yet flexible. A planner for the City described it as a “flexible game plan” (B, 2012). It is reviewed during every mandate period and is designed to be more responsive to changing conditions. The plan underlines the importance of environmental and climate issues. In meeting these challenges, there is an emphasis on energy efficient buildings, a strong transit system that emphasises public transport, walking and cycling. The importance of preserving and in some cases improving the city’s green and blue spaces is also discussed. Additionally, the importance of new energy solutions and infrastructure improvements is noted. In terms of urban development, the intensification of activities in the city centre and the strengthening of urban cores is seen as a way to foster greater resource efficiency in the city’s urban form.

Finally, the City recently released the *Stockholm Environment Programme 2012-2015* (2012a). There are six core goals, all of which correlate with the above mentioned plans. The goals are to promote environmentally efficient transport; to ensure that goods and buildings are free of dangerous substances; to promote and increase sustainable energy use; ensure sustainable use of land and water; treat waste with minimal environmental impact and to promote healthy indoor environments.

### ***Key actors and institutions***

The City of Stockholm plays a central role in urban development and resource efficiency, in large part due to its significant land ownership and a planning monopoly within its territory. The City of Stockholm can be broken down into a series of connected, but not always cooperating, actors. Relevant to this case study are the following departments; Development Office (*Exploateringskontoret*), the City Building Office (*Stadsbyggnadskontoret*), the Traffic Office (*Trafikkontoret*) and the executive board (*Stadsledningskontoret*). Further, each department has a board made up of elected municipal politicians. Larger projects, such as Stockholm Royal Seaport also have a steering group, which consists of a number of decision-makers from the aforementioned departments, as well as public authorities. It should be noted that there are other actors, such as the Stockholm Beauty Council (*Stockholms Skönhetsråd*) who is concerned with maintaining and developing the city’s urban design. Beyond the City, key private actors include development companies including Skanska and NCC (Nordic Construction Company), architecture and planning companies like White Architecture and Spacescape, as well as firms that deal with a number of aspects of urban development, including engineering, architecture and planning, like Sweco. Further, grassroots organizations with an interest in Stockholm’s development include YIMBY (Yes In My BackYard) and Samfundet St. Erik. The regional planning office (TMR) and the public transit authority (SL) also have roles of varying importance within Stockholm’s municipal boundaries. Many of these actors were interviewed during the course of our research.

## **2 Integrating policy sectors**

There are several important aspects to consider in the integration of policy sectors in Stockholm. The city planning departments have considerable responsibility for dealing with the complexity of urban planning in a municipality with more than 870 000 residents and currently experiencing a growth rate of more than 10% (Statistics Sweden, 2012). The interaction and integration between the various actors within

the City is thus important to consider. Further, the expanding role of private actors, and the interactions between them, is an important part of territorial governance for resource efficiency in Stockholm. It is also important to note that through the course of our research, the dominance of the economic factor was underlined time after time in terms of urban development in Stockholm, while the environment was deemed to be paramount in Stockholm Royal Seaport.

### ***Different motivations limit cross-sectoral synergies***

The city planning department is divided into four somewhat autonomous divisions. In addition to development, building and traffic (also responsible for waste management); the respective city districts have their own oversight, though, based on the interviews, they appear to have a more limited role in this case. For decades, the departments have operated quite distinctly from one another and while there have been recent efforts to reduce barriers between these divisions, this modernist heritage remains evident today (B, 2012). Further, changes in political direction at City Hall can have an impact on the trajectory of planning and development in Stockholm. Through the interviews, it became apparent that the silo effect continues to pervade urban planning at the City of Stockholm in large part because of the size of each department and the complexity of the issues at hand. There are internal politics in each department; each is positioning itself in regards to other departments. Additionally, the politicians have a role, but are also separated (G; D, 2012; E, 2013).

A key challenge here is the sequential process in which urban development decisions are taken. In the standard situation, proposals, usually initiated by either the City or developers, are assessed based on their economic feasibility and profitability by the Development Office, which is responsible for City-owned land (most of the available land in the territory). If the transfer of land rights, for up to two years prior to development, is approved, the issue of building and design quality is subsequently addressed by the City Building Office. This results in a disparity in decision making power between departments and reduces considerations about building and design quality, both important aspects to achieving resource efficiency. Within this so-called “Stockholm model”, the central actor on the side of the city is the Development Office, which follows a purely economic logic (F, G, 2012). A challenge that results from this model is that economics are thus considered prior to quality. Most urban development projects are expected to be “self-feeding”, which means that in addition to meeting the City’s general strategic requirements, the City should not incur any debt in selling the land and establishing the infrastructure (B, 2012). This means development is likely to occur where the city can make an immediate return, and not necessarily where resource efficiency standards are best met. Finally, the Traffic Office focuses almost exclusively on roads and mobility (G, 2012; E, 2013), limiting connections, and thus positive externalities for resource efficiency, between mobility and the built form.

### ***Policy Packaging for resource efficient urban development applied inconsistently***

The need for integration and a more holistic approach to urban development is recognized in SRS, as well as other prominent projects. In recent cases of this nature, the city executive has strongly encouraged departments to cooperate. This top-down process is evident in projects that have widespread public and political attention. In addition to Stockholm Royal Seaport, this was exemplified by a project in the central business district (CBD) where the Executive Office took charge because the City felt it was too

important a project for a department with a specific disciplinary focus to be responsible for (E, 2013). In Stockholm Royal Seaport, the area's designation as Stockholm's newest eco-district ensured that quality was considered simultaneously with economics. This was underlined by a planner from the City Building Office, working in Stockholm Royal Seaport, who felt coordination between public authorities in different sectors had been quite strong (F, 2012). They also described how quality issues were addressed quite early, something that is not a standard practice: "Because Stockholm Royal Seaport is special, a series of environmental requirements were established that developers needed to agree too." Something that took place early in the process, as a vision for the area was formed (F, 2012). However, the requirements also illustrate the continued barriers to integration between sectors, where the requirements dealt primarily with environmental issues, rather than economic or social, which were harder for the City to define technically (F, 2012). Finally, Stockholm Royal Seaport illustrates how a project's prominence, and thus political interest, can influence its aims. A flagship projects like Stockholm Royal Seaport is not expected to be economically 'self-feeding' (at least in the short term), as it also serves to promote Stockholm's environmental profile while ostensibly providing a best practice for the City and private actors to follow for continued urban development. It is only through political support that a project does not need to make rapid economic returns within the paradigm of the politically approved Stockholm Model (E; I, 2013).

