ESPON

RISE
Regional Integrated Strategies in Europe

Targeted Analysis 2013/2/11

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1.0 Introduction

The *central aim* of this report is arriving at a deeper understanding of some of the most important RISE concepts and to elaborate these concepts. By doing that this report seeks to contribute to the interpretation of the results of the case studies as well as the construction of the RISE toolkit.

In this report four groups of concepts have been identified:

- Policy integration. This is a key concept in the entire RISE project so it is of crucial importance to ground the work on (improved) policy integration firmly in the literature.
- Policy transfer and learning. As this ESPON Objective 2 project is on collecting and comparing evidence from various, highly different regions and countries it is important to reflect on some of the challenges in relation to learning and the possible transfer of policy practice from one situation to another.
- Meta-governance and new forms of governance. The position of government and governmental actors in nearly all European countries has changed dramatically over recent years. The fact that policy integration takes place in settings with increasing numbers of actors needs reflection on steering possibilities.
- Collaborative planning, legitimization and partnership. Policy integration in a context of a plurality of actors makes it necessary to reflect on the relationships between government, stakeholders and civil actors in terms of potentials and challenges to cooperate and collaborate as well as how to arrive at a political legitimization of policies.

The literature on the four groups of concepts is vast. So we have been looking at literature which makes an *application* in the RISE project possible. This means that we have been looking at literature presenting building blocks for *operational definitions* of concepts. Due to the application goal of this report we have not strived for comprehensiveness. The focus in the interpretation of the case study results on the basis of this report is on policy integration as the overarching theme. The other three groups of concepts are related to this theme.

2.0 Policy integration[1]

2.1 Introduction

The desire to integrate policy across different sectoral planning domains such as economic development, transport, housing, retail development is not new. Complaints that departments do not communicate, or that policy actions are contradictory are legion (Peters, 1998). Pressman and Wildavsky (1984)

[1] This chapter has been prepared by Stewart MacNeill, Gill Bentley and John Gibney, Department of Management, University of Birmingham.

observe that “no suggestion for reform is more common than ‘we need more coordination’”. Thus while planning systems vary greatly across Europe (CEC, 1997), most countries employ mechanisms to seek policy integration amongst different sectors and different levels of governance. At EU level integrated spatial planning is argued as able to help secure efficiency gains through improved vertical integration of activities across spatial scales and horizontally between regions (Kidd, 2007).

At the same time an increasing emphasis on localism – and on accountability, transparency and citizen-oriented interventions at the sub-national scale – is driving the aspirations for improved policy integration across the board. Indeed, given the many horizontal and vertical complexities involved, effective integrated spatial planning may be more likely at smaller spatial scales (Vigar, 2009). Emphasis on cities and city-regions as engines of growth is also focusing attention on the need to improve degrees of policy integration to avoid management/resource inefficiencies (Buitelaar et al., 2007). Briassoulis (2004) suggests that policy integration is needed to hold the policy system together, to overcome its tendencies towards disorder, and to manage the numerous policy interconnections so that policy supply meets policy demand, supporting the effective resolution of complex problems and the transition to sustainable development.

2.2 What is policy integration?

Policy integration can be conceptualised as a process either of coordinating and blending policies into a unified whole, or of incorporating concerns of one policy into another. Vigar (2009) characterises policy integration as having four broad overlapping processes: (1) (co)-aligning strategies and policies; (2) policy (re)-framing; (3) connecting policy and (4) action and enabling co-operation amongst actors (Healey, 2006a). Collier (1994), by contrast, is more concerned with outcomes and suggests three dimensions: (1) achieving sustainable development [and preventing environmental damage]; (2) removing contradictions between as well as within policies; and (3) realising mutual benefits and the goal of making policies mutually supportive.

Policy integration thus refers to the process of sewing together and coordinating policies, both over (horizontally) and across (vertically) levels of governance, modifying them appropriately if necessary, to create an interlocking, hierarchical, loosely-coupled, multi-level, policy system that functions harmoniously in unity. The output of such an integration process will be an integrated policy system aiming to achieve multiple complementarities and synergies.

De Boe et al. (1999) consider three broad dimensions describing integration. Firstly, *sectoral integration* or the ‘joining-up’ different policy domains and their actors within a particular territory. Secondly, *territorial integration* concerning policy integration between different territories and is seen to minimise the negative impacts of policy in the context of inter-territorial (cross-boundary) working and encourages complementarities. Thirdly, *organizational integration* which they describe as necessary to encourage the strategic and operational co-operation between actors that is critical to effective delivery (see text box).

