

## TiPSE

# The **T**erritorial **D**imension of **P**overty and **S**ocial **E**xclusion in Europe

Applied Research 2013/1/24

Work Package 2.4

Case Study Report

### **Metropolitan Region of Attiki, Greece**

George Kandyliis, Michalis Petrou, Nikos Souliotis & Kostas Vakalopoulos

July 2013

This report is one of the deliverables of the TiPSE project. This Applied Research Project is conducted within the framework of the ESPON 2013 Programme, partly financed by the European Regional Development Fund.

The partnership behind the ESPON Programme consists of the EU Commission and the Member States of the EU27, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Each partner is represented in the ESPON Monitoring Committee.

This report does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the members of the Monitoring Committee.

Information on the ESPON Programme and projects can be found on [www.espon.eu](http://www.espon.eu)

The web site provides the possibility to download and examine the most recent documents produced by finalised and ongoing ESPON projects.

© ESPON & EKKE, 2012.

Printing, reproduction or quotation is authorised provided the source is acknowledged and a copy is forwarded to the ESPON Coordination Unit in Luxembourg.

## The ESPON TiPSE Project:

The TiPSE project has been commissioned by the European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion (ESPON) programme. It is concerned with the issue of poverty, and processes of social exclusion in Europe.

One of the key challenges for the EU, in its pursuit of social, economic and territorial cohesion, is to address regional or local concentrations of poverty and social exclusion. In terms of practical governance, this remains a national responsibility within the context of EU strategic guidance. In practice, regional or local administrations are often in 'the front line'; implementing national policies to ameliorate deprivation and exclusion. At a higher level, the EU defines its role as identifying best practices and promoting mutual learning.

Poverty and social exclusion are essentially relative concepts, arguably only meaningful within a specified geographical context. This underlines the essential roles to be played by observation, measurement, and careful data analysis, as preparations for intervention. The TiPSE project aims to support policy, both by enhancing the evidence base and by identifying existing good practice.

A central objective of the TiPSE project is to establish macro and micro-scale patterns of poverty and social exclusion across the ESPON space. This will be achieved by compiling a regional database, and associated maps, of poverty and social exclusion indicators. Such quantitative analysis of geographical patterns is considered a fundamental part of the evidence base for policy.

In addition, in order to better understand the various social and institutional processes which are the context of these patterns, a set of ten case studies are to be carried out. These will be more qualitative in approach, in order to convey holistic portraits of different kinds of poverty and social exclusion as experienced in a wide variety of European territorial contexts. The principal goal for these investigations will be to bring forward clear illustrations of the social, economic, institutional and spatial processes which lead to poverty and social exclusion in particular geographic contexts.

The selection of case study areas has been carried out with careful regard to the wide variety of geographic, cultural and policy contexts which characterise Europe. The ten case studies are also intended to highlight a range of different 'drivers' of poverty and social exclusion, including labour market conditions, educational disadvantage, ethnicity, poor access to services and urban segregation processes. A second objective of the case studies will be to identify policy approaches which can effectively tackle exclusion, and thus strengthen territorial cohesion.

The TiPSE research team comprises 6 partners from 5 EU Member States:

No.	Partner	MS	Principal Researchers
LP	Nordregio - Nordic Centre for Spatial Development	SE	Petri Kahila
2	UHI Millennium Institute	UK	Philomena de Lima
3	Newcastle University	UK	Mark Shucksmith
4	Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, HAS	HU	Katalin Kovács
5	ILS - Research Institute for Regional and Urban Development	DE	Sabine Weck
6	EKKE - National Centre for Social Research	EL	Thomas Maloutas
7	The James Hutton Institute	UK	Andrew Copus

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ECB	–	European Central Bank
ESeC	–	European Socioeconomic Classification
EU	–	European Union
GDP	–	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	–	International Monetary foundation
MRA	–	Metropolitan Region of Attiki
PPS	–	Purchasing Power Standards
SEGs	–	Socio-ethnic groups
TIPSE	–	Territorial Dimension of Poverty and Social Exclusion

# CONTENTS

Executive summary .....	viii
1 The Regional Context .....	1
2 Characteristics of social exclusion and poverty: patterns and processes .....	8
2.1 Description of the case study area, territorial characteristics, and the affected population group the case study is focusing upon .....	9
2.2 Socio-ethnic inequalities.....	12
2.3 Spatiality of the socio-ethnic hierarchy .....	15
2.4 Discussion and conclusions .....	21
3 Analysis of underlying processes and trends .....	23
3.1 Main factors shaping dimensions and processes of poverty and social exclusion .....	23
3.2 Development over time and the influence of policies and/or other factors .....	35
3.3 Policy challenges and policy solutions.....	38
4 Validity of European-wide data analysis from a local perspective .....	41
5 Transferability of results.....	45
6 Conclusions for policy development and monitoring .....	47
7 Literature .....	49
Annex 1: Additional maps and tables .....	51
Annex 2: List of interviewed experts .....	68

## TABLES

Table 1: Resident population of the region of Attiki, 1991-2011	2
Table 2: Population by age groups, 2011	2
Table 3: GDP at current market prices, 2005-2009	2
Table 4: GDP indicators, 2011	2
Table 5: Employment by sector of economic activity, 2011	3
Table 6: ESPON CU typology and classification of the Region of Attiki	3
Table 7: Unemployment rates in the Region of Attiki, 2000-2012	4
Table 8: Unemployment rates by sex and age, 2011	4
Table 9: Long-term unemployment (12 months and more), region of Attiki	5
Table 10: EU (Eurostat) poverty indicators	5
Table 11: EU (Eurostat) education indicators	6
Table 12: Citizenship of the population of the Region of Attiki	6
Table 13: Summary of regression models	13
Table 14: Composition of socio-ethnic groups, MRA, 2001	14
Table 15: Socio-ethnic groups and basic indicators. MRA, 2001	15
Table 16: Segregation level of the immigrant population and SEGs at the 1km grid cells. MRA, 2001	19

## FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Athens in the context of the ESPON space	1
Figure 2: Population density by 1km GRID cell MRA, 2001	4
Figure 3: Main land use by 1km GRID cell, region of Attiki	5
Figure 4: Immigrant residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001	16
Figure 5: SEG 1 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001	16
Figure 6: SEG 2 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001	17
Figure 7: SEG 3 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001	17
Figure 8: SEG 4 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001	18
Figure 9: SEG 5 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001	18

Figure 10: At-risk-of poverty in the Greek NUTS III Regions, 2001	43
Figure 11: Mean duration of residence by ethnic group. MRA 2001	51
Figure 12: Gender distribution by ethnic group. MRA 2001	52
Figure 13: Mean age by ethnic group. MRA, 2001	53
Figure 14: Household structure by ethnic group. MRA, 2001	54
Figure 15: Education level by age group. Region of Attiki, 2001	55
Figure 16: Socioeconomic classification by ethnic group. MRA, 2001	56
Figure 17: Tenure by ethnic group. MRA, 2001	57
Figure 18: Mean domestic surface by ethnic group. MRA, 2001	58
Figure 19: Percentage of immigrant population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001	65
Figure 20: Percentage of SEG 1 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001	65
Figure 21: Percentage of SEG 2 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001	66
Figure 22: Percentage of SEG 3 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001	66
Figure 23: Percentage of SEG 4 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001	67
Figure 24: Percentage of SEG 5 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001	67

## Executive summary

The focus of the present case study is on the the relationship between poverty/social exclusion and the urban segregation pattern and processes in the Metropolitan Region of Attiki (MRA). Although the interconnections between segregation and patterns of social inequalities are the theme of a vast literature, this relationship needs to be placed in the socioeconomic and spatial context of the Region, so that any generalizations are informed by the specific dynamics of poverty and social exclusion.

MRA exhibited high development rates in the 1990s and the early 2000s, before the current economic crisis. Those development rates were supported by the EU funding and were based on a circuit comprising the construction sector (especially the construction of large projects and transport infrastructure) and investments in the by then liberalized banking, telecommunications and media sectors. However, income inequalities persisted, as this was a by and large jobless growth and because employment in Greece is hardly a safeguard against poverty. For example, in 2006 the rate of at-risk-of poverty employed persons was twice bigger than the EU15 average.

During the current period of the sovereign debt crisis and the austerity policy implemented under the Memorandum between the Greek governments and the troika (IMF-EU-ECB), one can already see the Regional unemployment rate rising dramatically and a not unimportant increase of the at-risk-of-poverty rate. Already vulnerable groups are reasonably more exposed, albeit new forms of poverty/social exclusion occur, affecting social groups that were used to better life standards and chances.

Apart from the cycle of economic boom, crisis and recession, the regional context of MRA consists of at least two other important elements. On the one hand, the high rate of incoming immigration since the early 1990s. The immigrants' integration model is one of poor policy intervention, based crucially on their employment in the shadow economy and their access to affordable housing in the private rented sector. On the other hand, the housing market has been historically characterized by important inequalities in housing conditions, but at the same time by low levels of residential segregation.

We deal with the historical background of the relationship between urban segregation and processes of povertization and social exclusion in the part of the in-depth analysis of this report. We also provide there some workable definitions of urban segregation, the indices we use to calculate its level and the affected groups, i.e. the ethnic groups of immigrant origin. After a short presentation of the multiple dimensions of the diversity of the immigrant population, the basic work for the analysis is the identification of different clusters of ethnic groups which we term socio-ethnic groups (SEGs) that share similar levels of exposure to poverty/social exclusion, according to latest available census data (2001).



In the absence of data on income, we use two different indicators of poverty/social exclusion that serve as the dependent variables of the analysis. The first is the available domestic space per capita, as we consider overcrowding to be an important dimension of material deprivation. The second is the interaction between available domestic space per capita, tenure and the possession of heating equipment. That is because, in the Athenian context, access to home-ownership is an important indication of upward social mobility and integration and the lack of central heating is, on the other hand, a supplementary indication of material deprivation.

We perform a regression analysis at the individual level using as indicators the variables of gender, age, household type, socioeconomic class (according to the ESeC scheme), education level and nationality. We find out that apart from the household type, nationality plays a significant role in both models. Consequently, there seems to be a specifically 'ethnic' dimension of material deprivation and thus we then perform a tree discriminant analysis in order to identify a hierarchy of SEGs. We end up with a solution of 5 SEGs and then we examine the level of segregation of these SEGs along the five dimensions of segregation as proposed in the vast related literature. We also elaborate maps that represent the distribution of the SEGs in MRA.

The basic conclusion is that there is no linear relationship between levels of segregation and exposure to poverty/social exclusion. First of all, all SEGs show low to moderate levels of residential segregation. Then, while it is true that the most segregated SEG 3 is at the same time the most deprived one, SEG 1 performs rather badly regarding deprivation measures but it is the least segregated SEG. Consequently, it becomes necessary to include in the analysis, apart from the findings at the meso-scale of the MRA, some reflections from the micro-processes at the micro level of the neighbourhood. There we can see that seemingly equal degrees of segregation may mean different levels of local inequalities, different levels of social polarization and social mobility prospects.

Furthermore, in the context of a residual welfare state where social reproduction is substantially based on family relations, we claim that MRA faces certain major policy challenges:

- The transition from a centralized model of policy making to a model where more actors (like NGOs and private providers) are involved in policy making and welfare provision. This is not without contradictions and one interviewee mentions that it might lead to a fragmented and inefficient system of welfare provision.
- The need to elaborate area-based policies, while up to now the dominant tendency was to focus on sectoral policies (either for the general population or for specific population groups, such as the unemployed, nuclear families, elderly people etc.), without being able to address poverty/social exclusion issues in specific localities.
- The lack of a consistent immigration policy and more specifically the issue of undocumented immigrants. New immigrants in MRA have today very limited opportunities to obtain any kind of legal residence. For this reason they are

extremely vulnerable and exposed to several forms of maltreatment. Concerning urban segregation, the issue of 'illegality' has as a consequence to treat the concentration of immigrants in specific places as a matter of security and public order than as an area for political intervention.

# 1 The Regional Context

The Region of Attiki counts today a resident population of around 3.8 million inhabitants (see Table 1). The region's population remained relatively stable between 2001-2011, against estimations by Eurostat for an increase from 3,904,292 to 4,113,979 during this period (Eurostat REGIO database). At the same time, the Region experiences a continuous spatial restructuring, with Municipalities of the most urban are around the CBD losing population, for the benefit of suburban and peripheral Municipalities, especially those in the Northeastern part of the Region.




Figure 1: Attiki in the context of the ESPON space

Following more general demographic trends in Europe, the age group of 65 years or over consists a significant and growing part of the population of Attiki, representing 17.5% of the total in 2011 (Table 2). In the period before the current sovereign debt crisis, the Region experienced remarkable economic performance: GDP grew at a rate of more than 5% during the period 2005-2008 (see Table 3). PPS per capita in Attiki is quite high and much higher than the national average (see Table 4). The economy of the Region is based mainly on the tertiary sector (especially commerce, tourism and leisure and financial activities), while manufacturing plays a secondary

role (see Table 5). This is only partially a result of the deindustrialization of 1980s, as Attiki was always primarily a service and administration center.

**Table 1: Resident population of the region of Attiki, 1991-2011**

	1991	2001	2011 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Attiki</b>	3,594,817	3,894,573	3,812,330

Source: Census, Hellenic Statistical Authority

**Table 2: Population by age groups, 2011**

	Attiki	Greece	EU 27
<b>% aged &lt;15</b>	14.2	14.4	15.6
<b>% aged 65+</b>	17.5	19.3	17.5

Source: Eurostat REGIO database

**Table 3: GDP at current market prices, 2005-2009**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Attiki</b>	88,846	97,795 (10.1%)	104,216 (6.6%)	109,718 (5.3%)	110,546 (0.8%)

Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority

**Table 4: GDP indicators, 2011**

	Attiki	Greece	EU27
<b>PPS (€'m)</b>	119,244	249,868	11,751,419
<b>PPS per Capita</b>	29,100	22,100	23,500
<b>% of EU 27 Average</b>	124	94	100

Source: Eurostat REGIO database

---

<sup>1</sup> Provisional data.

**Table 5: Employment by sector of economic activity, 2011**

NACE Rev. 2 Category		Attiki	Greece	EU27
<b>A</b>	<b>Agriculture, forestry and fishing</b>	1.2	17.9	5
<b>B-E</b>	<b>Industry (excl. construction)</b>	12	16.9	18
<b>F</b>	<b>Construction</b>	5.4	8.81	7.4
<b>G-I</b>	<b>Wholesale, retail, transport, accomm., food services</b>	32	44.1	24
<b>J</b>	<b>Information and communication</b>	3.4	2.66	2.9
<b>K</b>	<b>Financial and insurance</b>	4.7	4.04	3
<b>L</b>	<b>Real estate</b>	0.2	0.2	0.8
<b>M-N</b>	<b>Professional, scientific, admin. and support</b>	9.8	10.3	9
<b>O-Q</b>	<b>Public admin., defence, education, health and social work</b>	24	32	25
<b>R-U</b>	<b>Arts, entertainment, recreation</b>	6.9	7.4	5.4

Source: Eurostat REGIO database

The Region of Attiki hosts the capital city of the country. The urban character Region of Attiki is indicated by its classification in the ESPON typology (see Table 6). It is also evidenced by its population density (1,001.11 inhabitants per 1km grid cell, Hellenic Statistical Authority, Map 1.2) and the quite unimportant share of the primary sector employment in the total private sector (0,89 % in 2006, EDORA Future Perspective). At the same time, however, quite large parts of the Region are mountainous and covered by agricultural land, semi-natural areas, wetlands and forests (the latter uses represent around 73% of the region's surface, see

Table 7 and Map 1.3).