The contrast between flagship projects such as Stockholm Royal Seaport and more typical developments was mentioned in a number of interviews. Approval for a project is formally a political decision, but in Stockholm, the directors of the two departments, particularly the Development Office, are quite powerful in preparing the decision making procedure. While it is more likely that politicians show an interest for flagship projects, smaller ones are dealt with almost solely by the planning administration. From a developer's perspective, this means that it is important to know the right persons (I, 2013).

Our original hypothesis was that resource efficiency and environmental sustainability, by-and-large, was something that was being promoted by a range of actors. Through discussions with stakeholders, it has become increasingly evident that while all parties are aware of the benefits of being perceived as leaders in environmentally sustainable development, economics plays an overriding role. As illustrated above, this is even the case for the City of Stockholm in many projects; however they remain the strongest force in promoting resource efficiency. As one stakeholder noted, "In terms of environmental standards, the City is driving it. And the developers understand that there can be benefits, but are also more reluctant due to the higher costs. It can be more difficult for developers to motivate the sustainability aims." (D, 2012). This stated in even more blunt terms by someone from a development firm, who stated "Sure if the money is there we try to build 'green'." (I, 2013).

### ***The growing role of private actors in integrating policy-sectors***

Hence although the City plays an essential role in territorial governance for resource efficiency, it is easy to recognize that private actors have taken an increasingly proactive role in integrating policy sectors dealing with this issue and more generally with urban development. As two interviewees from an architecture company (increasingly dealing with urban development projects as well) remarked about their own firm, "There is a good culture for sharing ideas in projects here. There is also a requirement



that every project has an environmental specialist present at the first meeting.” (D, 2012). A trend towards a more proactive approach to planning is also evident among developers as well. This reflects the efforts of private actors, developers in particular, to fill the void in the two step – economic, then quality – Stockholm Model, by ‘selling’ their development proposals as thought out contributions to Stockholm’s built form. In doing so, private actors can play a greater role in shaping the detailed plan and quality aspects of their prospective development. They also have a greater opportunity to shape the rules and frames of a project. Once parameters such as density, population and work spaces are established, they tend to remain fairly consistent throughout a project; early involvement gives developers a larger role in setting these parameters (E, 2013). One interviewee elaborated on this type of situation. “We worked with a big developer that owns a lot of land around the Central Station (Centralen). They basically created their own urban planning and sustainability strategy to develop that land. We try to work strategically with the sustainability strategies from the Cities, but it’s particularly interesting when a developer creates a strategy (and sets higher requirements than what the national laws and even the City require).” (D, 2013).

### **3 Coordinating the actions of actors and institutions**

Complex urban systems consist of a diversity of actors and institutions, with sometimes similar and sometimes competing aims and perspectives. The previous chapter went into considerable detail regarding the internal working logics and interactions of the City of Stockholm’s planning apparatus. These activities are also central to how the actions of various actors and institutions are coordinated; there is no need to rehash the previous chapter however. As a result, interactions among the City’s respective planning bodies will be considered to a more limited extent here. Rather, this chapter will focus on the relations and dealings between the City and private actors (primarily developers). Here, strategic documents and the way decisions about how urban development takes place are central. The role of civil society actors in Stockholm’s urban development will also be explored.

The City’s relationship with private actors, and large developers in particular, strongly influences efforts to promote resource efficiency in Stockholm. The context in which these interactions take place has undergone a considerable shift in recent years, something that continues to this day. This shift results primarily from a national, but also municipal, political focus on liberalization, away from the traditional welfare state; and Stockholm’s population growth, which has led to an acute housing shortage. Efforts at liberalization are reflected in the Stockholm Model, which emphasizes the City’s need for immediate economic returns for most urban development projects. Such efforts are also evident in the increasing prominence of private developers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, they are taking larger roles in Stockholm’s urban development, as well as going beyond their traditional scope, exemplified by a growing role in planning. The position large developers have in Stockholm’s development is also bolstered by population growth. In responding to the acute housing shortage, the governing coalition has promised that 20 000 new dwellings will be constructed during their current mandate period, a goal that, within the context of liberalization, necessitates a large role from private developers. The need to encourage dwelling construction by private developers limits the City’s power, which given their

dominance in the ownership of available land and an official monopoly on planning, would otherwise be very strong, in this relationship.

### ***Contested and shifting leadership***

One of the most interesting aspects of our research in this dimension were the contrasting perspectives on leadership in urban development in Stockholm. Several individuals we spoke to felt that the current dynamics were very much in favour of large developers, while others felt that the city continued to have a strong leadership role. During the course of the study, the multifaceted nature of the relationship between developers and the City arose time and time again.

There is a great deal of tactical strategy going on between developers and the City, which can also involve other stakeholders as well. Interactions of this nature often entail a combination of urban planning strategy, in addition to political and personal interactions. (A, D, I). Developers tend to be in a strong economic position vis-à-vis relations with the City. Not only do they finance most of the building costs, but also by paying to create plans, which as previously mentioned, was something dealt with almost exclusively by the City. Conversely, the City has maintained its monopoly on planning, whereby they can reject a plan for a vast range of reasons. This situation is further complicated by a lack of standardization for how decisions are made for all projects. This increases the capacity for strong personalities, on all sides, to influence specific project outcomes; something that further reduces consistency between projects (A, D, E, G, I).

Planners working for the City also felt that the planning administration remained in a strong position. “The planning architect from the Development Office is (formally) leading meetings to develop specific parcels of land and thus is a powerful position. Of course his or her leadership is contested in particular by the developers. We of course are powerful due to the planning monopoly and that we have to take care that the process is going according to the rules/policy documents.” (B, 2012 - translation)

Regardless of which actors are leading development in Stockholm, most interviewees felt that there was a lack of consistency in the City’s application of strategic objectives in practice, to the detriment of the city’s urban development. For most actors we spoke with, this variation resulted from a number of factors, including the lack of specific steps and measures for achieving the City’s strategic aims for urban development, the time consuming and costly process, public and political interest in the project and the personalities in charge of the respective projects.