Text box: different forms of policy integration

Sectoral integration: this is about the 'joining up' of different public policy domains and their associated actors within a given territorial area (De Boe et al., 1999, p. 15). Spatial planning to a large part is legitimised by the drive to sectoral integration: public sector domains with a territorial impact need to be addressed on this impact. For instance: territorial impact assessment advocated by spatial planners is based on this logic. Spatial planning emphasizes other aspects apart from territorial impacts. For instance: without proper coordination or integration approaches (the latter being the superlative degree of coordination) sectoral domains remain "inefficient, in that they can result in competing and contradictory objectives and duplication of effort, and ineffective, in that they ignore the complexity of interactions between different areas of public policy interest." (Kidd, 2007, p. 164).
Within the category of sectoral integration two dimensions can be distinguished: 1) **cross-sectoral integration** between different policy areas which can operate at a range of different scales for instance at the trans-national (e.g. European Union) level (De Boe et al., 1999) and "at all local, regional, state and national scales in between."(Kidd, 2007). Sectoral integration can also imply **inter-agency integration**: integration between public, private and voluntary sector agencies. This is also known as stakeholder integration.

Territorial integration: this is about the integration of public policy domains between territories (De Boe et al., 1999, p. 15). This category is legitimized by perspectives such as (again) efficient governance, globalisation and sustainability. "The argument here is that current planning approaches are, to a greater or lesser extent, disjointed across territorial divisions. This situation can lead to inefficiency and ineffectiveness in dealing with important policy issues and infrastructure investments that transcend administrative boundaries." (Kidd, 2007, p. 166). Territorial integration is often advocated in the case of positive or negative externalities of certain developments or in the case of what is often called 'intrinsic spatial relations': spatial structures or systems which cross administrative boundaries but to their nature cannot be easily split up in different parts.
As Kidd (2007) and De Boe et alia (1999) emphasize the category of territorial integration also encompasses different dimensions: both "vertical integration" – policy coherence across spatial scales, and "horizontal integration" – policy coherence between neighbouring authorities (nations, states, regions etc.) and areas with some shared interest.

Organizational integration: as we have already emphasized both sectoral and territorial integration require "co-operation between parties in the form of organisational integration" (De Boe, 1999, p. 19). This final category of integration emphasizes the actor perspective. One can even say that organizational integration is "critical to the effective delivery of sectoral and territorial integration." (Kidd, 2007, p. 166). Again a variety of forms can be distinguished according to Cowell and Martin (2003; quoted in Kidd, 2007) and the RTPI (2003; idem): 1) **strategic integration** – the alignment of linked strategies, programmes and initiatives, and 2) **operational integration** – the alignment of related delivery mechanisms. We can also use different words: organizational integration implies a coupling between (strategic) spatial visions, objectives and spatial concepts at the one hand and operational decision making (including concrete investments on the ground) at the other hand.

2.3 Analysing and assessing policy integration

Briassoulis (2004) considers a relational approach and proposes the need for congruent relationships amongst (see table 2.1):

- *Policy objects* – a common scope and treating common or complementary facets (environmental, spatial, economic, social, institutional) of a problem.

- *Policy actors* – common actors increase the chances of integration.
- *Policy goals* – common or complementary goals as necessary (but not sufficient) pre-conditions for integration.
- *Policy structures and procedures* – horizontal linkages among organizational and administrative apparatuses and coordinated structures and procedures for formulating and carrying out solutions;
- *Policy instruments* – congruent instruments of the same or different types (or the use of integrative instruments).