**Table 6: ESPON CU typology and classification of the Region of Attiki**

Typology	Classification of the Region of Attiki
1. Urban-rural regions	<u>Predominantly urban region</u>
2. Metropolitan regions	<u>Capital city region</u>
3. Border regions	Other regions (not a border region)
4. Islands regions	Not an island region
5. Sparsely populated regions	Not a sparsely populated region
6. Outermost regions	Not an outermost region
7. Mountainous regions	<u>Moderately mountainous regions under urban influence</u>
8. Coastal regions	<u>Coastal regions with a very high share of coastal population</u>
9. Regions in industrial transition	Area not covered by typology

**Basic socio-economic indicators show that despite the GDP growth during the 2000s, social inequality remained important. Furthermore, the burst of the sovereign debt crisis aggravated dramatically social inequality. Unemployment rates remained relatively high in the 2000s (between 6.5-9%), to explode after 2010 (17.5% in 2011 and 23.3% during the first semester of 2012,**

Table 7). Women are more vulnerable concerning unemployment (see Table 8). The difficulty of reinsertion in the labour market is evidenced by quite high levels of long-term unemployment rates (Table 1.9). Social inequality is also evidenced by the rate of people whose disposable income after social transfers is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (60 % of the national median) and the people facing severe material deprivation (see Table 10): the former fluctuated between 12-13% during the years of economic growth to climb to 16.3% in 2010, and the latter remained at 9.5-10.5% in the years 2005-2010. Early leavers in education show one more dimension of social inequality and affects 1/10 of pupils (see Table 11). Last but not least, the rapid increase of immigrant population is a major demographic transformation of MRA, connected with forms of social inequality, especially in the labour and housing markets. From 2.2% in 1991, individuals with foreign citizenship increased to 9.5% in 2001 (see

Table 12).



**Figure 2: Population density by 1km GRID cell MRA, 2001**

**Table 7: Unemployment rates in the Region of Attiki, 2000-2012**

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Total</b>	12.1	10.4	9.3	8.8	9.1	8.8	8.3	7.6	6.5	8.9	12.3	17.6	23.4

Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority

**Table 8: Unemployment rates by sex and age, 2011**


	15 years or over	From 15 to 24 years	25 years or over	Females 15 years or over	Males 15 years or over
<b>Attiki</b>	17.6	21.4	8,3	20,9	21,9
<b>Greece</b>	17.7	44.4	15,8	51,5	38,5
<b>EU 27</b>	9.6	43.2	16,1	47,3	39,6

Source: Eurostat REGIO database

**Table 9: Long-term unemployment (12 months and more), region of Attiki**

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
4.83	5.05	4.70	4.45	4.54	3.78	2.82	3.28	5.02	8.53

Source: Eurostat REGIO database



**Figure 3: Main land use by 1km GRID cell, region of Attiki**

<sup>2</sup> First and second trimester

**Table 10: EU (Eurostat) poverty indicators**

	<b>Attiki</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>EU27</b>
<b>% At Risk of Poverty 2010</b>	16.3	20.1	23.6
<b>% Severe Material Deprivation 2010</b>	9.5	11.6	8.3
<b>% Low Work Intensity 2010</b>	6.8	7.5	10.0

Source: Eurostat REGIO database

**Table 11: EU (Eurostat) education indicators**

	<b>Attiki</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>EU27</b>
<b>Persons aged 25-64 with tertiary education attainment (2011)</b>	31.5	25.4	26.8
<b>Early leavers from education and training (2011)</b>	10.6	13.1	13.5

Source: Eurostat REGIO database

**Table 12: Citizenship of the population of the Region of Attiki**

	<b>1991</b>	<b>2001</b>
<b>Greek</b>	3,513,495	3,524,355
<b>Foreign</b>	80,717	369,973
<b>Non declared</b>	605	245
<b>Total</b>	3,594,817	3,894,573

Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority

There are at least three main underlining processes that produce the above-mentioned forms of social inequality and transcribe them into urban space:

a. The dynamics of the labour market. Since the mid of the 1990s Attiki's economy started to grow, overcoming the crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. The engines of this growth were EU-funded investments in transport infrastructures and deregulation and privatizations in banks, telecommunications and media (Stathakis, 2010). In 1995-2002, this growth did not lead to a diminution of unemployment (jobless growth), as it was based on more intense utilization of the existing workforce (increase of the marginal productivity of labour, see INE, 2005: 75). In 2003-2008 unemployment decreased, following the more general European trend of the period (INE, 2008). Greece's accession to the Eurozone in 1999 entailed cheap credit for households and led to a more private consumption-drive growth. Labour-intensive services grew and unemployment rate withdrew, although it never felt to very low levels (INE, 2008). During the recession of the last years, unemployment increased, the reduction of nominal and real wages in both private and public sectors led to a dramatic decrease of private consumption; the decrease of the demand lead to the reduction of production.

Nevertheless, it must be underlined that in the case of the Greek economy employment protects less from poverty than in other European countries. The rate of



poor employed persons in the mid 2000s was double in Greece than in EU (14% against 7% in EU-15 in 2006, INE, 2008). This must be attributed to jobs' characteristics (low wages, part-time and unstable occupations) and to a familial structure where one or more individuals depend upon one employed person (INE, 2008, p. 221).

b. Immigrants' settlement has been a major source of social inequality and exclusion. Since the early 1990s, Greece started to receive important inflows of mostly undocumented immigrants, initially from Balkans and later from Asian countries. The integration of these immigrants into the labour market and the Greek society has taken place without institutional regulation. The absence of integration mechanisms entailed the exposure of immigrants to hyper-exploitation, through informal occupations and low wages. The integration of immigrants into the labour market has been associated with their de-qualification, their working position being rather linked to gender and ethnicity (Kandylis et al., 2012). The vast majority of immigrants in Attiki hold lower technical and routine jobs at a rate of between 70% and 90% compared with 24% for Greeks (Kandylis et al., 2012, p. 271). The only exception among immigrants is that of immigrants of Greek origin who have been rewarded with full citizenships rights and generally enjoyed a preferential treatment by the state which facilitated their integration into the labour market (Kandylis et al., 2012). The current fiscal crisis and the implementation of austerity policies put additional stress on immigrants. They face now higher rates of unemployment while at the same time they do not enjoy the same social protection as native populations.

c. The main forms of social inequality are converted into socio-spatial segregation mainly through the mediation of housing production processes. State intervention and public housing has played diachronically a minimal role in housing production in the case of Athens (and more generally in Greece, Maloutas 2010). State regulation has been confined to building legislation and the urban master plans. The access to housing depended upon market processes and, during the first postwar decades, spontaneous housing production. Market processes involved small construction companies and petty landowners, and produced an affordable housing stock of small and medium-sized apartments (Kandylis et al., 2012; Maloutas, 2010). Socio-spatial segregation in postwar Athens has been relatively mild in the sense that this model of housing production generated a socio-economic continuum in the urban space rather than sharply separated socio-economic zones. However, more intense forms of social segregation appeared since the 1990s in the city center as a result of suburbanization process and the irregular integration of immigrants in the Athenian society. Since the late 1970s, a large number of dwellings in the city center have been gradually vacated by the native middle and upper middle strata that moved to the suburbs of Attiki (Maloutas, 2010). Given the absence of a housing policy for immigrants, the latter occupied a large part of this stock, often in very bad housing conditions. Actually, the housing and social conditions in the city center appear in the public agenda as the most important problem of social exclusion and social segregation in Athens.

## 2 Characteristics of social exclusion and poverty: patterns and processes

The thematic focus of the present case study is on the multiple connections between processes of povertization and social exclusion and the urban segregation pattern in the Metropolitan Region of Attiki (MRA). By urban segregation we mean especially the residential segregation of different socio-ethnic groups, although some comments on the differential spatial mobility of these groups are going to be made. Table 2.1 summarizes the basic definitions employed for the elaboration of this thematic issue.

**Table 2.1: Basic definitions about urban segregation**

Metropolitan Region of Attiki (MRA)	The mainland of the Region of Attiki, leaving aside the islands and the separate area of Peloponnese that administratively belong to the Region.
Residential segregation	The separation of the residential space occupied by two or more social groups.
Evenness	A dimension of segregation that refers to the differential distribution of two or more social groups among areal units. Indices used: IS, H. <sup>a</sup>
Concentration	A dimension of segregation that refers to relative amount of physical space inhabited by one social group. Index used: DEL. <sup>a</sup>
Centralization	A dimension of segregation that measures the concentration of one social group in the city centre (defined here as the Municipality of Athens). Index used: ACE. <sup>a</sup>
Clustering	A dimension of segregation that measures the extent to which areal units inhabited by one social group adjoin one another in space. Index used: ACL <sup>a</sup>
Exposure	A dimension of segregation that measures the extent to which members of two or more social groups confront one another by virtue of sharing a common residential area. Index used: P. <sup>a</sup>
Ethnic group	People sharing the same nationality in the 2001 census.
Socio-ethnic group	A cluster of ethnic groups that share common characteristics in terms of living conditions.

a. See formulas in Appendix 1.

The structure of this part of the case study is as follows. First we present a short summary of the historical urban segregation pattern in the MRA, its context, its underlying processes and its relationship with processes of povertization and social exclusion for specific groups of the population, in different parts of the metropolitan area (2.1.1). Then we move to a quantitative description of the new immigrant population, focusing on its ethnic and demographic diversity (2.1.2). In the next section we explore the formation of a socioethnic hierarchy of unequal positions in the society of the metropolis and we connect these unequal positions to different levels of exposure to risks of poverty and social exclusion (2.2). This is followed by an investigation of the spatiality of the socio-ethnic hierarchy, using some key

segregation indicators and maps (2.3). In the last section (2.4) we draw some basic conclusions about the context-dependent relationship between urban segregation and poverty/social exclusion, also focusing on the dynamics of the micro-scale of specific neighbourhoods of the metropolitan area.

## **2.1 Description of the case study area, territorial characteristics, and the affected population group the case study is focusing upon**

### **2.1.1 Contextual conditions of urban segregation in Attiki**

The mainland of the Region of Attiki constitutes a quite large metropolitan area which has been historically characterized by comparatively low levels of residential segregation in terms of the socioeconomic differentiation of its (formerly ethnically homogeneous) population. As early as in the pre-World War II period, an inverse-Burgess spatial model, with the bourgeoisie over-represented in the centre and the working class in the periphery and especially in the western part (Leontidou, 1990) was the result of the symbolic architectural equipment of the city centre, the massive inflow of refugees of Greek origin from Asia Minor who settled in then peripheral areas in the 1920s and the weak regulatory capacity of the state that followed rather than planned the urban expansion.

The industrialization process in the post-War period, with a rather limited presence of large industrial firms, has prevented Athens from becoming organized on the industrial principle with activity zoning and public housing provision for the working class (Maloutas et al., 2012, Allen et al., 2004). Based on massive internal migration from rural areas and on a pattern of spatially diffuse industrialization (Vaiou & Chadjimichalis, 1997), the metropolitan area experienced instead the development of vast and relatively socially mixed residential areas. Two major driving forces sustained this development:

- a. The housing provision system that, in the context of a family-oriented model of social reproduction, tolerated irregular construction and ensured the protection of small land-ownership.
- b. The high rate of social mobility that was in turn supported by the socially diffuse access to home-ownership, together with the expansion of the service sector and the opportunities for self-employment.

Consequently, large urban areas in and around the city centre were traditionally resided by socially unequal neighbours. The phenomenon of spatial proximity combined with social distance finds its more evident expression in the form of the vertical social segregation, where the social differentiation is reflected to the different floors of the same building (Maloutas & Karadimitriou, 2001). Poor and/or socially excluded individuals, households and groups tend to disperse in residential that they share with other groups, a pattern quite different from one of spatial isolation and stigmatization. Importantly enough, especially for the lower and lower-middle social strata, social mobility was expressed in housing improvements in the same residential areas where they were already established, instead of moving somewhere else in the city (Maloutas, 2004).

On the other hand, upward social mobility was also reflected to the formation since the late 1970s of more socially homogeneous suburbs in the north-eastern periphery of the main agglomeration. The liberalization of banking loans since the late 1980s and the high development rates until the mid 2000s (mainly attributed to the expansion in finance, telecommunications and the constructions sector) contributed to a new wave of investment in private housing and (Emmanuel, 2004). If one adds in the picture the new transport infrastructure and the construction of mega-projects at the outskirts of the metropolitan region during the two previous decades, the new peri-urban landscape tends to be one of urban sprawl, exhibiting niches of different levels of welfare, housing stock and socioeconomic composition.

Back to the city centre, the settlement of new transnational immigrants who populated the lower strata of the social hierarchy that followed the outflow of middle social strata since the 1970s, enriched the dominant representation about degradation with an explicitly racist component. In general, the distribution of the immigrant population as a whole area is quite even, although different ethnic groups exhibit different levels of segregation. Immigrants are more centralized than the Greeks (Arapoglou, 2006), as a sizeable part of the immigrant population settled in the residential areas in and around the city centre. They found there affordable private rented dwellings in apartment buildings, but sometimes in marginal housing conditions in small inner apartments and on the lower floors (Maloutas, 2007). At the same time, an important part of the immigrant population settled in remote peripheral areas, usually attracted by available jobs in the primary sector, constructions and domestic services and also by the low-status housing stock, consisting mainly by ageing low-rise buildings and some deteriorating apartment blocks, formerly used as second houses by the Greeks during summer vacation. In any case, despite that immigration did not contribute to some increase in class segregation in the metropolitan area, face a reality of sever discrimination and inequalities that we now turn to.