### ***A lack of consistency in urban policies limits the coordination of concerted actions between the City and private actors***

From the City’s perspective the comprehensive plan, *The Walkable City*, encourages flexibility, while *Vision 2030* provides a general long term outlook that all of the major parties supported, thus helping to adapt to political changes at election time (City of Stockholm, 2012 & 2007). More critical perspectives were shared by other actors, however. Of particular interest to resource efficient urban development was the issue of clarity for how strategic aims are concretely applied to projects (D, E, G). “In Stockholm, the City has worked well at defining profiles for a number of areas (like Royal Seaport). They work very

hard in such areas but much less so in others with lower profiles. There are significant differences between projects.” They continued, “You don’t see equal efforts from the City to promote sustainability. It’s emphasized much more in Royal Seaport than in other, less prestigious, developments.” (D). Difficulties in integrating the goals of the environmental programme more widely and consistently appear to stem from the emphasis on immediate economic solvency (A). One positive step in favour of greater resource efficiency was the City’s recent increase in energy standards to 55 kWh per sqm. in all new developments.

The general inconsistency between projects, combined with the politically driven requirement for more dwellings, allows developers more flexibility to say the right things in the right way, with less emphasis on actually achieving the City’s strategic aims. This flexibility is enhanced by the fact that the plan, *The Walkable City*, is not legally binding. Developers can use window dressing and the right wording to meet city aims without actually contributing positively to urban environment, or being held accountable (A, G). As one interviewee noted, “There’s so many creative and legal people involved in all these plans, it’s easy to have one or two pages at the start of these plans to just say and motivate how the proposal is part of the city or regional plan. But you can still put a row house enclave right in an urban development zone. It doesn’t really match reality.” (G). From the interviews, we gathered that high profile projects have a great deal of political interest, and in the case of eco-districts such as Hammarby Sjöstad and Stockholm Royal Seaport, support. Further, such projects serve to promote Stockholm’s green profile in European and global settings. This increases the likelihood that private actors will be interested in the marketing benefits of being involved in such projects, and thus more willing to meet higher standards, in addition to the revenue such projects can generate.

This political support, coupled with the strong interest of private actors in these projects ensures that the City has a stronger position in such cases, something underlined by a planner working in Stockholm Royal Seaport, “We knew it was a good place to build, so we approached developers. It was easy to sell the land we wanted to sell (F, translation). This dichotomy between more ‘standardized’ projects and the flagship projects further underlines the lack of consistency in the City’s efforts at urban development. It also supports the notion that the City lacks a strong idea for urban development in Stockholm (D, E).

### ***Transparent distribution of power and influence among actors and institutions***

Also the importance of the lead planner from the City on a project was underlined during several conversations as well. “I’m still a bit amazed, when talking about dominance, that the planner responsible has so much to say. If there’s a strong personality, and I think this is heritage from the modernist era, when the architect was this ‘genius’ that had solutions for everything. But I’m amazed that if you look at the plans that become physical, there is lots of power for the planner themselves.” (E). The variation in how the planner guides a process, the political support the project enjoys, and their relationship with private actors influence the outcome and from a citywide perspective, reduce the outwardly perceived consistency between projects in Stockholm.

Efforts to coordinate the actions of actors and institutions in Stockholm Royal Seaport went further than in many other developments in Stockholm, according to a planner working in the area. Here, developers

have been more involved in many aspects of the project throughout the process. Making detailed plans for the area has involved a broader range of actors as well. To this end, the district (borough) administration has been involved with planning for schools, amongst other things; the traffic office continues to deal with a number of issues, including parking and cycling, while the county (regional) administration been involved with certain legal aspects of the development (F). However, citizen engagement took place quite late; something that was attributed to the legal framework for development, which is considered an inhibitor to public participation (A, F, G).

### ***How to better integrate actors and institutions: the case of Stockholm Royal Seaport***

As regards the case of Stockholm Royal Seaport, one can note at first that overall, there are about 40 different developers and similar number of architecture companies involved (F). Many meetings have been organized so far with the developers, discussing strategic issues such as how the development will look, as well as more detailed aspects, such as how what will be included in specific greenspaces (F). Other initiatives are also taking place in Stockholm Royal Seaport, including a competence program for the developers and architects. Through lectures and seminars, private actors, together with the city, look at issues that affect construction and architecture (F). It is also noteworthy that few factors influence urban development patterns, and thus resource efficiency, to the extent that transport planning does. In Stockholm Royal Seaport, it is the municipality who clearly leads the question what kind of public transport is suitable (C, F). This isn't the case for all public transport projects in Stockholm, however.

Also a technical requirement list for environmentally sustainable development, alluded to earlier, was created and included in legally binding contracts with private actors. Consequently a significant number of relevant actors were included in drafting the requirement list, including Stockholm Vatten, the waste authority, which falls under the Traffic office, and SL (F). Developers were involved fairly early, but there feedback was more limited, focusing on what they considered realistic or challenging among the requirements. There was no open engagement here because the requirements are so technical (F)

Other small arenas for coordination between many actors have developed as well. The regional planning office, which has developed one of only a handful of regional plans in Sweden, is encouraging municipalities to talk with one another, identifying common objectives and challenges. Conferences and other planning related events are also occurring. A good illustration of this type of arena was an exhibit at a multifaceted community, culture and discussion centre, Färgfabriken, called Stockholm at Large. This exhibition helped to broaden the urban development discussion while also making it more inclusive. "It was quite an eye opener for the Stockholm planning community, with the concept 'Hey, let's talk about planning, whoever you are.'" (E). Developers, architects and others became involved, promoting a more integrated approach to Stockholm's development. Conferences and events such as this help to break through formal structures and institutional barriers; enabling a wider exchange of ideas and critical analysis. Given its scope, scale and high profile, Stockholm Royal Seaport was identified for having the potential to be an arena for people from different disciplines to meet and discuss related issues as well.