Table 2.1 Criteria for assessing policy integration (Source: Briassoulis, 2004)

General	Political commitment and leadership for policy integration in general; Existence of long term development strategies; Shared core beliefs and communication across policy sectors; Absence of intra-governmental power relations or vertical alliances; Flexible general taxation.
Related to policy objects	Congruent, compatible, consistent and/or complementary policy objects; Multidimensional policy objects and integrated/interdisciplinary theories; Common and consistent concepts and terminologies.
Criteria related to policy actors	Common formal actors on and across various spatial/organizational levels; Common informal actors on and across various spatial levels.
Criteria related to policy goals and objectives	Political commitment/leadership for policy integration in the case of the policies analysed; Common, congruent, compatible and/or complementary goals/objectives; Stipulation of quantitative, measurable, indicator-based targets and timetables.
Criteria related to policy structures and procedures	Administrative capacity for policy integration – Organization, officials administrative reform; Informal interaction among formal policy actors and actor networks; Interaction among state and non-state policy actors; Consistent, compatible and coordinated procedures and rules of decision making; Strengthening existing administrative units with regard to procedural rights and rules relevant for coordination and joint problem-solving; Joint decision making and joint responsibilities of the policy sectors considered; Provisions for implementing policy integration requirements (e.g. compliance, enforcement and accountability mechanisms among competent agencies).
Criteria related to policy instruments	Existence of a legal framework; Common legal and institutional instruments; Use of integrative instruments; e.g., legal, economic, financial, planning; Favourable budgetary process and use of financial mechanisms/ incentives, such as, subsidies for policy integration. Common or coordinated/compatible sector action plans; Common, shared research resources and consistent, information bases; Common assessment and evaluation methodologies, and tools (policy integration indicators); Education and training services.

Briassoulis (2004) suggests the object of policy integration should be analysed in terms of four clusters of dimensions:

- The *substantive* dimensions which encompass the thematic, conceptual, and value dimensions of the policy objects to be integrated.
- The *analytical* dimension that entails spatial, temporal and methodological considerations.

- The *procedural* dimensions that refer to the structural and procedural relationships among policies that constitute the means through which policy integration materialises.
- The *practical* dimensions that concern the availability, compatibility, consistency and congruence of information needed to analyse properly the object of policy integration.

Developing the theme she suggests a list of criteria for assessing whether integration already exists and for proposing how it can be achieved or improved (see also table 2.1).

In the context of integrated coastal management, Pickaver et al. (2004) discuss indicators as management tools to define problems, set goals for solutions and track progress. They suggest that indicators should be representative, simple, responsive, well founded, linked to economic models and measurable. They can evolve out of processes that are *en train* which may be non-integrated (often sectoral) discrete actions but which, subsequently, can enable vertical and horizontal integration of administrative and planning bodies to bring about efficient, participatory, integrative planning.

2.4 Difficulties of achieving policy integration

According to Underdal (1980), policy integration is successful when the effects of policy decisions are assessed in advance and when different policy elements are consistent. However, the process of achieving such 'joined up governance' is becoming more and more difficult due to the different jurisdictions and *raisons d'être* of the range of public authorities, agencies and private businesses that provide every day services (Peters, 1998) and the sharing of governance at national and international level (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). In this respect, one of the main difficulties is integrating governmental actors in different professional fields where the power of decision making is based more on expertise than on authority (McPhee & Poole, 2001; Mintzberg et al., 2003). Moreover, communication processes in any policy field are often threatened by differences in power among individual actors. Hence, decisions on policies are often based on dependency relations among actors rather than on rational arguments.

Stead and Meijers (2009) also observe that there are an increasing number of cross-cutting issues, (such as environment, sustainability and equal opportunities), that add to this complexity. In addition there is a need to integrate both 'static elements' (built environment, urban form and the protection of special places), and dynamic 'flow' between territories (Kidd, 2007).

Stead and Meijers (2009) refer to the three umbrella concepts of *policy integration, policy coordination and policy cooperation*. They distinguish between these such that policy integration relates to the management and linking of actors, organisations and networks across sectoral and other boundaries whereas policy coordination is concerned with outcomes and avoidance of either redundancies or gaps in services. Clearly they are closely

related and both involve policy cooperation through sharing and collaboration. The three concepts and their outcomes are illustrated in figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Integration, coordination and cooperation (Source: Stead & Meijers, 2009)



It is clear from the above discussion that there are limitations to the degree(s) of 'policy integration' that can be realistically achieved. Stead and Meijers draw on a number of academic sources to consider the facilitators and inhibitors. They list these as:

- *Political factors* – which may be positive where there is a convergent problem of definition, professional ideologies, interests and approaches plus a perception that integration increases the ability to manage uncertainty and complexity. Inhibiting political factors pertain where there are divergent priorities and interests resulting in a lack of consensus and common commitment.
- *Organizational factors* – are facilitators where there are standardised procedures but inhibitors where there is excessive bureaucracy, poor levels of communications of poorly trained/motivated personnel.
- *Economic/financial factors* – are the potential gain in resources (time, money, information, raw material, legitimacy, status), cost and risk sharing plus economies of scale. Alternatively the costs of coordination may outweigh any benefits especially if the planning/policy cycles differ.
- *Process, management and instrumental factors* – can be facilitators, for example where there are group-centred approaches to problems plus open natured networks. Alternatively inhibitors include lack of communication, fear of delays and increased complexity requiring additional management procedures.
- *Behavioural, cultural and personal factors* – where facilitators include a positive attitude and organizational culture towards working with other organisations often based upon good historical relations. To the contrary, poor relations, vested interests and the lack of commonly identified goals inhibit integration.

In their discussion the authors observe that no single factor is sufficient to either bring about or to prevent policy integration. Much depends upon the

perceptions and interpretations of the key actors – be they supportive or not. Simply stating that policy integration would improve delivery does not address the complexity of the factors involved.

2.5 Is policy integration practical or (even) desirable?

The underlying assumption of planning integration is that policy integration will produce more coherent development and implementation thereby improving outcomes. However, this is not necessarily the case. Briassoulis (2004), for example, offers some preliminary thoughts on designing policy integration schemes and asks three broad questions:

- Is a general, all-purpose and all-encompassing policy integration scheme possible and desirable or is a case, or issue, specific policy integration scheme more appropriate?
- Is horizontal integration sufficient to tackle crosscutting issues or is vertical integration necessary too, or both?
- Is policy integration at a given level sufficient or is cross-level policy integration necessary – or even a grand scheme of full-blown integration on and across levels?

Mintzberg (1994) distinguishes between the 'planning school' and the 'learning school'. The former has the philosophy that organizations can improve performance and delivery if they follow a documented plan or strategy. Here top down planning control tries to increase predictability albeit at the expense of empowerment and flexibility. The counter position is informal and emergent strategy formation, which does not necessarily imply the formulation of a strategy document. In public policy, the 'learning school' goes back to Lindblom's (1959) notion of 'incrementalism' where strategies are seen as evolving through informal and mutual adjustments amongst actors rather than through formalized procedures. Against this background, Mintzberg (1994) highlights a number of issues related to strict top-down integration. *Firstly*, planning builds on a predetermination of future developments and discontinuities, which are uncertain and therefore not predictable. *Secondly*, those who develop plans or strategies are rarely the same as those who implement them. *Thirdly*, he suggests that strategy formation cannot be accomplished by formalizing the process through distinct planners isolated from daily routines. He thus concludes that 'strategic planning' may be an oxymoron.

In this view, strategy formation cannot be formally planned but instead emerges out of collective and incremental learning processes. While the planning and learning schools represent two extreme standpoints the reality, as Steurer and Martinuzzi (2005) point out, is that practical strategy planning and implementation falls between the two. Complex plans cannot be drawn up and implemented in a neat linear manner. However, pure incrementalism – opportunity without strategy – is likely to result in 'drift' and/or in faddism and fashionable innovation. The extent of integration at different levels can also be questioned. There is inevitably a 'trade off' between sectoral and territorial integration. The greater the extent of the latter the more difficult it may be to integrate across sectors, especially where policy is decided at different governance levels.

2.6 Integrating frameworks

Steurer and Martinuzzi (2005), writing in the context of national sustainable development strategies, argue for a hybrid version of strategic management where strategy can evolve as it is implemented but still works within an overarching vision and framework. It is thus flexible but does not reject formal plans so will stay close to the original intended outcomes. They look at strategic plans for sustainable development in a number of European Member States as good examples of how a broad theme can combine hierarchical strategy, vision and steering with collaboration in networks that enable learning and adaption and the deployment of different modes of governance. Here we can suggest that a general wider framework in which individual actions and/or incremental learning can take place is both desirable and beneficial. Hence, Simeonova and Van der Valk (2009), writing about environmental policy integration, see policy integration as an operational principle for implementing and institutionalizing, in their case, the concept of sustainable development. Like most forms of policy integration, they argue, environmental policy integration is seen as an important part of 'good governance': the more integrated and mutually reinforcing the policies are, the easier their effective delivery will be (Lenschow, 2002; Margerum, 1997; EEB, 2003).