### **2.1.2 Immigrant population in MRA: Diverse and unequal**

Foreign people from 212 countries lived in MRA in 2001. They represented about 10% of the total population and almost 13% of the economically active population, compared with less than 2% of the economically active population in 1991. Only one ethnic group that of the Albanians, amounted to slightly more than 50% of the immigrant population. Other important groups from the Balkans and Eastern Europe represented more than 15%, including immigrants from Poland (3.4%), Russia (3.3%), Bulgaria (3.1%), Romania (2.9%), Ukraine (2.8%) and Moldavia (1.1%). Groups from the Indian Peninsula represented over 4% and the biggest African groups of Nigerians and Ethiopians represented together about 0.9%. Minor groups included people from Afghanistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and China, who are at the moment considerably more numerous than in 2001. However, nationality is by no means the only distinctive characteristic in the total immigrant population. Ethnic groups exhibit important variations regarding several demographic and social features that are expected to indicate different levels of exposure to poverty and/or social exclusion (see also Arapoglou & Maloutas, 2011; Kandyliis et al., 2012), including:

- i. Period of settlement (see Figure 2)<sup>3</sup>. While massive immigration to Greece is quite recent, there are some groups with members that settled before the 1990s and other groups with members that arrived very recently. We expect exposure to risk of poverty and social exclusion to be reduced for those with long-term presence in the society of the metropolitan area, and to some extent for those who settled more recently but have the opportunity to benefit from the longer presence of some of their co-ethnics and their (informal, semi-formal or formal) networks of solidarity.
- ii. Legal status. A complex system of civic stratification (Kofman, 2002) is indicated by the fact that the aggregate immigrant population comprises an unknown number of undocumented immigrants exposed to the danger of arrestment and expulsion (including an equally unknown population of detainees in marginal living conditions in detention centres, police stations and other premises), together with asylum seekers, those with temporary residence permits, those with long-term residence permits, those enjoying the possibility to acquire Greek citizenship and Greek citizens. We expect the condition of illegality to be a severe obstacle to social integration, followed by the unstable legal status of asylum seekers, often holding nothing but a monthly deadline to leave the country.
- iii. Gender composition (see annex Figure 12). While some groups exhibit a quite balanced composition (e.g. the Albanian), other groups are either male (e.g. the Pakistani) or female (e.g. the Filipino) dominated. We expect some women to be more vulnerable and especially those outside the labour market, single-mothers and victims of trafficking. Furthermore, we expect that the unbalanced gender composition of an ethnic group tends to reduce social integration opportunities for the members of this group through family formation.
- iv. Age structure (see annex Figure 13). The majority of the population of each ethnic group belongs to the broad age category of 25-49 years. However there are groups with an important part of minors and other groups with relatively high proportion of elderly people. We expect ageing to be an indicator of exposure to poverty/social exclusion. We also expect adolescents to be more exposed, especially if they are school leavers.
- v. Household structure (see annex Figure 14). Some ethnic groups, including the Albanians, are characterized by a significant proportion of people living in households organized in nuclear families. Single-person households are mainly characteristic of male-dominated immigrant groups from the Middle East and Africa; collective households without a family nucleus are characteristic of male-dominated groups originating from the Indian peninsula. We expect households with no family nucleus to be an indication of exposure to poverty/social exclusion. At the material level, that is because we expect family relations and mutual help to assist the organization of everyday life. Furthermore, family formation seems to reduce the perceived threat and hostile representations by the natives.
- vi. Educational skills (see annex Figure 15). Ethnic groups differ in terms of average educational attainment as well as in terms of the educational prospects given to their younger members, with those from the Indian peninsula being at the bottom of the

---

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix.

hierarchy in both cases. We expect low education level and low educational prospects to be indications of exposure to poverty/social exclusion.

vii. Socioeconomic structure (see annex Figure 16). The vast majority of immigrants hold lower technical and routine jobs at a rate of between 70% and 90%, compared with 24% for Greeks. However, certain immigrant groups (e.g. Syrians and Egyptians) occupy positions in intermediate and small employers' occupations at a proportion that is more than twice that for most groups. We expect unemployment and confinement in routine occupations to be an indication of exposure to poverty/social exclusion, although the exact content of other occupational categories has to be examined as well.

viii. Tenure (see annex Figure 17). Home ownership in Athens is very high for natives (65%), (misleadingly) high for groups from some eastern European countries because of their live-in status as domestic workers and much lower for the rest. In the context of the absence of public housing provision, we expect access to home ownership to be an indication of social integration.

ix. Housing conditions (see annex Figure 18). Available domestic space is noticeably smaller for most immigrant groups than for the Greeks, with almost 50% of the Albanians and even more for the groups from the Indian peninsula falling into the deprived category of those possessing less than 15 m<sup>2</sup> per capita. We expect conditions of overcrowding to be an indication of poverty/social exclusion.

## **2.2 Socio-ethnic inequalities**

All in all, inequalities between the aggregate immigrant population and the Greek population regarding the respective positions the multiple social hierarchies of the metropolitan cannot be overstated (Maloutas 2007, Kandylis et al., 2012). Leaving aside the social distance between native and foreign population, in this section we focus on the findings of a regression analysis regarding the previously identified indicators of poverty/social exclusion of the immigrant groups. The data we use are from the 2001 census, as the data from the 2011 are not available at the moment. We extracted a 10% random sample of the individual records and limited the investigation to the 27 biggest ethnic groups in MRA and to those over 15 years old.

In the absence of census data on income, we use two different indicators of poverty/social exclusion that serve as dependent variables in the analysis. One is the available domestic space per capita [DM], as we consider overcrowding to be an important dimension of material deprivation. The other is the interaction between available domestic space per capita, tenure [TEN] and available heating equipment [HEAT]. In the Athenian context, access to home-ownership is an important indication of upward social mobility and integration. The lack of central heating is on the other hand a supplementary indicator of material deprivation. The independent variables include age [AGE], gender (GEN], duration of settlement in Greece in years [SET\_DUR], position in the socioeconomic stratification according to the European

Socioeconomic Classification (ESeC) [ESEC], level of education [EDUL], type of household [HHTYPE] and ethnic group [NAT]<sup>4</sup>.

The regression models summarized in Table 13 reveal the importance of the type of household and national origin regarding the expected welfare level of individuals, as defined by either the available domestic space (Model 1) or the interaction of the available domestic space with tenure and heating equipment (Model 2). In both models (and especially in the latter) these two indicators are followed in importance by the duration of settlement in Greece. The contribution of socioeconomic category, education level, gender and age appear to be of less importance.

**Table 13: Summary of regression models**

Indicator	Model 1 Dependent: Per capita domestic space			Model 2 Dependent: Interaction of per capita domestic space with tenure and heating equipment		
	St. B	Sig	Zero-Order Correlation	St. B	Sig	Zero-Order Correlation
GEN	0,067	0,000	0,101	0,071	0,000	0,144
AGE	0,021	0,000	0,127	0,054	0,000	0,175
SET_DUR	0,088	0,000	0,190	0,135	0,000	0,245
ESEC	-0,064	0,000	-0,127	-0,078	0,000	-0,163
EDUL	-0,067	0,000	-0,130	-0,106	0,000	-0,182
HHTYPE	0,470	0,000	0,524	0,262	0,000	0,329
NAT	0,239	0,000	0,385	0,307	0,000	0,442
Adj. R <sup>2</sup> = 0,380 F = 274,5 Sig. = 0,000			Adj. R <sup>2</sup> = 0,305 F = 198,6 Sig. = 0,000			

The contribution of the type of household is largely explained by the position of immigrants in single-member households who expectedly enjoy much more domestic surface. However, against expectations, immigrants in nuclear families are situated slightly below immigrants in multi-member households with or without family relations and those in single-parent households. This is a strong indication that a large part of immigrant nuclear families are exposed to dangers of material deprivation at least comparable to the dangers faced by immigrants outside nuclear family households.

The importance of the nationality in both models indicates that there is an independent ethnic element in the pattern of exposure to poverty/social exclusion. Some ethnic groups such as the Pakistani and the Bangladeshi appear much more vulnerable than others, such as the Bulgarians and the Ukrainians, while for the latter

<sup>4</sup> There are no census data concerning the legal status of immigrants' residence in Greece. To some extent we can assume that this indicator is reflected on the duration of residence, although this is rather problematic if one considers the cycles of legalization and delegalization based on temporary work permits. However there is good reason to suppose that the 2001 census data concern a by and large regular immigrant population, as the first legalization process had started a few years earlier.

(as well as for other female dominated groups) better living conditions are to some extent explained by their proportion in the sector of domestic services and their live-in status. The largest group of Albanians is situated close to the bottom of the hierarchy.

In both models, the relationship between the dependent variable and the duration of residence in Greece is in the expected direction, indicating a small improvement of integration prospects for those that settled earlier. It is worth to note that the importance of the duration of residence and the ethnic group increase between the two models, while the importance of household type is reduced in the latter, where the dependent variable is more comprehensive. Thus the importance of the ethnic group and the duration of residence seem to increase when, apart from domestic space, tenure and heating equipment are also considered as indicators of social integration.

For the less important variables of the analysis the relationships are in general in the expected direction, with immigrants in the lower echelons of the socioeconomic and the educational hierarchy being slightly more vulnerable to risks of deprivation. The low importance of these two variables might be explained respectively by the concentration of the biggest part of the immigrant population in the lower socioeconomic categories and by the dequalification of the immigrant population in the process of integration in the Athenian labour market (Labrianidis, 2011). Socioeconomic category and education level are more important in Model 2.

Age and gender of the individuals are also of low importance. However the importance of the nationality may reflect the contextual importance of the age structure and the gender composition of the ethnic group in which individuals participate.

Applying a classification tree process we can identify clusters of ethnic groups with similar living conditions in terms of the interaction between available domestic space, tenure and heating equipment. These clusters, which we term socio-ethnic groups, are presented in Table 14 and some basic indicators are presented in Table 15.

**Table 14: Composition of socio-ethnic groups, MRA, 2001**

SEG	Ethnic groups	Share in the aggregate immigrant population	Interaction DM*TEN*HEAT (mean score)
1	Albania	51.6%	8.9
2	Armenia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Syria	7.9%	14.3
3	Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Pakistan	3.7%	6.6
4	Bulgaria, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine	11.3%	24.8
5	Philippines, Moldova, Russia	4.9%	18.8
<b>Total</b>		79.3%	11.35



**Table 15: Socio-ethnic groups and basic indicators. MRA, 2001**


SEG	% with domestic surface less than 15 m <sup>2</sup>	% of home-owners	% with no central heating	% in routine occupations (ESeC 9)	% less than 9 years in school	% of arrivals in the 2 previous years
1	52.5	10.4	39.2	36.8	23.9	10.7
2	29.7	13.1	24.6	33.8	18.1	19.0
3	65.3	5.9	66.3	45.4	47.9	27.6
4	15.6	38.4	18.7	38.9	17.9	21.2
5	31.1	28.8	19.5	51.1	14.3	17.9
<b>Total</b>	46.0	14.2	36.4	38.0	23.9	14.4

SEG 3 concentrates ethnic groups from the Indian peninsula and shows the lowest mean score in the interaction between DM, TEN and HEAT. It is at the same time in the bottom of the socio-economic, educational and temporal hierarchies. It is closely followed by SEG 1, which comprises only the Albanian ethnic group, despite their percentages in the lowest positions of every hierarchy being significantly lower. The rest of SEGs show greater geographic diversity in what concerns the origin of their members. SEG 2 and SEG 5 perform quite well in terms of the interaction and concerning the latter this performance contradicts the high percentage of people in the lowest position of the socio-economic hierarchy. SEG 4 has the highest mean interaction score, while the percentages of its members in the lowest positions of the hierarchies are not very different from the average.

### 2.3 Spatiality of the socio-ethnic hierarchy


The aggregate immigrant population is distributed in a wide part of MRA, and in a way that leaves few areas inhabited only by the native population, even at the census tract level. The wide dispersal of the Albanian population is particularly responsible for this desegregation pattern, because Albanians account for about half of the immigrant population. Nevertheless, different ethnic groups follow very diverse location patterns. Smaller ethnic groups tend to be more concentrated and clustered together, but not isolated from the native population, as Greeks constitute the majority almost in every single census tract.

In Figure 4 - 9 we present the distribution pattern of the aggregate immigrant population and the 5 SEGs and the in MRA, at the 1km grid cells.




**Figure 4: Immigrant residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005




**Figure 5: SEG 1 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005




**Figure 6: SEG 2 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005




**Figure 7: SEG 3 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005



**Figure 8: SEG 4 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKK-ESYE 2005



**Figure 9: SEG 5 residents per 1km grid cell, MRA, 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKK-ESYE 2005

Members of SEG 1 reside in a wide area of MRA. SEG 2 exhibits a quite centralized residential pattern. SEG 3 appears to be concentrated mainly in the western part of the city centre and in the nearby working-class suburbs. SEG 4 is quite centralized but extends along the North-South axis of the densely populated urban area of MRA. SEG 5 presents a bipolar pattern, due to the spatial separation of its members, with Filipino residing mainly in the eastern part of the city centre and Russians in some low-status suburbs of the western periphery<sup>5</sup>.

Table 2.5 summarizes some basic indices used to measure different aspects of residential segregation (Massey & Denton, 1988) for the identified SEGs at the 1km grid cells in MRA.

**Table 16: Segregation level of the immigrant population and SEGs at the 1km grid cells. MRA, 2001**

Group	Evenness		Concentration	Centralization	Clustering		Exposure	
	IS <sup>1</sup>	H <sup>2</sup>	DEL <sup>3</sup>	ACE <sup>4</sup>	ACL <sup>5</sup>	ACL adj <sub>6</sub>	P <sub>gre</sub> <sup>7</sup>	P <sub>imm</sub> <sup>8</sup>
Greeks	0.211	0.050	0.541	0.570	0.863	0.981	0.902	0.078
SEG1	0.259	0.055	0.539	0.559	0.064	1,240	0.110	0.872
SEG2	0.375	0.097	0.645	<b>0.717</b>	0.022	<b>2,785</b>	0.134	0.848
SEG3	<b>0.530</b>	<b>0.174</b>	<b>0.686</b>	0.565	0.013	<b>3,514</b>	0.124	0.864
SEG4	0.353	0.086	0.646	<b>0.696</b>	0.015	1,327	0.120	0.856
SEG5	<b>0.413</b>	<b>0.115</b>	<b>0.656</b>	0.633	0.009	1,837	0.108	0.871
Total immigrant population	0.249	0.055	0.546	0.598	0.110	1,387	0.114	0.867

1. **Segregation index.** 0: Even distribution; 1: Uneven distribution.
2. **Entropy index.** 0: Even distribution; 1: Uneven distribution.
3. **Delta Index.** 0: Uniform distribution; 1: Absolute concentration.
4. **Absolute Centralization Index.** -1: Tendency to reside in remote areas; 1: Tendency to reside in the city centre.
5. **Absolute clustering index.** 0: No clustering; →1: Absolute clustering.
6. **Absolute clustering index adjusted.**
7. **Interaction index.** 0: Absolute isolation from the Greek population; 1: Absolute exposure to the Greek population.
8. **Interaction index.** 0: Absolute isolation from the aggregate immigrant population; 1: Absolute exposure to the aggregate immigrant population.

The Segregation Analyzer Application was used for the calculations (Apparicio et al., 2008). See Appendix for equations.