## **4 Mobilising stakeholder participation**

Several actors underlined the fact that there is currently a big opportunity for engagement in Stockholm because the population is extremely engaged in urban development here (B, D, E, G). This is evident in the local media, where planning debates figure prominently in the news cycle. It is also illustrated by hands-on activities, such as high attendance rates at town hall meetings and urban development exhibitions. It is also important to point out that the debate is quite polarized, although one interviewee felt that this was something that the media sought to play up (G). Important for this discussion; there is no doubt that there are strong opinions, represented by a number of grassroots organizations, with a range of perspectives. This high level of engagement offers considerable possibilities for greater participation in shaping Stockholm's development; however such efforts have been quite challenging thus far.

### ***Securing legitimacy through participative democracy – a central challenge***

A central challenge in terms of communication and stakeholder mobilization are the barriers inherent to Swedish building law. There are formal rules for engagement in the detailed plans. However, this happens later in the process, once the decision-making process has come quite far (A, B, E, F, G). This is underlined by the fact that there is no formal requirement for the involvement of concerned stakeholders while either the Development Office or Building Office are considering plans, thus leading to situations where stakeholders are informed rather than consulted (A, 2013). This is the source of considerable frustration for many stakeholders seeking to be engaged in development (Reardon, 2010). The existing system ensures that many of the decisions regarding development are made prior to public involvement because, "There is a lot of public consultation rather late in the process. There are a lot of decisions that are made very early, when you don't have the structures for public consultation and meetings. When we had these formal consultations (mandated in the act), the planning process had gone rather far." This can lead to frustration on both sides, whereby members of the public would like to have greater input, while municipal officials would prefer to move forward, something illustrated by planners involved in the process (K), who stated that "I think that is a hard thing to communicate with the public, what decisions have already been made and what is open for discussion." (Reardon, 2010).

### ***Transparency is restricted by the prevailing complexity***

Further, the mobilization process is restricted by the complexity of the projects at hand. Only inhabitants who are really interested normally take part in this, as such efforts require a lot of knowledge and reading. In the wider context of development within the territory, it was also noted that, "Stockholm is doing a lot, but I think it is important to communicate as well the big picture, how Stockholm as such will develop and not only project by project." (H). This further contributes to a lack of outward consistency in how projects are carried out within the territory. There is evidence that the City is working to enhance participation however. In larger or more strategic projects, the City of Stockholm has introduced new participation approaches before starting the formal planning process (including comprehensive opinion surveys, distribution of brochures, partly also with social media like Facebook). This is voluntary and goes beyond what is legally required (B). The cost of carrying out these processes is regarded as the number one reason that such efforts do not take place in smaller projects (B). This suggests that the City has

good intentions in promoting citizen engagement and participatory planning; however it also underlines the variation between projects and also a division between “larger or more strategic projects” and others.

A critical focus on the City’s efforts is sharpened by local grassroots organizations that have a strong interest in Stockholm’s development. YIMBY and Samfundet St. Erik are two well-known groups that frequently voice their opinions and make efforts to influence Stockholm’s development. YIMBY, which stands for Yes In My BackYard is logically an organization that seeks to demonstrate that there are pro-development stakeholders in Stockholm, adding a perspective that had not figured prominently in the urban development debate prior to their creation a decade ago. Conversely, Samfundet St Erik tends to focus on preserving Stockholm’s traditional built form. The organization often cooperates with the City Museum (Stadsmuseet) and the Stockholm Beauty Council (Skönhetsrådet), where common views are prevalent. Beyond these organizations, there are a host of smaller groups that are often focused on a very local area and/or a specific issue that work to lobby for specific outcomes. Of particular note are a number of environmental groups that work to safeguard the city’s natural beauty and promote other environmental aims that often relate to improving the city’s resource efficiency, including Förbundet Ekoparken, an umbrella organization that represents 48 smaller groups, Kristinebergs Strandparks Vänner, which looks to restore Kristineberg Park to its natural state and Djurgården – Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening, which looks to improve living, working and public spaces in the Djurgården – Lilla Värtan area (Södermalmsnytt, 2012). A spokesman from a grassroots organization we spoke to underlined the importance of trying to engage the City as well as the media “It’s important for us as outsiders to clearly state what we want be proactive. We have much more influence in the arena of public opinion.” (G). Here, grassroots organizations work to express themselves through the press, promoting transparency, communication and a greater public role in decision-making. In this context, Stockholm’s media plays an important in shaping the debate, but it was particularly interesting to note that the local neighbourhood papers, circulated for free in their respective districts, play an important role in disseminating information (D).

### ***A lack of public accountability***

There was also concern about the level of accountability of the decision making process for urban development. Within the decision making process, citizens and politicians don’t often get to choose between projects. Rather, they tend to only here about the one idea from civil servants at Development Office and Building Office, who have identified the proposals that should be brought before the politicians. As a result democratic representatives are not often given multiple choices for one site, but rather the option to accept or reject a plan. An interviewee also underlined the opacity that pervades development projects in Stockholm, “The underlying problem is the ‘anonymity of power’, since the inhabitants who then live in these neighbourhoods have no one to address their concerns, questions etc. There is no e-mail address or telephone number to question who has planned and decided that Tensta (a suburban million homes program) is as it is today. And the only response to this is by politicians to say, well vote another one next time.” (A).

### ***Better stakeholder mobilization and transparency practices in Stockholm Royal Seaport***

In Stockholm Royal Seaport opposition to the development was not assuaged with early, and legally mandated, efforts at participation. Discomfort was primarily centred on the development's proximity to Royal National Urban Park, the threat to the area's ecological diversity, the affect that the development would have on outdoor recreation in the area and the preservation of the historic gasworks buildings (Reardon, 2010). In response to the opposition, the city chose to embark on a strategy of greater cooperation with area residents and other concerned stakeholders in 2007. Beyond this, the manner in which such engagement took place was altered to create an atmosphere whereby information could be more easily diffused and concerns addressed (Reardon, 2010).