**Source:** 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005

IS compares the residential distribution of each SEG and the aggregate immigrant population with the residential distribution of the total population. It represents the percentage of the members of each SEG that should relocate in order to obtain a distribution identical to that of the total population. Comparatively low values for the

<sup>5</sup> Tables about the percentage of SEG members in the local population per grid are provided in the Annex.

aggregate immigrant population and for SEG1 are accompanied by relatively higher values for SEGs 2 and 4. The most deprived SEG 3 exhibits the most uneven distribution, followed by SEG5. Similar findings derive from H index, which compares the socio-ethnic entropy (i.e. diversity) of each areal unit with the socio-ethnic entropy of MRA.

DEL and ACE values (measuring respectively members of a SEG residing in grid cells with above than average density of this SEG and the proportion of the members of a SEG that need to change residence in order to obtain a uniform distribution around the city centre) show that all SEGs and the aggregate immigrant population are characterized by similar (moderate to high) levels of both concentration and centralization. Only SEG 2 and SEG 4 exhibit a quite stronger centralization pattern.

Concerning clustering, the values of ACL (representing the average number of members of the same SEG in nearby grid cells as a proportion of the total population in nearby grid cells) indicate low levels of contiguity between members of the same SEG, at least at the grid cell level. However, to get a more concrete picture one should calculate the ratio of ACL to the proportion of the respective SEG in the total population of MRA. In this case some degree of clustering becomes evident for SEG 3 and SEG 2.

Last but not least, all SEGs exhibit similar levels of exposure to either immigrants as a whole or Greeks. For members of every SEG the probability to share grid cells with Greeks is higher than 80%.

In sum, segregation levels for all SEGs are quite low. Some differences between the segregation patterns concern four out of the five dimensions of residential segregation, i.e. evenness, concentration and centralization, while high levels of exposure to the native population is an important indication of desegregation for all. Moreover, there seems to be no clear relationship between the level of segregation of SEGs and the living conditions of their members. To be sure, the most segregated SEG 3 (in terms of evenness, concentration and clustering) is at the same time the most deprived SEG. On the other hand, SEG 1 performs bad in the deprivation measures but it is the least segregated SEG. The most prosperous SEG 4 shows some levels of centralization. SEG 2 and SEG 5 exhibit similar performance with different kinds of segregation pattern, as the former tends to centralization and clustering and the latter tends to dissimilarity and concentration.

Another aspect of residential segregation with potential effects on risk of poverty/social exclusion has to do with residential mobility. In the 1995-2001 period different ethnic groups had different relocation rates in MRA but in general the residential relocation flows show that most ethnic groups tend to desegregate rather than congregate (Kandylis & Maloutas, 2012). On the other hand, the varying rates of residential mobility of the immigrant groups are not in a linear relationship with their socioeconomic status. For some group with low relocation rates there seems to be a positive connection between residential mobility and some aspects of social status. This is not however the general rule, especially in the case of the single biggest Albanian group.

## 2.4 Discussion and conclusions

The process of spatial differentiation of the residential patterns of different SEGs may be attributed to community ties that tend to shape different preferences and priorities for members of different groups. However the role of community ties has to be examined in connection with the spatial effects of diverse occupational activity structures and then again in connection with the spatial structure of employment opportunities in the Athenian housing market. For example, immigrants from Philippines are concentrated in the north-eastern part of the city centre, in affordable apartments of the dense housing stock consisting of apartment buildings. Their location choice is particularly explained by the fact that this part of the city centre is situated at the beginning of the traffic lines to the high-status suburbs in the northern and north-eastern parts of the agglomeration. Many women of this female dominated group have worked as domestic servants in Greek households of these suburbs since the 1980s. Subsequently, the development of informal ties and formal institutions such as the Philippine school assisted to attract newer members of the community and to reproduce this specific location pattern.

Similarly, people from Pakistan who found employment opportunities in the small labour-intensive textile industries in the north-western edge of the city centre (in the Municipality of Nea Ionia) remain there after the decline of these industries. They have established a closely-knit community and renovated the old housing stock that consists of small independent houses constructed by Greek refugees from Asia Minor and their descendants decades ago. Thus, what might, at first glance, be considered as segregated areas becomes in fact the ground for social integration. On the contrary, a number of Pakistani who arrived lately settled in the industrial districts along the national highway that crosses MRA from the North to the port of Piraeus. They were attracted there by informal employment opportunities in the surrounding industrial units and they live in an environment of residential isolation from the native population.

Moving to another part of the densely-built city centre, in urban neighbourhoods such as Kypseli and Kato Patisia, one can find different articulations of segregation patterns and integration prospects. Overcrowding and environmental degradation had started to drive out middle-strata residents as early as in late 1970s. New international immigrants found available apartments and assisted to the restoration of the housing stock. This is in fact the area with the highest proportional concentration of the aggregate immigrant population as well as the preferred location for specific ethnic groups. Situated in the lively (although congested) urban core and being inhabited by a mosaic of different ethnic groups (including the natives), these neighbourhoods look very different from 'ghettos' (Wacquant, 2008). However, this is exactly how they were perceived in the past few years, in the context of the massive arrival of new immigrants (some of them from new countries of origin such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan) and economic and social insecurity caused by the sovereign debt crisis and the stabilization program. Already vulnerable enough, with poor means and prospects of legalization, living in marginal housing conditions and often entrapped in Greece on their way to other European countries, new immigrants found themselves in the middle of an explosion of stigmatisation, police repression and racist violence that seems to be transmitted in

different parts of MRA (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011). On the other hand, these same neighbourhoods accommodate immigrants' informal networks of great importance for the support of the newcomers (Vaiou & Stratigaki, 2008; Kalandides & Vaiou, 2012).

Processes at the micro-scale such as the neighbourhood may be of great importance for immigrants' integration prospects. The conditions in the meso-scale of MRA reveal, on the other hand, that low levels of segregation (i.e. patterns of spatial proximity between immigrant groups and the natives) are not necessarily synonymous with prosperity and social inclusion. On the contrary, low levels of segregation may be associated with polarization at the micro- and meso-scale. Stigmatization of the poor and social excluded and tension between diverse and unequal social groups may be the outcome.

Based on the previous analysis of residential segregation in MRA one can identify a combined typology of metropolitan areas and ethnic/socio-ethnic groups that are exposed to risks of poverty/social exclusion and require policy interventions.

- i. Densely populated urban neighbourhoods where an ethnically diverse immigrant population resides in deprived living conditions, together with other socio-ethnic groups.
- ii. Urban neighbourhoods where a relatively small minority of immigrants reside in deprived living conditions, together with other socio-ethnic groups but remain more or less 'invisible'.
- iii. Deteriorating commercial and industrial urban areas where immigrants of specific socio-ethnic groups live in deprived living conditions and spatially isolated.
- iv. Deteriorating commercial and industrial urban parts of the CBD where an ethnically diverse immigrant population lives in deprived living conditions.
- v. Peripheral areas where immigrants of specific socio-ethnic groups live in deprived living conditions, close to older second housing areas or developing residential communities.



### **3 Analysis of underlying processes and trends**

The following chapter examines some of the main processes of povertization and social exclusion of immigrants in Attiki, as well as attempts of both the central/local state public and third sector organizations to provide relevant institutional responses. We first investigate current processes leading to social exclusion: immigration, new poverty and new homelessness. We present in particular the attempt of the central state to devise a more coherent immigration policy and its limitations, the re-organization of municipal social services during the crisis and the social action of the Orthodox Church and a prominent NGO specialized in homelessness. In the second part of the chapter we focus more specifically on urban social segregation. We present the context of residential segregation in Athens since the first post-war period and we examine current trends in segregation. In the third part we deal with some occurring policy challenges and policy priorities.

#### **3.1 Main factors shaping dimensions and processes of poverty and social exclusion**

##### **3.1.1 Central state and immigration policy**

Massive immigration to Greece started in the early 1990s, mainly with people from Albania and Eastern Europe (King, 2000). The common wisdom is that the Greek state was unprepared to provide a consistent policy framework for social integration, as incoming migratory movement was a new phenomenon in a 'traditional' sending country. However, the situation with the Greek migration regime is much more complex (Parsanoglou, 2009). First of all because transnational immigrants had started to settle in the country as early as in the 1970s, although in significantly lower numbers, mainly as students who prolonged their residence after their studies, as domestic workers and as workers in specific flourishing industries of the secondary and primary sector. Second, because Greece has experienced massive inflows of immigrants of Greek origin throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the Greek cities have been receiving successive waves of internal migration. And more importantly, because the theory of a 'surprised' social and political system may explain what did *not* happen but not how the actual migration regime was produced.

The migratory inflow of the early 1990s was dominantly perceived as an abnormal condition, one that threatened the social and economic stability of the country (Pavlou, 2007, Swarts & Karakatsanis, 2012). The first Law on immigration was adopted by the Parliament as early in 1991. Its rationale was to pose tight restrictions to what was considered as a kind of invasion, through the implementation of strict preconditions for legal residence, while leaving no room for social integration measures. It was only six years later when the reality of massive arrivals and the acceptance of the positive role of immigrants in the then developing Greek economy, led to the implementation of the first 'legalization' process, which was followed by two

more waves in 2001 and 2005-2007. The central idea was the recognition of immigration as an economic reality and the recognition of immigrants' rights on the basis of their participation in the labour market. In fact, the right to stay was linked with employment, as a minimum number of insurance stamps was (and still is) required in order to validate a residence permit.

A step towards a more consistent immigration policy was the implementation in 2001 of a new legal framework for granting residence permits to immigrants and the foundation of a specific administrative department in the Ministry of Interior, the Direction of Immigration Policy (DIP). These institutional interventions codified and clarified criteria for legalization and, at the same time, improved and rationalized administrative services for immigrants. Until 2001 the Ministry of Public Order was responsible for the total immigrant population, fostering a policy-oriented immigration policy. The 2001 reform assigned the authority on documented immigrants coming from non EU countries and the members of their families to the Ministry of the Interior (Regional Authorities and DIP). The Ministry of Interior undertook also the responsibility for immigrants who ask for residence permits for humanitarian and other exceptional reasons. Moreover, beyond 2001 reform, specific legislation has been implemented concerning different immigrant subcategories, like second generation immigrants, former reformatory and prison inmates. The Ministry of Public Order maintained control over undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers, as well as over persons coming from EU countries and immigrants of Greek origin.

However, as the immigration policy focuses on immigration control, security (Karyotis, 2012, Swarts & Karakatsanis, 2012) and the regularization of access to legal documents, it does not comprise a more integrated strategy for combating against immigrant's poverty and social exclusion (Pavlou, 2009). SK admits that the services provided by DIP are quite one-sided and do not face immigrants' social exclusion on the whole:

“Certainly, we do not face exactly the cause of poverty. We see [examine] some groups which arrive to us, we provide them with administrative status. They are [thus] visible in the whole administrative system and they have a number of professional and economic [rights] and [have access to] all the services to which they can apply in order to gain something, [like] professional training, we give them this right. But if the labour market [does not offer jobs], especially within an environment formed by the IMF and the troika, then they will have some problems; not some, a lot of problems” (staff member of DIP, 15/11/2012).

What is more, the immigration policy is far from adequately addressing the changing dynamics of immigration. The two main processes which expose immigrants to social exclusion and poverty are:

a. The growing number of undocumented immigrant flows towards Greece. According to official data, the documented immigrants in Greece are about 650,000; according to estimations, the total number may be more than one million (Maroukis, 2009). The transition of these immigrants to legal status seems now unlikely, as the Greek state is unwilling to proceed to massive granting of residence permits, partly due to the pressure of Northern European countries which are afraid of growing

immigration flows among EU-countries (staff member of DIP, 15/11/2012). The Regional Authorities examine demands for residence permits on an individual basis, while the DIP does not grant more than 1500 residence permits for humanitarian and other exceptional reasons every year (over around 2500 demands, staff member of DIP, 15/11/2012). This policy, however, reproduces the main condition of social exclusion and poverty for immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are much more exposed to overexploitation and unemployment (as the staff members of the DIP that we have interviewed fully recognize).

b. The current economic crisis affects immigrants in a specific way as increasing unemployment leads not only to poverty but also to the loss of access to residence permits. One of the main preconditions to validate residence permits is having worked for a minimum number of days on a two-year basis. Although the limit has been reduced recently (from 400 to 240), the very high unemployment rate pushes more and more immigrants (as well as the members of their families whose legal status depends on them) to illegality, fuelling a vicious cycle of material deprivation and administrative invisibility.

Similar problematizations of the current migration regime are reported by the interviewed representatives of immigrant groups. They stress that the period of economic crisis threatens the ability of their established members not only to sustain their achieved quality of life, but also to validate their residence permits. In the case of the newcomers, the absence of any opportunity for legal entrance and residence is a serious obstacle.

“I am unemployed for two years, after sixteen years in the same job. Imagine...those of us who studied here and know the Greek society...imagine those who did not study here but just came and later they brought their families. They face [difficulties]. About 75-80% of the Sudanese are poor” (member of the Sudanese community).

“Sometimes I feel that only our hands are appreciated... I even wonder if we are complete humans” (member of the Pakistani community).

The ambiguous legal status of the newcomers makes them extremely vulnerable to exploitation and to maltreatment by state authorities. Arrestment and imprisonment occur frequently. Moreover, the Greek police fail constantly to monitor racist violence in the streets or against while the victims are often persecuted because they do not possess legal documents.

“The political system in the last few years of this crisis has cultivated racism. This is reasonable since there are fewer jobs for the Greeks. But on the other hand we see police officers collaborating with fascists” (member of the Pakistani community).

Even in the case of the established members of the Filipino community, there is a clear connection between the economic crisis and the ability to sustain a standard level of life. Acquiring residence permits has been a main task for the organized part of the community (KASAPI, Union of Filipino Migrants in Greece) since the first legalization process in 1997. Recently, many Filipino families decided to ‘go back’ to

Philippines, even despite that such a decision seemed unlikely a few years ago, at least for those who had settled as early as in the 1980s.

“If you spend here 12 years, then if you come back [to Philippines], then the experience will be totally different and you cannot adjust anymore” (member of the Filipino community).

### **3.1.2 Facing poverty and homelessness at the local level: municipal authorities, the Church and NGOs**

The current economic crisis in Greece triggered a series of actions and initiatives for fighting social exclusion and poverty of both institutional actors (e.g. municipalities, central and local authorities, the Church of Greece etc.) and actors of the civic sector (NGOs). In all cases of institutional and non-institutional interventions, policies are focusing on vulnerable social groups facing serious survival problems (homeless, unemployed, not insured population, people with severe mental health problems, migrants, single parent families, etc.).

Municipal authorities in Attiki proved rather unready to face the social impact of the crisis. Diachronic deficiencies of municipal politics (clientelism, mismanagement and corruption) and limited financial resources had disorganized municipal social services during the last two decades.

The interview with FG, social worker at the Municipality of Athens, offers some clues on these processes. FG is particularly critical towards what she describes as “deconstruction” of municipal social services during the last two decades. Being at the end of her career, she expresses her ideas quite freely and particularly her frustration about the Municipality’s incapacity to fulfil its mission to face immediate social needs of vulnerable citizens.

As a first indication of disorganization, FG stresses that the number of municipal social workers reduced substantially during the last two decades. This has been mainly a result of clientelistic practices which fostered the hiring of non specialized staff:

“FG: We are aware that the scientific personnel of the Municipality of Athens is 2%. All the rest are mostly primary school graduates. That was the concept. They [politicians] could manipulate these people, [so] they got them into the public sector. They were not interested in the scientific personnel. In my department [Organization of Youth and Sports] there were 69 positions [to be occupied by social workers] according to the old Figure and they reduced them to two. Two positions for social workers in the largest Municipality of Greece? The professionals [i.e. social workers] left the Organization of Youth and the positions remained vacant. And they [the municipal authorities] got in cleaners etc. who are better paid than we are, because they are supposed to work overtime etc.

R [Researcher]: That means that the social services have shrunk.

FG: This is not new! This has been taking place since years. Beis [Mayor of Athens during the 1980s] had organized social services, 25 years ago, with

parents schools of very high standards, of that time, and since then all this has been entirely deconstructed.” (FG, social worker, 18/10/2012).

At the same time, as FG argues, the NGOs have been a competitive in providing social services which attracted significant municipal economic resources against the financing of municipal social services themselves. Here again, clientelism prevailed, this time in the relations of the municipal political staff with the NGOs:

“FG: I think that the NGOs run in parallel with the public sector and serve some... I’m not suspicious. I’m very sceptical about these organizations, regarding the money that they raise and the way that they spend them without control etc. I mean, I have found during my duty that there has been an economic abundance and...

R: That means that they have handled a lot of money.

FG: Too much money (with emphasis). I think that the NGOs have been a cover for other things. Yes, they do some things, but beyond that... And although I’m a volunteer, I have never been a NGO member. I have been for several years a volunteer in associations which have nothing to do [with NGOs], and are not financed by the public sector.” (FG, social worker, 18/10/2012).

The lack of specialized staff and the shrinkage of municipal social services had, according to FG, a double outcome: First, the Municipality does not play the role it could play in the provision of social services that satisfy the immediate needs of poor and excluded persons of the city. Actually, the Greek-orthodox Church and a number of NGOs develop activities, like food supply, collection and distribution of cloths etc. that could be undertaken by the Municipality in association with volunteers and local communities. Second, the lack of specialized staff does not only entail reduced social services, but also acts per se as a mechanism of reproduction of social exclusion. FG notices that when the non-specialized employees of the Municipality get in touch with excluded groups, like immigrants and homeless people, they “do not know how to behave” or even they express sentiments of abomination and dislike.

The disorganization of municipal social policy mechanisms led to experimentations for the implementation of social services of different type. The case of the Centre of Reception and Solidarity of Municipality of Athens (KYADA) represents a case of a “new”, less centralized type of provision of social services. KYADA is a autonomous public agency supervised by the Municipality. It provides services to homeless people and poor families, including provision of meals, cloths and other basic commodities, as well as short-term hosting in shelters. Distribution of goods takes place into two buildings which are owned by KYADA, while the infrastructure of the Centre also includes two shelters (one owned and one rented) and a “social store” for cloths. All services are located in the city centre. During the winter, KYADA is also responsible for ad hoc operations of shelter provision to homeless people. There are about 600-700 individuals who benefit from the everyday food provision, while KYADA also maintains a list of about 100 poor families which receive basic commodities from the “social mini market” and the ad hoc distribution of goods. KYADA employs ten permanent employees and thirty-three temporary ones.

The KYADA receives an annual subvention by the Municipality of Athens. But what characterizes KYADA is its capacity to attract sponsorships from the private sector and donations from associations and individuals. Two of the buildings owned by KYADA were bought as a result of private donations. The renovation of one of the buildings was financed by one of the largest telecommunication companies. The main installation of the Centre hosts a “social mini market” which is sponsored and operated by a multinational super market chain. Large businesses sponsor the various cultural events organized by the KYADA, in order to collect money and food for the poor and the homeless. Members of an association for the social reintegration of individuals who have been inmates of psychiatric clinics contribute to KYADA activities as volunteers. Last, KYADA is, along with a number of NGOs, a member of the Network of the Right to Housing which aims at fostering political issues related to homelessness.

The KYADA’s services contribute to the relief of material deprivation and homelessness, but, as its vice-president stresses (AR, vice-president of KYADA, 25/10/2013), its success to social re-integration is more doubtful. Characteristically, although individuals hosted in KYADA’s shelters are supposed to stay for a period of maximum 6 months, they turn to be long-term residents as the reintegration process fails.

Access in KYADA’s services is somewhat limited by legislation which forbids shelter provision to undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, one of the KYADA’s shelters operates under the conditions associated to its donation by an individual according to which its residents have to be poor individuals older than 65. Last, despite KYADA’s institutional openness, discrimination against immigrants appears also in everyday micro-practices. As AR describes:

[about food provision] “Junkies, immigrants, criminals get in, everybody will eat, there is no element of racism. There is “racism”, in quotes, at a micro-level. An employee may serve first a Greek and then the immigrant, this is something that we cannot control, I’m not there during the dinner. But everybody is welcome” (AR, vice-president of KYADA, 25/10/2012).

[about the access of immigrants to the shelters] “It is not prohibited to get them [the immigrants] in the shelter, but you know what is happening, there a problem between them [the immigrants and the natives]. If there are five extreme right-wingers, what will happen to the Pakistani? The others will beat him. There will be a problem between them. We do have foreigners [in the shelters]. We had an Egyptian, an Italian woman and a Romanian, I think, into the shelters, who were living in harmony, there were not problems, but:

“We are afraid; the coexistence is an issue for us. Because the KYADA has no relations with racism, not for a joke, there is no case.” (AR, vice-president of KYADA, 25/10/2012).

The organizational logic of KYADA’s activity may be seen as the result of three conditions: First, the organization of municipal social services through a larger involvement of the private sector appears as an answer to the diachronic deficiencies of clientelism and mismanagement which characterize local politics and policies. The Mayor of Athens stressed this turn when he transferred an important part of the

subvention given to the municipal radio station – the latter being criticized as typical terrain of clientelistic practices – to KYADA. Second, the KYADA is able to attract sponsorships and donations due to its specific task and geographical position. As the KYADA deals with the homeless and the poor of the capital of the country, it offers strong visibility opportunities to the businesses which desire to develop sponsorship activity. Third, we can also attribute KYADA's inclination to the sponsorship and donation, at least in part, to the vice-president of the Centre, AR, who has a rich experience in the third sector as a member of NGOs.

The Centre has until now successfully implemented the strategy of attracting sponsorships and donations and, from this point of view, it shows an “alternative” way of organizing social services at the local level. Furthermore, the involvement of the private sector offers additional economic resources in a context of reduced municipal budget; it could also contribute to the formation of more transparent mechanisms of social services against the traditional clientelistic practices. However, it can be argued that this model of organization of social services can only play a complementary role in the whole structure of municipal social policies. First, KYADA's activity depends a lot on the energy and initiatives of individuals, like AR, who are active in the attraction of sponsors and the organization of various events. This dependence poses the question of the capacity of the Centre to function on the basis of donations and sponsorships regularly and in the long-term. Second, and most important, the KYADA is an emblematic institution which offers strong symbolic and moral benefits to sponsors. On the contrary, the bulk of more “ordinary” social services of the Municipality could not be as much attractive for sponsors.

Another example of re-organization of municipal social action is that of the Municipality of Hellinikon whose main initiative is based on coordination of volunteers. The Municipality of Hellinikon launched during the crisis a ‘social dispensary’ that relies on a network of volunteer doctors. It is operating since early 2011, including almost all medical specialties. The vice-mayor responsible for the operation of the social dispensary has characteristically pointed out there on:

“We received a lot of requests for medical care from our citizens; these are rapidly increasing as the economic crisis deepens. The dramatic rise in unemployment has created a ‘whole army’ of uninsured people without rights and access to health insurance. We have been addressed to doctors not only of our city but also from throughout Athens so as to offer their services voluntarily. Today 90 doctors of all specialties are involved. These services are for people coming from all over Athens who are unemployed, immigrants, and generally people who are at risk of poverty.” (GM, vice-mayor 25/10/2012).

Indicative of the increasing demand for healthcare services is that the social dispensary has extended its opening hours and on weekends. The Municipality has also allocated additional room of its premises as to accommodate other medical specialties. A characteristic example to mention is that of a volunteer psychologist who asked permission from the municipality to use its premises for extended hours as the incidents of citizens in need of psychological support are growing. Actually, alarmingly increasing incidents are those associated with the specialties of the psychologist, the psychiatrist and the cardiologist. Incidents i.e. associated with mental disorder, stress, anxiety and hypertension due to the economic crisis.

While the number of users of social services is rapidly increasing, it is not the same as the staff of the municipality, and in particular the highly skilled staff, since the recruitment has been stopped because of financial problems brought about by the memorandum. On the other hand the existing staff is not sufficient numerically since the social service that supports the dispensary is staffed by only two social workers, one psychologist and one secretary. In other words, four persons for a population of 60,000 citizens. As vice-mayor told us:

"If there were no volunteers, none of these actions could have been realized. For this reason, our main priority is to enable more people to volunteer in this effort" (GM, vice-mayor 25/10/2012).

Drugs and other medical supplies are provided by private offers (medical associations, pharmaceutical companies or local pharmacies). Last year efforts are being made to conclude partnerships between the municipality and the Greek Church which undertakes similar activities. Instead, despite calls of the municipality to the central government to contribute financially to the effort of social services, the relevant government departments have not yet responded. It is typical that just last month the oil for heating schools has been assured from stocks destined for vehicles of the municipality.

But neighboring municipalities have not decided yet to support this effort, although at the beginning the idea was well versed. It seems that political considerations prevail over social problems as the fight against social exclusion is conducted in the light of correlation influences between the "memorandum parties" supporting the government and the anti-memorandum opposition parties (especially of the Left). In the opinion of the vice-mayor:

"The new municipal authority of Argyroupolis [municipal district of Helliniko] that emerged from the 2010 elections had the idea of the social dispensary which was welcomed by the neighboring municipalities. But while we started out strongly and gradually realized our idea by finding roof for our service, the neighboring municipalities were in disagreement about which should be the seat of the social dispensary. I should note here that the new local authority [Argyroupolis] relied on the majority of left-wing voters. Unlike the 3 neighboring local districts [of Helliniko] (Glyfada, Alimos and Agios Dimitrios) were elected with the support of the voters of PASOK, the party which was in government and put us then in the Memorandum, and supports also the current government. Maybe that was not cadet, municipal authorities that support the Memorandum policy to support another local authority that is in opposition and whose successful project is likely to become a magnet for other voters" (GM, vice-mayor 25/10/2012).

A major role in fighting poverty and social exclusion is played by other actors such as the Archbishopric of the Church of Greece and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the "Klimaka" organization which is active in addressing the phenomenon of new homeless.

With particular regard to the role of the Archbishopric of the Church of Athens is characteristic the effort made by its appropriate department to prepare and distribute 10,000 meals on a daily basis to needy people throughout the metropolitan area of



Athens. The 8,000 rations are distributed to fifteen parishes representing fifteen municipalities around the municipality of Athens. These parishes make more effort since their volunteers are those who undertake both to record the cases of people who are in poverty or are facing critical survival problems and to cook, package and distribute the meals. In contrast, as far as it concerns the Municipality of Athens where meals are much more the Church hires catering services for the preparation and distribution of food portions. Indicative of the situation is the statement of an official of Charities of the Archbishopric:

"Our basic philosophy was that every person can ensure at least one meal a day. We cooperate with the Municipality of Athens which has bestowed us room for food distribution. In other neighborhoods there are volunteers, the priests and parish commissioners, who assume this mission. It is telling that before the crisis strike 80% to 90% of people participating in soup kitchens of the Municipality of Athens were immigrants, while the number of immigrants involved in soup kitchens of the Greek parishes were minimal and counted on the fingers. Today, three years after the economic crisis, the percentage of Greeks involved in soup kitchens of the Athens Municipality is 40% while in parishes has reached 90%" (father PH, director of the Charity Fund of the Archdiocese, 9/10/2012).

Apart from the distribution of soup kitchens, the Archbishopric of Athens operates in housing persons belonging to vulnerable social groups like the elderly and children. In this context, Archbishopric of Athens operates in its responsibility area (fifteen municipalities and the City of Athens) sixteen retirement home, two nurseries, one founding hospital and two shelters for children with mental retardation. The financing of the actions of the Church, such as the soup kitchen relies on resources of the Church itself and sometimes on other financing sources such as foundations for children funded through the NSRF (National Strategic Reference Framework). Yet, the funding flows from other agencies (e.g. donations from individuals) and resources (properties that remain vacant due to the crisis) have been significantly reduced while operating costs of foundations are steadily increasing as the state imposes more and higher taxes for public goods (e.g. electricity). At the same time, while efficient partnerships with various organizations in undertaking joint actions (e.g. with the Municipality of Athens for the soup kitchen) are in progress, significant problems of cooperation with the same body in another action for fighting social exclusion may arise. This is the case of the Archbishopric plan to convert an empty hotel of its property into a homeless shelter. As explained by the head of the Archbishopric:

"We encountered great difficulties and the matter has not progressed. We had objections from many organizations including the Ministry of Health that has put hygiene issues, the Ministry of Public Order that raised delinquency issues as many of the homeless are users of addictive substances and the surrounding area would become drug market, and the City of Athens that raised fears of creating a small ghetto. Generally we better cooperate with individuals and with regional municipalities wherein our parishes belong to rather than with larger, more cumbersome and bureaucratic government structures"(director of the Charity Fund of the Archdiocese, 9/10/2012)

*Klimaka* is active in addressing the phenomenon of newly homeless and mentally ill. The action is nationwide concerning seven internship for psychiatric patients in different Greek cities hosting 112 people, one hostel for asylum seekers, three day centers for mental health problems (for general population, Roma, and Muslims), one mobile mental health unit in the Cyclades , one day center for suicide prevention and one center for homeless care in Athens that serves daily 120 people visiting welfare services (medicines, medical care, laundry, etc.) and can accommodate up to 15 people, and in extraordinary circumstances (cold, snow) from 45 to 50 people. Unlike homeless people in the past, in most cases characterized by mental disorders, low educational level, and use of addictive substances, the profile of today's homeless population presents a major change; more and more homeless people come from the middle strata, with medium and high educational level, while the majority of them had worked as freelancers. A responsible people of the homeless center notes:

“We're talking about an entirely new category of people without shelter whose professional, educational and social profiles markedly away from the profile of homeless people we knew until the economic crisis. We adopt the concept of newly-homeless to characterize this class of people. We estimate that in Athens today there are about 3,000 to 4,000 homeless while in Greece the figure is estimated at 20,000. The important thing is that this category is constantly expanding as daily new people in difficulty are entering from middle socio-economic strata with high educational level” (OT, staff member of *Klimaka*, 6/11/2012).