The first step in this renewed process, and in the development of the plan for the Hjorthagen section of Stockholm Royal Seaport, was to hold an open house information session, an event that was attended by approximately 170 people (Claesson, 2009). In doing so, the aim was to better inform interested and concerned parties of the development plans (Reardon, 2010). At that meeting, those who were interested in the more intricate plans were given the opportunity to participate in a more detailed roundtable discussion (K). Shortly thereafter, the planners themselves were invited to participate in a meeting held by an environmental group with an interest in the area. Subsequent to the roundtable discussion, another open house was conducted to further develop the findings of the previous meetings and to inform other interested parties of what had transpired (Reardon, 2010). Finally, these meetings also served to underline the need from the planners' perspective to better present and inform the public of their plans, something that led to a mail survey involving the residents of Hjorthagen, Gärdet and Lidingö and to several walking tours of the development area (Claesson, 2009).

From the perspective of the municipal development team, the biggest benefits of the participatory process will be recognized once the area is completed (Reardon, 2010). They emphasized the fact that there has been a significant focus on connecting the newly built area with its existing surroundings and feel that this objective may not have been successfully realized in the planning stages if there had not been a constructive dialogue with area residents (Reardon, 2010). Further, in promoting more stakeholder involvement, relations between the municipality and the public were improved and as planners involved in the process stated, "We in some way built up a trust that was rather damaged before."

In conclusion, we can easily recognize again a lack of consistency between urban development projects. It was argued by a number of the interviewed key informants that the City is trying to develop different methods of dialogue with stakeholders and the public, but there is no structure that can be carried out from one project to the next. To resolve this, the city could have more standardized measures for engagement. As one interviewee noted, "There are too many experiments on dialogue in Stockholm and it depends so heavily on the planner responsible. They need a well systemized and structured way of doing it." (E).

## 5 Being adaptive to changing contexts

Through the course of our study, it became clear that there were no institutionalised mechanisms for reflection of adaptation. This is due in large part to a firm belief in long term population growth and demand for housing. It also suggests that the City can weather an economic downturn (D, F, G 2012; A, 2013).

### ***Weak reflexivity, but some signs of knowledge transfer between urban development projects***

Also in terms of learning and reflection, a lack of consistency between projects was once again highlighted as an issue, “My experiences are that the city is rather bad at learning from its mistakes. Much is determined by the personalities involved in specific projects.” (D, translate). Through the course of the study, it was also gathered that the City of Stockholm is heavily focused on ongoing projects, but that there were no standardized routines for feedback or process evaluations to distill lessons that could be transferred (I). It also became clear that as with other aspects of a project, experimentation was dependent on the planner responsible, who then needed permission from the City’s Real Estate Office (Fastighetskontoret), which decides if money can specifically be allocated for “unusual planning procedures” (B). Finally, a private actor felt that a risk adverse culture within the City’s planning administration was a challenge, “I don’t think there’s much room to take risk or experiment with the City. Companies like us have money available for researching new ideas. But it’s very difficult to push new ideas. There seems to be a culture to do things the same old way.” (D, translation).

It was also noted that even in the case of flagship projects, the City moves on fairly quickly. This was illustrated in Hammarby Sjöstad by the creation of HS2020, a community group in the district that was started by a local resident who is also a former national Minister of Finance. He created HS2020 as a response to the perceived shortsightedness of planning in Hammarby Sjöstad, arguing that development is an ongoing process and that such a perspective would allow the eco-district to sustain its globally recognized success if such a position were adopted (HS2020, 2013). The City’s fairly short term perspective towards projects is underlined by the fact that residents are organizing themselves to deal with these issues despite the fact that construction in Hammarby Sjöstad is not expected to be complete until 2017.

According to a planner in Stockholm Royal Seaport, there has been some knowledge transferring however, “You can say that we’ve learned a fair amount from Hammarby Sjöstad. In terms of being goal oriented and having a fairly long term perspective, but it wasn’t really a model to build a community on. We’ve added the requirements and people can also write in with proposals, which hasn’t been the standard process.” (F, translation). Further, as was the case in Hammarby Sjöstad, “parallel sketches” are being applied in SRS. Here, each proposal that the developer’s make needs two or three alternatives, ensuring that multiple visions for each block are considered before determining the final outcome (F, 2012). This helps to promote a diverse and high quality built environment, while also providing an opportunity to promote the project’s democratic legitimacy, given that, as mentioned above, politicians and the public are often given only one plan to make a decision on.



Reflecting on what has been learned in Stockholm Royal Seaport, it was noted that “We’ve learned that it’s important to have a good dialogue with those already living in the area. We’ve also worked to refine the requirements, either because we missed something or because they weren’t applicable. We will reevaluate the requirements throughout the life of the project.” (F, translation). A planner in Stockholm Royal Seaport also described at length how challenges to the urban development process there were dealt with. “We have a hierarchy. We have a leadership group with the Building Office, the Development Office and five other representatives including a representative from Hjorthagen, the existing neighbourhood in the Stockholm Royal Seaport district, and the Traffic Office. So far, we haven’t had any major challenges that couldn’t be worked out within the group. But if the issue was very sharp, or involved a broader range of actors, education in the area for example, then the issue would be sent to our director. We have a steering group for Royal Seaport. In this steering group, we have all of the directors for the public authorities: the Building Office, the Development Office, Stockholm Harbour (Stockholmshamnar), the Environmental Office (Miljöförvaltningar), the Traffic Office, the local district administration, and representatives from the public housing companies Stadshus AB and Allmännyttan. At this level, we have a rather broad and strong group. It’s quite big.” (F, translation). They also noted that the Building Office has a small project to look at how this decision making body can be applied in other projects, but that currently, the organizational intensity required for such efforts is limited to large projects that are of particular public and political interest (F, 2012). This indicates that efforts are being undertaken to promote learning and knowledge exchange to a greater extent. For the time being, this appears to be limited to Stockholm’s flagship projects, but steps are being taken to consider how this learning and coordination can take place in smaller projects as well.

#### ***Limited capacity for adaptability, but some signs of knowledge transfer between projects***

An academic with a great deal of experience in many aspects of Stockholm’s urban development over the last half century adopted a long term, and critical, perspective on the importance of being adaptive to changing contexts and the current growth paradigm. “I think the whole issue about the enormous growth in Stockholm is discussed in a too simple manner, namely just in a way to build new dwellings. Some municipalities are criticised because they do not want to grow, such as Lidingö or Danderyd. So they do not want to take responsibility. Other municipalities eventually remember the sudden decrease in population from one month after the other in 1971 after the ‘record years’. I would also say that the municipalities in the south, Botkyrka, Huddinge etc., remember this and are a bit more cautious. I would say there is too little capacity for reflection; we are too stuck in the growth euphoria and almost take for granted the forecast of endless growth, instead of being more cautious. I think it is possible that we could see an abrupt turnaround as in 1971 again. A part of this blind discourse is also the argumentation that Stockholm is the engine for all of Sweden.” (A, translation).

#### ***Concluding notes***

A lack of reflection and adaptation was also evident at the regional level. Here, the Regional Planning Office does not have a way to evaluate internal institutional learning, or routines for feedback loops (J). Further, there are no specific routines for absorbing new information or to evaluate how municipalities are performing in regards to achieving the regional plan. There is also little in the way of knowledge

intake at the public transit authority (SL); however in SL's case, they do create multiple plans, thereby providing greater variation in potential project outcomes to their decision makers (C).

Through the course of our research, it has become clear that there is very little in the way of institutionalized mechanisms for adaptation or reflection in Stockholm, in regards to resource efficiency or otherwise. By addressing this issue, the City could improve urban development in Stockholm, while increasing the consistency between projects and enhancing economic certainty about development projects. This is a significant opportunity for the City that is ignored at the peril of Stockholm's development trajectory.

## **6 Realising place-based/territorial specificities and impacts**

At first, it is important to note that the City of Stockholm is a small territory by Swedish standards, something that increases the need for interaction with neighbouring municipalities who are also part of Stockholm's urban morphological form. Further, this means that there is only limited room for further greenfield development, putting a greater onus on densification efforts for accommodating population growth. At the regional level, Stockholm county (Stockholms län) includes 26 municipalities. Therefore, considerable effort is necessary to coordinate activities between these various levels of governments.

### ***Territorial relationality – container versus network approach***

However, it was felt that Stockholm's cooperation with neighbouring municipalities is under developed. While there are examples of cooperation (e.g. Kista-Sollentunna, Stockholm-Huddinge, Bromma-Sundbyberg), there seems to be little individual capacity for strategic regional thinking within the various administrative departments within the Stockholm municipality (B). The strong decision making capacity that municipalities enjoy in Sweden, best illustrated in this case by a planning monopoly within their territories, which was described as 'sacred', challenges coordination and cooperation as well. This results from the fact that a number of larger urban development projects (e.g. large retail centres) are dealt with by only a single municipality (A, H). In addition, inter-municipal cooperation between the City of Stockholm and its neighbours is further challenged by various, sometimes conflicting, municipal development strategies. Some want to grow and have rather aggressive plans for more densification, while others are happy to maintain their current population and thus do not contribute to the immense need for housing in the region, or the related provision of social and economic services (A, B and I). This inevitably leads to a number of tensions among the municipalities. Yet the strategic regional development plan (RUF 2010) suggests many areas for further densification, which are based on a number of investigations together with the municipalities and criteria (close to Public Transport, but maintaining green wedges, cultural heritage etc.). As a matter of fact, many of them are close to or just on municipal borders. However, due to its non-binding character, this policy document cannot be used to align strategic municipal land-use planning within the Stockholm region. It is designed to support regional consensus-building and inter-municipal cooperation, but, as admitted by a number of interviewees, it is in many cases rather weak to restrict the municipal planning monopoly (A, B, C and I). However, criticism of municipal coordination efforts by the City of Stockholm should be qualified by the

fact that they were described as a willing partner who took an active role in financing some regional efforts (B, E).

In this light, it has been also mentioned that SL, the regional public transport agency, follows a different territorial logic when it comes to determining the nodes and axes for future development compared to the regional development plan (RUFS 2010) (A, B, C, F and J). Also on the neighbourhood level, a kind of territorial blindness has been criticised, since in terms of the provision of public transport the Stockholm Royal Seaport project has been solely discussed in a more narrow municipal perspective, instead of considering it in a more systemic, larger regional context (C). As a result, it appears that the capacity for territorial relationality to overcome the functional barriers of municipal jurisdictions is hard to conceive in this case. A more soft or functional understanding of urban planning is restricted by the strong tradition of local government. This is insofar surprising, since Stockholm and Gothenburg are the only Swedish metropolitan areas with a comprehensive regional planning programme. In addition, the above described challenges in terms of population growth and resource efficient solutions for urban planning would require a network approach to governance.

#### ***Utilising territorial knowledge – to some extent***

In regards the utilisation of multiple sources of territorial knowledge, a consensus could be observed among the interviewees. Nearly every interviewee stated that a number of ex-ante evaluations are integrated to support the planning and decision-making process, but that ex-post assessments are rather exceptional. This applies to various aspects of urban development, including territorial, social, economic or environmental, but also public transport. One reason is obviously that the first is of higher political interest and eventually less problematic in case such evaluations prove any negative (territorial) impacts, another one is the lack of resources and the rush to approach the next project. In this light it has been also criticised that developing the city predominantly on a project by project basis also encourages NIMBYism, since people are more concerned with single processes instead of a larger territorial (G.).

On a more positive note, both through our research and wider experiences, it is clear that Stockholm has a strong urban planning culture in general. Almost every week numerous workshops, forums and other events take place. Further, due to the planning monopoly and the fact that the city owns lots of land, there are numerous opportunities for making a comprehensive territorial strategies, in particular regarding resource efficient urban planning that is not only focused on some specific spots and projects (such as the Stockholm Royal Seaport one) within the city (A, E).

One specific issue seems to be the different territorial mind sets within the city's planning authority. The tensions between the physical planners within the Development Office, who follow a more project and design-based approach and the more strategic planners within the Building Office, who have a more holistic perspective in mind (A, B, I).