In this case too, the flow of state funding is shrinking. A characteristic of this case is that in boarding houses for psychological support operating all over Greece the budget has been reduced by 50%, while for the last 5 months the staff has not gotten the accrued. At the same time applications to provide mental health services have continued to increase while the homeless are increasing. Things are a little better for day centers which have been integrated into the NSRF program while homeless shelter in Athens is self-funded by individuals (donations), companies (that offer equipment and catering), citizens (miscellaneous financial and other offerings) and volunteers.

The biggest problem faced by *Klimaka* is the lack of a specific institutional framework for preventing social exclusion. There is also the problem of underfunding and bureaucracy that, combined with the lack of an evaluation system of NGOs' services, cause dysfunctions, delays in funding, and wasting financial resources. These deficiencies affect effectiveness of welfare work and result in fragmentation and poor quality of services. Another problem is the effectiveness of the cooperation between the stakeholders involved in the fight against social exclusion, since there are different approaches to tackling the problem. As a social worker of the homeless shelter observes:

“There are different cultures in addressing social exclusion with our prospective partners. For example, the City of Athens and the Church of Greece adhere to outdated, in my opinion, actions such as soup kitchens, which cost 7,000 to 10,000 Euros per day. With this money and with the assistance of other agencies (public and private) we could funded on an annual basis a housing

structure, i.e. a permanent social housing for people who are in poverty" (staff member of Klimaka, 6/11/2012).

In what concerns the activities of the organized immigrant communities, a main finding from the interviews has to do with the wide importance of the legal support provided to their members. Legal support takes mainly the form of information provision adjusted to the specific needs of each community (as, for example, the most important task for immigrants from Philippines is to validate existing residence permits, while for many Sudanese the only available way to some form of legalization is to apply for asylum). Moreover, the communities undertake the duty to support members that face specific difficulties in their relationships with public authorities or their employers. The interviewed members of the Pakistani and the Sudanese community mentioned several stories in which the experience and the social networks of the established members and the official representatives of the community proved to be significant in order to deal with instances of maltreatment and rights' violation. This happens to be a time-consuming activity organized mainly at the individual level.

On the contrary, the official role of the communities is rarely recognized by the Greek public authorities. There is no funding from either the central or the local state and the relationship with them is more characterized by the communities' effort to 'exercise pressure' in order to achieve specific goals, than by formal communication and recognition. The recently established Immigrants' Integration Councils which are organized at the local (Municipal) level might be an indication for the adoption of a more sustainable form of collaboration between the communities and the authorities but there are no concrete outcomes from their activities so far. The representative of the Pakistani community stressed the role of his organization in the political representation of the Pakistani group, through mobilizations and collaboration with Greek political parties.

Moreover, the situation is already quite different regarding the relationships between immigrant groups and the NGOs, many of which communicate regularly with organized communities in order to better understand specific needs and to disseminate their potential for support more effectively. Medical and psychological support, legal advising, the provision of temporary dwellings and the organization of Greek language courses are among their activities. However, the collaboration between NGOs and the communities has to overcome obstacles posed by the failure to recognize particular priorities of the beneficiaries. As the representative of the Sudanese community reported for example, although speaking Greek is a crucial component of integration, most Greek language courses are held in working days and hours, thus neglecting the needs of employed immigrants.

The individualized basis of the support raises questions about the access of individual members to the services provided by their communities. In the case of the Pakistani and the Sudanese groups the main challenge is to communicate with undocumented newcomers who are not informed about the activities of the communities. The same applies with live-in Filipino domestic workers. All interviewed representatives insisted on the role of informal community networks, stressing that strong ties between co-ethnics offer a safety net. As the representative of the

Sudanese community mentioned, these ties either originate from the country of origin or are created in Greece or even during the long journey of emigration.

However, it is important to note that informal networks are spatialized in specific ways in the destination country. The representative of the Pakistani community explained that they decided to establish local organizations in every part of Greece where Pakistani people live, so that they enable them to participate in the activities of the community. The representative of the Sudanese community mentioned the importance of specific places such as a Sudanese local café and informal places of temporary accommodation in the city centre, where he could get in touch with newcomers and where they get informed about work opportunities and access to documents. The representative of the Filipino community mentioned that the concentration of many of their members in the *Ambelokipoi* neighborhood is explained by the easy access to their work places in Northern Athens but it helped them to establish a Filipino school there. Accordingly, places of immigrants' concentration prove to be important in order for relationships of solidarity to be expressed. Interestingly enough, this fact contradicts dominant representations of these places as areas of anomie and disorder.

Another example of the complicated spatiality of community networks, one that also reveals their organization at multiple scales, comes from the working class suburb of *Aghia Varvara* in Western Athens. Since decades, *Aghia Varvara* has been a residential area with many inhabitants of the Roma community, living together with the descendants of the refugees from Asia Minor who settled there in the 1920s and with earlier immigrants of Greek origin from the former Soviet Union. According to the representative of the Roma community, the coexistence of poor population groups in the same area, contributed to the absence of social stigmatization phenomena: "Here all people are poor, there is a common path for all. The Rom is poor, the non-Rom is poor. There are no coffee shops for Roma and non-Roma". In the current period of economic recession relatives and social networks play an important role in the economic and social support for those who found themselves without work and income. For this purpose, the voluntary Network of Social Solidarity and Mutual Aid plays was set up by residents of the municipality (Roma and non Roma), aiming at covering emergent needs and crossing the ethnic boundaries. At the same time, according the representative, social inclusion prospects for Roma people have benefited from the establishment in 1995 of nationwide Roma Network in which 62 Municipalities with Roma inhabitants were involved. In collaboration with the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki, the activities of the Network contributed to the increase of the Roma children in public education. In the specific case of *Aghia Varvara* the increase rate was above the average, due to the active collaboration of the local authority and the non-discriminatory culture of the members of the other local ethnic groups.

To sum up, since the early 2000s and during the crisis there has been some effort to overcome chronic deficiencies of central state's immigration policy and municipalities' social services. The establishment of the Direction of Immigration Policy and the enactment of a specific legislation dissociated partially the immigration policy from the question of public order. Municipalities experiment with more decentralized and volunteerism-oriented ways of social services provision, as a response to the

disorganization of traditional municipal social services. At the same time, other agencies with important financial and/or human resources, like the Orthodox Church and NGOs, play a significant role in social service provision within a context of weak central and local state presence.

However, public and third sector mobilization proves rather insufficient compared to the intensity of current trends of poverty and social exclusion. Immigration inflows continue to increase the number of undocumented immigrants in the country, while even legalized immigrants run the risk of losing resident permit due to unemployment. At the same time, unemployment and the shrinkage of household incomes lead to the emergence of new poor and multiply vulnerable social groups. The municipalities as well as third sector organizations have to cope with increasing needs in the provision of basic goods and services (food, cloths, health services, housing). However, despite some success of their initiatives, their action has two limitations: first, they cannot address the roots of the problems, mainly the reduction of jobs in an economy in deep recession. Second, their action remains restricted in some emblematic activities and institutions (soup kitchens, agencies specialized in homelessness) and it does not lead to the creation of a new, adequate model of social protection of wider scope.

In what concerns the role of immigrants' collective organization and representation, it is quite evident that organized communities provide multiple forms of support to their members, either established or newer ones. Representation in front of the Greek public authorities and third sector bodies and the tightening of the relations between members are among their most important duties. The ability of the organized communities to reassure the access of their members to their services is based on informal networks which are in turn further developed by their contacts with formal activities. The condition of 'illegality' and institutional racism function as general limitations of what the organized communities can do, while the perception of any spatial concentration of immigrants as a threat of 'ghettoization' is an obstacle in recognizing the spatiality of immigrants' networks.

### **3.2 Development over time and the influence of policies and/or other factors**

Social regulation in cities relies on a kind of osmosis between the traditional solidarity mechanisms (domestic, relational, community) and the institutional solidarity mechanisms which is the welfare state. In Northern Europe, traditional solidarity mechanisms have gradually run down and in some cases vanished, leaving the welfare state in charge of social regulation. On the other hand, in the countries of Southern Europe, traditional solidarity mechanisms still thrive and have enabled cities to weather the decline of the (in some cases rudimentary) welfare state (Friedrichs & Vranken, 2001).

With a history of high social mobility in the post-war decades, as well as of the rather limited integration of the city into the high-end of the global labor market and the consequent limited presence of an international corporate elite exercising pressure

on the higher end of the housing market, residential segregation between classes remained comparatively low in Athens. Reduced segregation is also related to the dominance of two housing provision systems that had an ambivalent impact on both class and ethno-racial segregation:

- a. The so-called system of *antiparochi* (quid pro quo) by which a land-owner transfers a plot to the contractor, who undertakes in turn to construct the building. In practice, this system gives land-owners the opportunity to construct buildings with the help of a constructor who instead of money gets apartments in the building.
- b. Irregular self-help construction in areas where no master-plan is implemented. Irregular constructions were usually tolerated in the past, either for primary or second housing. Entire suburban areas were constructed this way and they were later incorporated in the official boundaries of the urban tissue, often to be reconstructed through the system of *antiparochi*.

These systems were connected to the family-centred welfare model that, as in the rest of Southern Europe, has grown to depend on family solidarity networks, reducing both residential mobility and segregation. They were also constitutive parts of the clientelist/populist political system that relied on defending both high social mobility rates and massive access to homeownership for its reproduction.

Urban growth in Athens was quite impressive during the first post-war decades, on the grounds of rapid inflows of internal migrants from the rural areas of the country. A spatially diffuse production system (Vaious and Hadjimichalis, 1997) and an unreliable planning system (Economou, 1997) resulted in piecemeal urbanization in the urban periphery, mainly through irregular self-help construction (Leontidou, 1990). At the same time vast areas around the historical centre were built under the system of *antiparochi* that secured and reproduced the preceding pattern of small and socially widespread land property. Besides nourishing the construction sector that was critical for the urban economy as a whole, *antiparochi* led to the production of sufficient housing units that made access to home-ownership possible for large parts of the urban population (Leontidou, 1990; Maloutas, 2007).

Economic restructuring in Athens has been comparatively gradual and limited in its impact due to the archetypal southern European character of the city's post-war development, where Fordist industry has never been the principal driving force. The steadily-growing tertiarization and the switch from international emigration in the first post-war decades to intense immigration inflows since the early 1990s have led to a certain degree of social polarization—which shows, however, substantial differences to the global city model. Nevertheless, Athens' polarization has not led to more segregation, either in terms of class, ethnicity or race; on the contrary, segregation indices have decreased in the 1990s, even though residential neighborhoods at the social extremes have increased their social homogeneity and members of distinct immigrant groups – especially the smaller ones – tend to be concentrated in space following clear residential location patterns.

Any effort to provide a comprehensive description of social and economic developments in modern Greek urban centers must include the importance of two factors that contribute to the eventual creation of serious problems of social

exclusion: the almost total absence of public housing policy and the limited applicability of town planning. The first factor is largely due to the underdevelopment of the welfare state in Greece and its consequent substitution by the family unit whose activities extend to large areas of social and economic life, like housing. This characteristic of the Greek society was not averted by the state, but has actually been reinforced through specific policies, non-policies and incentives. Trust in the effectiveness of the family's invisible hand, together with the power of the prevailing system of political clientelism which promotes illegitimate claims or prevents policies from being implemented, lies behind the inability to apply various existing projects of town planning. Small land ownership further discourages any substantial intervention in space (Vrychea & Golemis, 1998). Initially, the absence of state intervention seemed not to have any serious effect on social inclusion. However, more recently, this superficial conclusion has proved false for three reasons.

- a. The traditionally strong ties of the Greek family, though still existing, are not as close as in the past.
- b. Family income has been severely reduced following the restrictive macroeconomic policies implemented during the 1990s and dramatically intensified under the current economic crisis.
- c. These developments, together with a sharp rise in the number of foreign immigrants increased the number of segregated and socially excluded neighborhoods, especially in the greater Athens area.

Socio-spatial change in Athens is still dominated (since the mid-1970s) by the gradual and segregating relocation of upper and upper-middle strata to the suburbs (Maloutas et al., 2006) and, at the same time, by the desegregating effect of vertical social differentiation around the city centre (Maloutas, 2011, p. 6). Segregation indices have decreased in the 1990s even though, during the last three decades, the pattern of the city's segregation has been changing in ways that usually favour an increase in segregation indices. The higher class categories have been steadily relocating to more peripheral locations in suburbs of increasing social homogeneity, while gradually abandoning the centre where they clustered almost exclusively until the mid-1970s. At the same time, processes of vertical segregation, spatial entrapment of social mobility in traditional working-class areas as well as the embryonic state of gentrification, indicate that segregation in Athens is influenced by a host of different factors.

Before the current period of economic crisis, immigrants in MRA have also found labour market conditions that did not massively push them to advanced marginality. They have not been the major victims of the more mitigated and gradual economic restructuring in this region, since they never occupied an important position in Fordist industries. On the contrary, they have found niches in small family businesses (in general immigrants work in substantially smaller units than locals, Kandylis *et al.*, 2008) – and in personal services. They have thus been a timely resource for the declining family business, as well as an invaluable substitute for traditional feminine roles (carrying the load of the residual welfare state) that the new generations of local women could hardly accommodate with their increasing employment. As in the rest of Southern Europe Processes of marginalization and territorial stigmatization have comparatively been avoided, therefore, mainly due to the milder transition to post-

Fordism and to durable urban structures and configurations — i.e. the absence of consolidated spaces of relegation — rather than to policies aiming at opposing these processes. They were also avoided due to the recent arrival of the large immigration wave, which found a place in local labour markets, replacing more than displacing the local upwardly mobile work force. However, the future may hold substantial difficulties as the growing crisis in the social reproduction of middle- and lower-middle-class positions is leading to a stricter social (and ethno-racial) hierarchy in the access to the relevant services – and mainly to education – while the second generation of immigrants is evidently expected to be more demanding than the first in terms of social mobility (Maloutas, 2009, p. 832).

### **3.3 Policy challenges and policy solutions**

In the historically underdeveloped Greek welfare state there is an equally poor tradition of policies aiming to manage the levels of urban segregation and its impacts. The concentration of poor and socially excluded people in specific parts of the urban tissue or its outskirts was not considered to be a field for specific policy making. Housing has generally been believed to be an issue of family strategies aiming to adapt to opportunities in the private housing market. The central state provided mainly the basic rules that would regulate the market: it took measures to protect small land-ownership and the small construction enterprises, it provided the regulations for the housing stock and it was restricted to a marginal role in the construction process in the sense of public housing units. Mortgage market was not liberalized before the early 90s and banking loans were until then accessible only by specific groups such as the civil servants. When the massive immigration inflow started the response was to take some measures for immigrants of Greek origin and to insist on a *laissez-faire* approach for the rest.