Stockholm Royal Seaport was again mentioned as a positive example, since here numerous forums and platforms have been installed to bring together various experts, in particular architects and the developer, to discuss various possibilities as regards a more resource efficient approach to urban

planning (B, C, F, H, I). The project also harnesses Stockholm's (if not Sweden's) strong environmental profile. In other words, the mobilisation of expert knowledge (at least to verify the positive impacts of the project) has to be also considered in the light of Stockholm's strive to promote itself internationally as a Green City (A, D, H).

## 7 Conclusions

The case study has given numerous insights into the territorial governance practices related to urban planning in Stockholm in general and one flagship-project, Stockholm Royal Seaport (SRS) in particular. The fact that a project that we hypothesized to be illustrative of how projects take place in Stockholm has had to be considered distinctly from wider urban development efforts, which highlights the lack of consistency between projects in the city. This lack of consistency appears to be the most significant territorial governance challenge that limits the City's capacity to promote greater resource efficiency. A silver lining to this finding is that Stockholm Royal Seaport demonstrates the City does in fact have the territorial governance capacity and competencies to achieve greater resource efficiency and that there is a strong potential for a greater exchange of learning experiences between projects.

Stockholm Royal Seaport demonstrates that there is political will to develop urban projects that are characterised by a high degree of resource efficiency and that help to promote Stockholm's green profile internationally. The extent to which the ambitious resource efficiency standards, as well as other environmental standards, are applied elsewhere in the city is limited by economic considerations, however. This suggests that the implementation of urban projects in Stockholm is dependent on the political will to make debts in support of such interventions. The strong role enjoyed by the City because of its planning monopoly, through Swedish planning law, and augmented by the fact that the City of Stockholm (still) owns a lot of land, gives the City, in principle, a considerable scope for action. Despite these strengths in steering decision making, the City's role in setting environmental standards and principles for a project, is limited by an acute housing shortage, a high degree of liberalisation in Sweden and the 'Stockholm model', which requires direct economic solvency for the majority of projects. This has led to a situation where development leadership is contested on a nearly case by case basis that is influenced by a range of factors including a project's prominence and the personalities involved.

Within the City, a silo mentality, while diminishing, continues to limit efforts to promote resource efficiency and project quality more generally. Greater integration and coordination between various departments (and thus sectors) and their interests and rationales (e.g. to strive for more sustainability or to sell the land to the highest possible price), which has been encouraged top-down, can be taken further. Variation between projects in the dominance of specific public policies and/or sectors continues to limit the knowledge transfers and learning between projects. The same applies to other territorial governance indicators, which are closely intertwined, namely governing capacity and subsidiarity, although the latter is rather implicitly addressed here, since our analysis has only moved for the most part between two levels, the city as such and the neighborhood level (here exemplified by the Stockholm Royal Seaport project). It appears that the performance of these vary from case to case (ie. among the urban projects under consideration). As a general rule, we can recognize tensions between the

Development Office and the Building Office, which inevitably influences in particular the question of governance capacity and leadership. On a general note, it has been difficult to distinguish analytically the two dimensions “integrating policy sectors” and “coordinating the actions of actors and institutions” and the various related indicators of territorial governance, since they are strongly interconnected and apparently cannot be studied in isolation.

In terms of mobilizing stakeholder participation, we can conclude that, as expected, the city follows what is stipulated in Swedish Planning legislation. In specific projects, such as Stockholm Royal Seaport and certain others, the City made efforts to go beyond the business-as-usual approach by adding additional platforms, including more open hearings or social media for instance. Nonetheless, it seems that engagement and communication could go considerably further, something reflected in a number of interviews. This was also evident in the analysis of our three strongly intertwined indicators of (good) territorial governance in this respect (democratic legitimacy, public accountability and transparency), where the results were rather disappointing, particularly in regards to the latter two indicators. This is insofar not surprising, since the mobilization of stakeholder participation is often seen very critically in planning research in general, as the factual unbalanced distribution of knowledge and power among the various actors and institutions involved becomes obvious. Apparently, urban planning in Stockholm is thus no exception, since all interviewees agreed that much more could be done, although a further and more comprehensive mobilization would require inevitably more resources. On the other hand, we can observe a “strong mobilization from the ground” in terms of grassroots organisations and the media.

In the fourth dimension of territorial governance, a number of practices could be distilled that have to be assessed as well as rather negative. There are hardly any institutionalized mechanisms for adaptation or reflection in Stockholm – in regards to resource efficiency or otherwise. In terms of specific knowledge that should feed into the planning process, we can state that numerous ex-ante studies and evaluations are conducted to ‘oil the political machinery’, as one critical voice mentioned (A). Ex-post evaluations, any kinds of feedback-loops or the definition of alternative paths (the plan B) and fields for experimentation, amongst other things, are hardly common in this respect. Besides remarking on the scarce resources to implement such mechanisms, the majority of the interviewees pointed to the considerable time pressure to build new houses and infrastructure, because of the immense local and regional growth in Stockholm (at European standards). This suggests that a number of the interviewed stakeholders support increased capacity for being adaptive to changing contexts, but that this is dropped in favor of other priorities.

Finally, the results regarding the fifth dimension confirm earlier investigations regarding the limited capacity for inter-municipal coordination in Stockholm (see Schmitt et al. 2013). In addition, it became obvious that urban projects are considered rather in an isolated manner or at best within the municipality, but hardly in a regional context. The fact that ex-post analysis (e.g. regarding various territorial impacts) is scarcely used in urban planning work in Stockholm, suggests that the integration of specific territorial knowledge is somewhat limited too. In regards to the Stockholm Royal Seaport project, it has to be noted positively that it appears to be part of a well thought out strategy to promote Stockholm as a Green City internationally. We do not want to disqualify this as a simple marketing

campaign, rather we argue that positive territorial impacts (and the knowledge about it) stemming from a good example of resource-efficient urban development project needs to be disseminated. Only in this way can it feed into a debate how to transfer the good lessons into other contexts, be it in the same city or elsewhere. Also we want to add that the identified specific features of territorial governance in this dimension are closely intertwined with those related to reflexivity and adaptability aspects.