On the other hand the local state possessed no tools for spatial planning other than the implementation of regeneration projects. Not rarely, central and local administration bodies had to provide basic physical and social infrastructure in the rapidly expanding outskirts of the city, only after irregular construction had already crystallized new residential areas. In the most densely populated areas around the city centre, planning process faced quite similar difficulties as they had to overcome the obstacle of a fragmented pattern of land property, with severely reduced physical space for intervention

In general, making the distinction between sectoral and area based policies, one can observe that some sectoral policies have reassured either the access of the general population to basic public goods (such as health protection and education), or the protection of specific groups (such as the unemployed, nuclear families, the retirees). Public expenditure on this sectoral model of social protection tended to increase from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s. On the contrary, there have been few initiatives towards policies addressed to specific areas. Even when the EU orientations and funding started to direct resources to spatially focused projects since the early 1990s, the main response by the Greek spatial planning system was to elaborate physical planning projects rather than addressing social issues.



In the current period of economic crisis, massive unemployment and impoverishment of employed people, austerity measures pose new obstacles in the development of a safety net. The general reduction of public expenditure threatens to leave unprotected not only the traditionally most vulnerable social groups such as the minorities and undocumented immigrants, but also people who used to have the benefit of a minimum level of protection, such as young unemployed, long-term unemployed and retirees. For many among them, family networks are still important but significantly less effective in transmitting resources to their members. Austerity policy challenges the capacity of family networks to provide assistance, while it gives no alternative access to social protection.

Furthermore, one has to keep in mind three separate policy challenges that appeared before the 'outburst' of the economic crisis, only to become even more visible afterwards:

- a. One has to do with the need to elaborate area-based policies, while up to now the dominant tendency was to focus on sectoral policies (either for the general population or for specific population groups), without being able to address poverty and social exclusion in specific localities. The *laissez-faire* approach towards the development of different areas of MRA provides no solutions in cases where impoverishment of parts of the local population alters the local social structure, often resulting in social polarization at the local level. As the case of the city centre indicates, a discourse on degradation and 'crisis' may lead to the claim for the replacement of vulnerable population groups by other respectable groups.
- b. The second issue is related to the transition from a centralized model of policy making to a model where more actors such as NGOs and private companies are involved in policy making and welfare provision. There is today a large discussion in Greece about the benefits of the social economy and the involvement of the 'third sector' in the social protection system. However, this is not without contradictions as it might lead to a fragmented system of welfare provision, while it is not necessarily guaranteed against corruption. Moreover, it seems crucial to be able to exploit the potential of a decentralized system of social protection in order to enhance the participation of the socially excluded, rather than adopting an approach of traditional philanthropic welfare provision for the most deprived.
- c. Last but not least, one has to mention the lack of a consistent immigration policy in Greece and more specifically the issue of undocumented immigrants in MRA. New immigrants have today few opportunities to obtain any kind of legal residence, after the official termination of the last legalization process in 2005. In fact, an unknown part of the immigrant population find themselves in a status of shadow residence, possessing (if anything) only the 'rose card' which proves. For this reason they are extremely vulnerable and exposed to several forms of maltreatment, from exploitation at work to police abuse and imprisonment. Especially concerning urban segregation the issue of 'illegality' has as a consequence to treat the concentration of immigrants in specific places primarily as a matter of security and public order rather as an area for political intervention.

The following directions seem to be of high importance towards the identification of policy solutions:

- a. The creation of new policy tools in order to elaborate and implement integrated area-based policies. The ability of the central and local state to apply social policies together with physical planning should be enhanced through the increase of both financial and human resources.
- b. The decentralizing system of welfare provision calls for a minimum level of coordination and clear definitions about priorities and needs. At the same time, decentralized initiatives and provision should be combined with a minimum level of social protection for all.
- c. Policies for the social inclusion of the diverse immigrant groups need to be promoted. For this purpose the issues of institutional racism and especially the regulation of the legal status of the undocumented immigrants in a way that respects their human and social rights is of absolute priority.
- d. The spatiality of immigrants' settlement has to be better understood. As mentioned in chapter 2, the concentration of immigrant groups in specific areas of the metropolitan region may mean either the concentration of poverty and social exclusion or the polarization of local social structures. However, the same patterns of concentration are necessary for immigrants' informal and formal networks. Accordingly, together with policies to combat with detriating living conditions, finding ways to fight against xenophobia and everyday racism at the local level is also crucial. Existing success stories have to be used as examples.

## **4 Validity of European-wide data analysis from a local perspective**

The adoption of the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion, as a broad umbrella in order to reach the 2020 target (of bringing at least 20 million people out of poverty and social exclusion by that year), shows that poverty and social exclusion are perceived as common European challenges by the EU. As indicated in the previous part of this report, the dynamics of poverty and social exclusion at the local and regional levels are context-dependent. However, local conditions are highly influenced by economic and political circumstances and arrangements at various greater geographical scales. In this perspective, there is a rich ground for comparison between proceedings and transformations at the European level and relevant proceedings and transformations at the local/regional level.

One key issue is to estimate the extent to which 'universal' EU policy responses to poverty and social exclusion are adequate across differing welfare regimes. For example, the dominant 'active inclusion' approach in combating poverty and social exclusion, meaning the identification of social inclusion with integration in the labour market, seems to have doubtful effects in the familiarist variant of the conservative welfare regime, especially in times of severe economic slowdown, accompanied by unprecedented unemployment rates. Against expectations, for an increasing part of the population of various age groups, finding employment is becoming harder and harder, while family protection networks face the danger to exhaust their potential. The settlement of a shadow immigrant population with no social rights and forced to find employment only in the informal economic sector makes the situation even more complex.

Moreover, the subordination of social integration goals to the priority of economic growth means that the fight against material deprivation and the fight for social inclusion and participation tend to be considered as side projects of economic competitiveness. Economic prioritizations fail not only to recognize the multidimensional (non-economic) aspects of social exclusion, but also to take into consideration bad employment conditions, gendered work relations, precariousness and more generally the various forms of social exclusion of employed people. These issues can be better examined under the lens of everyday povertization and exclusion at the local level.


The opinions of the interviewees concerning the position of Greece and MRA in the wider European environment reveal some key considerations concerning economic and institutional priorities.

- a. A wider crisis discourse. Most respondents see poverty and social exclusion as the results of economic recession and crisis. Some of them stress that things became only worse by the austerity measures since 2010. Economic slowdown and austerity policies are recognized (and usually condemned) as common European (and even global) trends. It is, however, believed that

Greece and the region of the Greek capital face the most severe and accelerated effects of global transformations. On the one hand this leads to some pessimist way of thinking, where poverty and social exclusion of wider groups of the population in the near future are considered inescapable. On the other hand, some respondents seek to find innovative ideas on fostering social assistance and solidarity with local initiatives, aided by local authorities and third sector agents.

- b. Implementation of EU policies at the local level. Respondents from central and local state agencies are quite informed about EU priorities, policies and opportunities for funding. Moreover they see European policies as an important asset and their implementation as opportunity for modernization of the Greek administrative system. On the contrary, there are important reservations about the actual application of certain European policy 'trends'. There are contradicting opinions concerning issues such as the decentralized system of policy provision and the involvement of third sector and private agents supported by EU institutions. For some respondents, despite that EU policies and funding are of great importance, their result is a fragmented system, characterized by lack of coordination and doubtful sustainability after the end of each specific project.
- c. Fighting against immigrants' poverty and social exclusion. Immigration is seen as an international issue. Respondents representing immigrant communities and respondents from agencies are highly concerned about the EU immigration policy and especially about the effects of the Dublin II Regulation that established the principle that only one Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application. The respondents stress the consequent entrapment of transit migrants in Greece. At the MRA level, the settlement of migrants that are unable to move either forward or backward has specific segregation effects, as many of these people concentrate in areas of the central city where they find employment in the informal sector, marginal accommodation and access to networks organizing attempts to escape to other European countries. For another part of The irregular immigrant population their inability either to obtain legal documents in Greece or to move to another European results in imprisonment in inhuman conditions and for periods extending to 18 months, in detention centres at the margins of the metropolitan area or in local police stations almost everywhere in the city.

The 2001 poverty map produced in the TIPSE poverty mapping exercise shows that MRA performs better than most other Greek NUTS III Regions (see Figure 10).



**Figure 10: At-risk-of poverty in the Greek NUTS III Regions, 2001**

While this is a valid indication of the overall poverty rate in MRA, in the perspective of the analysis in this report, it seems that this maps masks important sub-regional inequalities. Mapping at the regional level seems to be of limited significance when complex metropolitan regions are concerned.

On the other hand, some interesting data are revealed by the TIPSE social exclusion mapping and might be useful as additional tools for elaborating further measures policies for a coordinated and effective response to poverty and social exclusion, both at the state and the local/regional level.

- a. Regarding the Economic Activity Rate, we observe that the percentage of the economically active population in several European Mediterranean countries ranges between 45% - 50%, while this rate exceeds 65% in central and northern Europe. In the case of MRA the percentage is between 50% - 55%.
- b. Regarding the Activity Gender Gap, the female rate per male rate in most European Mediterranean countries is less than 60% in contrast with the countries of central and northern Europe where is ranging over 80%. In MRA region the rate is around 65% as opposed to most areas of Greece where this figure is below 60%. This is partly due to better employment opportunities offered to a large urban centre as well as to more strongly traditional attitudes and stereotypes on gendered division of roles and tasks within the family and the professional arena prevailing in regional / rural areas of Greece.
- c. As regards the ratio of non-Citizen Population, the percentage of total non-European citizens varies among countries; in Greece the percentage is between 5% -10% compared with other Mediterranean countries where the rate ranges from 1% to 5%. Concerning the case of MRA, the corresponding figures are similar to most of the countries of central and northern Europe ranging between 5% and 10%.
- d. Concerning unemployment, rates vary among Mediterranean European countries; e.g. in southern regions of Spain, France and Italy the unemployment rate exceeds 20% in total active population while in Greece

ranges between 8% -12% including MRA. In contrast, in some countries of northern and central Europe (as in N. Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands) the rate is below 4%, while in others remains relatively high (e.g. Germany: 8% - 12%).

- e. Finally regarding the average household size, in the countries of the southern Mediterranean the average number of household members is between 3.25 and 3.75 persons. The same rate applies in the case of Attica MRA in central and northern Europe the figure is lower ranging between 2.25 and 2.75 persons. This differentiation is largely due to the traditional role played by the institution of the family in the South as a supporting structure to provide services and care for the weaker members (children and the elderly), due to the inefficiencies of the welfare state.

## 5 Transferability of results

The relationship between urban segregation and processes of poverty/social exclusion is context-related. Specific patterns of residential concentration or dispersal of social groups are interconnected with specific levels of exposure to risks of impoverishment and exclusion and not every conclusion drawn in MRA is necessarily generalizable and applicable in different socio-spatial contexts. However, there are some specific results of the above analysis that raise important questions at a macroregional or even European level and could be used as a lens to examine segregation together with poverty and social exclusions in other parts of Europe.

- a. Immigrant groups may find themselves in conditions that entrap them in poverty and exclude them from social services and social participation. These conditions are quite complex, as they are taking shape by interacting factors such as class, age, gender, legal status, education skills, employment opportunities in different economic sectors and the duration of settlement. However, there seems to be a specific ethnic component in the levels of exposure to poverty and social exclusion. Belonging to a specific ethnic community seems to 'explain' part of the differentiation in living conditions. That is possibly because members of immigrants groups may share similar characteristics regarding other factors (e.g. position in the labour market and legal status), but more importantly it may be connected with community solidarity relationships and the ability of established members to support the social integration prospects of the newcomers. The policy question here is how to support immigrants' (formal and informal) social networks, while enhancing their interaction with the 'receiving' society.
- b. Established welfare regimes that have been shaped after decades of political negotiation between different social actors in the European societies may underestimate the needs of 'new' vulnerable social groups such as undocumented immigrants, homeless and the new poor. What is more, their needs tend to be understood and assessed in terms of the established preconditions of welfare provision. For example, a family-centred housing provision model not only leaves poor space for developing policy responses for asylum-seekers outside family relationships but also even fails to recognize them as a particular category with special needs. The policy question here is how to adapt with changing needs and priorities and how to broaden the scope of policy intervention.
- c. The congregation of vulnerable social groups is often understood as merely the spatial expression of phenomena of poverty and social exclusion, i.e. as an indication of spatial exclusion. Our analysis reveals, on the contrary, that poverty and social exclusion may be present in situations of spatial dispersal and, on the other hand, that some level of congregation is a positive factor for social integration. The policy question here is how to adopt policy interventions, in order to fight the negative and promote the positive aspects

of congregation, often having to combat with dominant representations about 'ghettoization'.

- d. The shadow presence of undocumented immigrants in the European societies produces unacceptable conditions of poverty and social exclusion. By far the most extreme case of concurrence of segregation, poverty and social exclusion is found in the institutionalized space of the detention centres where undocumented immigrants are imprisoned awaiting deportation. The policy question here is not how to manage the migratory movements at the European borders but rather how to combat with immigrants' marginalization caused by a restrictive European immigration policy.
- e. Access of vulnerable groups to adequate housing is a crucial element of social integration. Adequate dwellings that correspond to residents' needs are not only indispensable for everyday material well-being but also means for social acceptance and recognition by others. Affordable houses may be provided through a variety of different methods in which the central and local state, the third sector and private investors may be involved. The policy question here is how to find flexible solutions in an environment of restricted allocated resources and without spatially segregating the affected groups.

In a more general context, the study of Attica raises some broader questions about policies and policy systems against poverty and social exclusion which are summarized in the next section.



## 6 Conclusions for policy development and monitoring

Issues of residential segregation and especially its connections with poverty and social exclusion have often been neglected by policies at the urban and the metropolitan scale in MRA. This is by and large a consequence of a family-centred welfare model and its context-dependent spatial expressions: the protected small land-ownership, socially dispersed home-ownership, low participation of public housing in the total housing stock, irregular construction, poor spatial planning, low levels of residential segregation. Most policies to combat with segregated and impoverished areas did not go beyond fragmented ex-post regeneration projects focusing on physical planning. Even the massive arrival of transnational immigrants since the early 1990s, did not alter the dominant perceptions about how urban development occurs and how it is to be managed as the private rented housing stock proved enough to prevent a housing crisis.

Both socioeconomic and ethnic segregation remain comparatively low after more than two decades of immigration and unequal social strata continue to live close to each other, even in the same urban neighborhoods or in the same block of flats. However, important inequalities are recorded between the native and the immigrant population. At the same time, ethnic groups exhibit important variations regarding several demographic and social features that indicate different levels of exposure to poverty and/or social exclusion. In a period of rapid income redistribution (as imposed by austerity measures) not in favour of the less privileged social groups, those already exposed find themselves in greater danger.

The Greek immigration policy focuses on immigration control and on the regularization of access to legal documents (permanently leaving behind a shadow population) and failed so far to elaborate a more integrated strategy for combating against immigrants' poverty and social exclusion. A more comprehensive evidence-based immigration policy is needed, both in order to increase the level of recognition of immigrants' rights and their position in the Greek society and in order to combat against several forms of deprivation.

One aspect of this immigration policy should concern problems and opportunities that derive from the spatiality of immigrants' settlement in MRA. The five types of spatialized deprived socio-ethnic groups identified in the typology of Chapter 2 need differential areal policy responses. Some innovative methods to provide affordable housing, as for example by repairing and reusing unoccupied buildings, would make some difference in category i. The organized immigrants' communities can be involved in regeneration projects both there and in category iv, where they could additionally undertake the allocation of the apartments to their members. All categories call for measures to improve immigrants' access to social services, but this is especially challenging in conditions of relative spatial isolation in categories iii and v. Enhancing the ability of the communities to communicate with their members is a special task in categories ii, iii and v. Finding ways to fight local expressions of racism is crucial in any case but especially in category i, where the polarization of the

social structure seems to increase xenophobia. Immigrants' entrepreneurship in the areas of the same category can be used as a positive example of enrichment of the local social and economic life and the same holds true for areas of category iv.

Despite local differences, there are some common challenges and preconditions, if it is to deal with variations of segregation and poverty/social exclusion. The ability of the central and local state to apply social policies together with physical planning should be enhanced through the increase of both financial and human resources. The welfare provision system is being decentralized, as more responsibilities are given to the local states and third sector or private actors are getting involved. While this has a positive aspect, especially if one takes into consideration the inefficiencies of the centralized welfare system, decentralization has to be followed by measures to keep the entire system coordinated and effective. Initiatives from below at the local level and networking at higher levels have to be supported and promoted by the organized institutions of the civil society, public bodies and the authorities.

Above all, immigration policy should go far beyond control, policing and restriction measures. Understanding that immigration is an ongoing social reality, the Greek immigration policy must deal with the multifaceted task of social integration which crucially comprises the positive recognition of immigrants' presence and redistribution measures against deprivation. What the current period of economic crisis reveals is that fighting poverty and social exclusion of immigrants requires recognition together with redistribution, despite that austerity policy severely reduces the prospects for both.

## 7 Literature

Allen, J., Barlow, J., Leal, J., Maloutas, T. & Padovani L. (2004) *Housing and welfare in Southern Europe*. Blackwell, Oxford.

Arapoglou, V. & Maloutas, T. (2011) Segregation, inequality and marginality in context: The case of Athens, *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 136 C': 135-155.

Arapoglou, V.P. (2006) Immigration, Segregation and Urban Development in Athens: The Relevance of the LA Debate for Southern European Metropolises, *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 121(C): 11-38.

Economou D. (1997) The planning system and rural land use control in Greece: A European perspective, *European Planning Studies*, 5 (4): 461-476.

EKKE-ESYE (2005) *Census data Panorama, 1991–2001. Data base and mapping application in the Institute of Urban and Rural Sociology*. National Centre for Social Research, Athens.

Emmanuel, D. (2004) Socio-economic Inequalities and Housing in Athens: Impacts of the Monetary Revolution of the 1990s, *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 113A: 121-144.

Friedrichs, J. & Vranken, J. (2001) European urban governance in fragmented societies. In: Andersen, H.T. & van Kempen, R., eds. *Governing European Cities: Social Fragmentation, Social Exclusion and Urban Governance*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 19-39.

INE (2008) *Annual report 2008: The Greek economy and employment*, Athens, INE (in Greek).

Kalandides, A. & Vaiou, D. (2012) Ethnic' neighbourhoods? Practices of belonging and claims to the city, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 19: 254–266.

Kandylis, G. & Kavoulakos, K. (2011) Framing urban inequalities: Racist mobilization against immigrants in Athens, *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 136 C': 157-176.

Kandylis, G. & Maloutas, T. (2012) Here for good: Immigrants' residential mobility and social integration in Athens during the late 1990s. In: Finney, N. & Catney, G., eds. *Minority Internal Migration in Europe*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Kandylis, G., Maloutas, T. & Sayas, J. (2012) Immigration, inequality and diversity: socio-ethnic hierarchy and spatial organization in Athens, Greece, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 19(3): 267-86.

Karyotis, G. (2012) Securitization of migration in Greece: Process, motives and implications, *Political Sociology*, 6 (4): 390–408.


King R. (2000) Southern Europe in the changing global map of migration. In: King R, Lazaridis G & Tsardanidis C.H., eds. *Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe*. Houndmills. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–26.

Leontidou L. (1990) *The Mediterranean City in Transition: Social Change and Urban Development*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

- Maloutas, T. & Karadimitriou, N. (2001) Vertical social differentiation in Athens: alternative or complement to urban segregation? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25: 699–716.
- Maloutas, T. (2004) Segregation and residential mobility: spatially entrapped social mobility and its impact on segregation in Athens, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 11: 195–211.
- Maloutas, T. (2007) Segregation, social polarization and immigration in Athens: theoretical expectations and contextual difference, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 31: 733–758.
- Maloutas, T., Arapoglou, V., Kandyliis, G. & Sayas, J. (2012) Social Polarization and De-segregation in Athens. In: Maloutas, T. & Fujita, K., eds. *Residential Segregation Around the World. Why Context Matter*. Faringham: Ashgate.
- Maroukis, T. (2009) *Undocumented Migration Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe. Country report – Greece*. Report prepared under the research project CLANDESTINO. [online] Available at: [http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/clandestino\\_report\\_greece\\_final\\_3.pdf](http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/clandestino_report_greece_final_3.pdf)
- Massey, D.S. & Denton, N.A. (1988) The Dimensions of Residential Segregation, *Social Forces*, 67 (2): 281-315.
- Parsanoglou, D. (2009) When social sciences reproduce ideological patterns: The uncontested alibi of ‘surprise’ of the Greek society by immigration. In: Pavlou M. & Skoulariki, A., eds. *Immigrants and Minorities*. Athens: Vivliorama.
- Pavlou D. (2007) *Racism and Discrimination against Immigrants in Greece: The State of Play*, Athens, HLHR-KEMO. [In Greek].
- Pavlou, M. (2009) Discourse and policies on immigrants. In: Pavlou M. & Skoulariki, A., eds. *Immigrants and Minorities*. Vivliorama, Athens.
- Stathakis, G. (2010) The sovereign debt crisis of the Greek economy. A historical view, *Sinchrona Themata*, 108: 5-9 (in Greek).
- Swarts, J. & Karakatsanis, N. (2012) The securitization of migration: Greece in the 1990s, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 14 (1): 33-51.
- Vaiou D. & Stratigaki M. (2008) From ‘Settlement’ to ‘Integration’: informal practices and social services for women migrants in Athens, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 15: 119–131.
- Vaiou, D. & Chadjimichalis, K. (1997) *With the Sewing Machine in the Kitchen and the Polish in the Fields. Cities, Regions and Informal Work*. Exadas, Athens.
- Vrychea, A. & Golemis, C. (1998) Spatial segregation and social Exclusion in a peripheral Greek neighbourhood. In: Madanipour, A., Cars, G. & Allen, J., eds. *Social Exclusion in European Cities*. London: Jessica Kingsley.
- Wacquant, L. (2008) *Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality*. Polity Press, Cambridge.

## Annex 1: Additional maps and tables

### Demographic and social differentiation of ethnic groups



**Figure 11: Mean duration of residence by ethnic group. MRA 2001**

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005




Figure 12: Gender distribution by ethnic group. MRA 2001

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005




Figure 13: Mean age by ethnic group. MRA, 2001

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005




Figure 14: Household structure by ethnic group. MRA, 2001

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005






Figure 15: Education level by age group. Region of Attiki, 2001

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005




Figure 16: Socioeconomic classification by ethnic group. MRA, 2001

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005





Figure 17: Tenure by ethnic group. MRA, 2001

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005



**Figure 18: Mean domestic surface by ethnic group. MRA, 2001**

Source: EKKE-ESYE 2005

## Segregation indices

1. Segregation index.  $IS = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{x_i}{X} - \frac{t_i - x_i}{T - X} \right|$

2. Entropy index.  $H = \sum_{i=1}^n [t_i(E - E_i) / ET]$

with  $E = (P) \ln[1/P] + (1-P) \ln[1 - (1-P)]$  and

$E_i = (p_i) \ln[1/p_i] + (1-p_i) \ln[1/(1-p_i)]$

3. Delta Index.  $DEL = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{x_i}{X} - \frac{A_i}{A} \right|$

4. Absolute Centralization Index.  $ACE = \left( \sum_{i=1}^n X_{i-1} S_i \right) - \left( \sum_{i=1}^n X_i S_{i-1} \right)$

5. Absolute clustering index.

$$ACL = \left\{ \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i/X) \sum_{j=1}^n (c_{ij} x_j) \right] - \left[ X/n^2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n c_{ij} \right] \right\} / \left\{ \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i/X) \sum_{j=1}^n (c_{ij} t_j) \right] - \left[ X/n^2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n c_{ij} \right] \right\}$$

6. Interaction index.  ${}_x P_y = \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i/X)(y_i/t_i)$

- $x_i$  Population of group X in spatial unit i
- $x_j$  Population of group X in spatial unit j
- $y_i$  Population of group Y in spatial unit i
- X Total population of group X in metropolitan area
- $t_i$  Total population in spatial unit i
- $t_j$  Total population in spatial unit j
- T Total population in the metropolitan area
- P Proportion of group in the metropolitan area (i.e. X/T)
- $A_i$  Area of spatial unit i
- A Area of metropolitan area
- $S_i$  Cumulative proportion of area of spatial unit i (from 1 to i). Spatial units are sorted by distance from the centre in ascending order.
- $c_{ij}$  1 if units i and j are contiguous; 0 otherwise
- n Number of spatial units in the metropolitan area

*Regression models: quantifications of categorical variables*

**Model I**

**SEX<sup>a</sup>**

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Male	11184	-,937
Female	9810	1,068

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

**ESEC Recoded<sup>b</sup>**

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Large Employers, higher grade professionals and managers	262	-6,160
Lower grade professionals and managers	252	-2,433
Intermediate occupations	270	-3,290
Small employers and self-employed	790	-1,767
Self employed in agriculture	102	,018
Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations	61	-,194
Lower services, sales & clerical occupations	1113	-1,068
Lower technical occupations	4071	,463
Routine occupations	7910	,038
Non-economically active	6163	,572

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

**Education Level Recoded**

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Higher education	2002	-2,228
Post-secondary education	1238	-1,411
Secondary education (12 years)	8580	-,162
Secondary education (9 years)	4259	,336
Primary education	3697	1,154
Less than primary education	1218	1,559

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

**Household Type 5**

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Couple	3199	,450
Nuclear	10449	-,579
Single-parent household	1118	-,031
Single-member household	928	4,248
No family nucleus or members outside family nucleus	5300	,133

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

**NATIONALITY\_CODE\_ID<sup>a</sup>**

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Albania	13537	-,475
Armenia	178	,381
Bangladesh	298	-1,263
Brazil	42	3,193
Bulgaria	718	2,069
Egypt	424	,282
Ethiopia	73	-,303
Filippines	425	1,219
Georgia	205	2,744
India	181	-,291
Iran	37	1,168
Iraq	317	-,536
Kazakhstan	117	,005
Lebanon	83	3,002
Moldova	245	1,185
Nigeria	87	-,821
Pakistan	642	-1,252
Poland	722	,494
Romania	597	,391
Russia	435	1,222
South Africa	51	3,950
Sri Lanka	69	1,915
Syria	267	,259
Turkey	558	3,018
Ukraine	575	1,911
Uzbekistan	25	,428
Yugoslavia	86	1,649

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.



## Model II

### SEX<sup>a</sup>

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Male	11297	-,934
Female	9847	1,071

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

### ESEC Recoded<sup>b</sup>

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Large Employers, higher grade professionals and managers	262	-5,710
Lower grade professionals and managers	252	-1,392
Intermediate occupations	270	-3,000
Small employers and self-employed	793	-2,128
Self employed in agriculture	107	1,297
Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations	61	-1,647
Lower services, sales & clerical occupations	1113	-1,560
Lower technical occupations	4100	,583
Routine occupations	7993	,453
Non-economically active	6193	,005

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

### Education Level Recoded<sup>b</sup>

Category	Frequency	Quantification
Higher education	2004	-1,782
Post-secondary education	1240	-1,382
Secondary education (12 years)	8608	-,445
Secondary education (9 years)	4285	,523
Primary education	3746	1,291
Less than primary education	1261	1,616

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

### Household Type 5


Category	Frequency	Quantification
Couple	3208	,666
Nuclear	10496	-,700
Single-parent household	1122	,037
Single-member household	936	3,887
No family nucleus or members outside family nucleus	5382	,285

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.

### NATIONALITY\_CODE\_ID<sup>9</sup>


Category	Frequency	Quantification
Albania	13618	-,449
Armenia	178	-,005
Bangladesh	298	-1,000
Brazil	42	2,568
Bulgaria	719	2,062
Egypt	428	,088
Ethiopia	73	,430
Filippines	425	,741
Georgia	205	2,323
India	212	-1,288
Iran	37	1,200
Iraq	317	-1,025
Kazakhstan	117	,433
Lebanon	83	2,097
Moldova	245	1,370
Nigeria	87	-,151
Pakistan	672	-1,665
Poland	722	,846
Romania	598	,617
Russia	435	1,706
South Africa	51	3,064
Sri Lanka	70	1,274
Syria	267	,760
Turkey	559	2,881
Ukraine	575	2,034
Uzbekistan	25	,188
Yugoslavia	86	1,492

a. Optimal Scaling Level: Nominal.




**Figure 19: Percentage of immigrant population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005




**Figure 20: Percentage of SEG 1 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005




**Figure 21: Percentage of SEG 2 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005




**Figure 22: Percentage of SEG 3 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005



**Figure 23: Percentage of SEG 4 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005



**Figure 24: Percentage of SEG 5 population per 1km grid cell. MRA 2001**

Source: 2001 census, EKKE-ESYE 2005

## Annex 2: List of interviewed experts

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Role in dealing with poverty and/or social exclusion</b>	<b>Geographical/political level</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Has declared willingness to work with TIPSE?</b>
Municipality of Argyropuli-Elliniko	Vice Mayor, Responsible for the Social Policy Department	Local government, Policy making/ Policy implementation	25/10/12	YES
Charity Fund of the Archdiocese of Athens	Director	Third sector, Policy making	9/10/12	
NGO Klimaka	Responsible for actions about homelessness	Third sector, Policy implementation	6/11/12	YES
Municipality of Athens	Social worker	Local government, Policy implementation	18/10/12	YES
Centre of Reception and Solidarity of the Municipality of Athens	Vice-president	Local government, Policy making	25/10/12	
Direction of Immigration Policy, Ministry of Interior	Head of the Department of Legal Coordination and Control,	Central government, Policy making	15/11/12	YES
Sudanese Community of Attiki	Secretary	Minority group, policy implementation	3/12/12	YES
'KASAPI', Filipino Community in Greece	Member	Minority group, policy implementation	20/1/13	YES
Pakistani Community in Greece	President	Minority group, policy implementation	15/12/12	YES
Roma network of Greece	Ex-Director	Minority group, policy implementation	3/4/13	