As a final note, we think that the individual capacities, attitudes, logics and routines are a bit overlooked in our research framework, which rather seeks to detect institutional practices. Throughout our interviews it was uttered many times for instance that the modernist planning tradition with its various implications (such as strong belief of the projectable society, appreciation of clear power-relations, the car as the norm for mobility and accessibility) has not withered away totally. Another example is the role of charismatic personalities in key positions (e.g. the head of the Development Office), which can, at least to some extent, influence certain governance practices and outcomes. The City of Stockholm has a number of strengths in regards to territorial governance for resource efficiency, something that is particularly well highlighted in Stockholm Royal Seaport; however more can be done to ensure that this goes beyond specific projects. Greater outward consistency can enhance resource efficiency, project economics, competitiveness and a host of other aspects that shape urban development.

## 8 Promoters and Inhibitors of Territorial Governance

### *Urban planning in Stockholm in general:*

#### Promoters:

- Synergies in focus in case it is a "good business" for both, the city and the investor.
- The City has a monopoly on urban planning, giving it a stronger position in developing and implementing strategies for resource efficient development.
- Decisions and negotiations are made at the project level, which makes them responsive to the project specificities.
- Sweden ranks consistently high for accountable government and very little corruption
- Individuals in positions of responsibility have an influence on the preparedness to follow new paths for urban planning. This can be both a promoter and an inhibitor.
- Municipalities have great deal of control over their jurisdictions due to their planning monopoly. Greater Stockholm is one of the few regions to have a regional plan in Sweden. It's informal and only indicative, but helps to coordinate at least a few activities between municipalities and thus to overcome hard boundaries.
- Successful in building a green profile. A green tech / clean tech cluster is emerging in Stockholm

#### Inhibitors:

- Economic rational dominates urban planning approach, which does not necessarily promote resource efficiency.
- Lack of consistency in how resource efficiency is achieved/promoted from one project to another.
- Strong variations regarding general governance procedures; apparently dependent on the project at hand.
- Leadership is contested and does not follow necessarily territorial goals.
- There is a lack of consistency in how decisions are made and how projects are carried out.
- Public participation is legally mandated, but occurs quite late in the development process, limiting opportunities to affect development trajectories.
- The representative democracy is limited by a bureaucracy that frequently makes decisions about what politicians see, limiting their choices. There is still a need for a more

standardized approach to public participation that can be transferred from one project to another.

- Public accountability is blurred or not given. Politicians are often vocal in opposition to a project, rarely so vocal in favour.
- Fairly short term interest in a project. Once a project ends, there is only limited, indirect accountability.
- The City is not particularly good at communicating publicly. Transparency is varying and thus dependent on the type of project.
- Social learning is limited, since any sorts of feedback loops to reflect on various components in urban planning (institutional, technical, instrumental etc.) are hardly installed.
- No mechanisms for adaptability because of a firm belief in continued population growth and demand for housing.
- Municipalities do not necessarily have the same aims (e.g. as regards to respond to the growing demand for housing). Zero-sum game mentality still evident to some extent.
- Limited use of existing territorial knowledge, in particular regarding ex-post analysis.
- Modernist planning traditions continue to influence urban development in Stockholm.

***As regards the Stockholm Royal Seaport (SRS) project:***

Promoters:

- Focus on an environmental rationale for the project; policies for various aspects of planning & resource efficiency are considered in concert, a clear goal.
- Political support; shared acceptance of the project aims; contributing to a common aim.
- The City had previous experiences with a similar project (Hammarby Sjöstad).
- Numerous stakeholders involved in discussions early on; Seminars for competence sharing; City in strong position with regard to developers.
- Leadership is clear and follows specific territorial goals.
- Decisions & negotiations are project specific. In SRS, this has led to more stringent requirements for resource efficiency. This reflects the environmental sustainability aims of SRS.
- Support from representative democracy has been important in achieving project success.



- As a flagship project, politicians are more involved (aware) of ongoing developments in SRS.
- Some accountability during the 20 year development process. Politicians can be defeated and planners and other decision-makers have professional accountability to a certain extent.
- Widespread public information campaign (after early opposition); Technical specification list makes aims clearer.
- Opportunities for social learning are (at least to some extent) given by additional layers of governance (e.g. steering groups) and more evaluations throughout the process.
- This project is considered within the context of Stockholm's aims at a Walkable City & densification.
- Harnesses Stockholm & Sweden's environmental profile; Promotes the development of a green tech/clean tech cluster.

Inhibitors:

- Swedish building law mandates public input late in the process (participatory democracy).
- Limited long term accountability. When a project ends (or in some cases even before), the focus shifts to "new" projects.
- Limited outward transparency in negotiations between City & developers and in decision-making within the City

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## List of Interviewees

A – Lennart Tonell, Stockholm University, Researcher (Urban Planning)/Local Politician (several years Member of the municipal Planning and Construction board), 10 January 2013

B – Michael Erman, City of Stockholm, Stads Byggnadskontoret, Urban Planner/Policy-maker, 20 December 2012 & April 25<sup>th</sup>, 2012

C – Tony Karlson, SL, Trafic Planner/Policy-maker, 20 December 2012

D – Johan Dahlberg & Petter Lindencrona, White Architecture, Environmental Consultant & Planning Architect, December 18, 2012.

E – Alexander Ståhle, Spacescape, Vice Director, January 8, 2013.

F – Anna Stina Bokander, City of Stockholm, Stads Byggnadskontoret, Urban Planner, Stockholm Royal Seaport, December 12, 2012

G – Gustav Svärd, YIMBY (Grassroots Organization), Spokesman, December 13, 2012

H – Anna Älgevik, Sweco (Sustainable engineering and Design), Environmental Consultant/Practitioner, 17 January 2013

I – Martin Bucht, Skanska (construction company), Business Development (here: appartments), 21 January 2013

J – Ulrika Palm, TMR (Office for Growth, Environment and Regionalplanning), Regional Planner/Policy-Maker, 19 December 2012

K - Jonas Claesson and Anna Haag (Planner at Exploateringskontoret and Project Leader at Stadsbyggnadskontoret (at the time)) *Interview*. April 12, 2010.