For Van den Broeck (2011) space itself, and the act of design for its future use, provides the uniting feature for policy integration. Thus spatial planning (design) can be viewed as a medium to "read (analyze), interpret and define spaces and places, to represent possible futures and necessary transformations and innovations and promote them, to explore different understandings of, and shared terms for, spatial quality". Thus spatial planning, it can be argued, is a form of meta-governance in that it seeks to coordinate different policies around place-based development agenda(s) (Jessop, 2002). It provides for a meta-coordinating strategy that looks to void/negotiate policy conflict and institutional contradiction (Hull, 2005); helps to secure efficiencies in innovation and sustainable economic development (Schön, 2005) – and, where spatial planning frameworks serve to broaden the policy frame, to accommodate new issues; resolve implementation deficits; and links actors through common goal setting, partnership working and knowledge sharing (Vigar, 2009). However, Van den Broeck (2011) recognizes the 'tricky' nature of relating process to project in a strategic way given the nature of budgets, events and political imperatives.

2.7 Conclusions

In general, policy integration is seen as desirable and, hence, calls to integrate are many. The perceived benefits of 'joined up' governance and strategy are more efficient policy development, and seamless, non-contradictory, non-wasteful implementation. It is argued that a lack of strategy leads to drift and to faddism and agendas that can be 'highjacked' by particular interests. A number of parameters have been identified as either facilitating or inhibiting integration. These include political, economic, organizational and behavioural factors. Similar, and overlapping, criteria can be used to judge the degree of integration.

However, the complexity of planning across different sectoral fields, and levels of governance, makes the process of integration difficult. One can argue that there is a 'trade off' between the different possible areas of integration: sectoral and territorial integration. The greater the latter the more difficult it may be to integrate across sectors, especially where policy is decided at different governance levels. Thus, since knowledge is bounded, the concept of integrated strategic planning is questionable. Too rigid frameworks leave little space for learning, adaption and integration.

Overarching frameworks, such as the design of space, sustainable development or environment can provide a sufficiently strategic policy envelope while at the same time enabling flexibility and 'real-time learning. However, it is recognized that translation into everyday practice, is determined by local culture, informal rules and path-dependent factors (Lloyd & Peel, 2005). For example, in England the Regional Development Agencies have been replaced by sub-regional Local Enterprise Partnerships. Their stated objective is to influence rather than to control the planning process. How the balance of fragmentation or integration through influence and cooperation will develop will be interesting to observe.

Useful for assessing the kind of policy integration taking place in the selected RISE cases the following *concepts* are proposed:

- Sectoral integration and its two sub-forms: cross-sectoral integration and inter-agency or stakeholder integration.
- Territorial integration, encompassing dimensions such as vertical integration (policy coherence across spatial scales) and horizontal integration (policy coherence between neighbouring authorities such as nations, states, regions etc. and areas with some shared interest.
- Organizational integration: co-operation between parties in the form of organizational integration. Different forms are: (1) strategic integration (the alignment of linked strategies, programmes and initiatives); (2) operational integration (the alignment of related delivery mechanisms), including a coupling between (strategic) spatial visions, objectives and spatial concepts at the one hand and operational decision making (including concrete investment on the ground) at the other hand.

3.0 Policy transfer and learning[2]

3.1 Introduction

One of the key assumptions of the RISE project is that policy integration in the four case study areas will show a high level of situated practice or contextuality. This means that each case is unique to a certain extent because the level and kind of integration depend on a number of regional contextual factors. In such a case, the validity of comparative studies between different regional contexts has limitations. It is therefor needed to look into

[2] This chapter has been prepared by Niels Boje Groth and Karina Sehested, Danish Forest and Landscape Research Institute, University of Copenhagen.

literature on policy transfer. It is necessary to get an overview of the main problems that arise in the practice of learning by comparing policies embedded in different localities. The following issues will be addressed:

1. The nature of important contextual factors such as planning cultures and planning systems.
2. Important barriers for cross-national and cross-regional learning.
3. Factors determining the transferability of policies, tools and instruments.

3.2 Important contextual factors

It is often emphasized that the literature on policy transfer belongs to a broader family of policy studies including e.g. policy diffusion studies and comparative policy studies. Most of these studies are concerned by the contextual diversity as one of the key barriers for policy diffusion, transfer and even harmonisation of policies.

The policy context belongs to the country from which policy transfer takes place as well as the country to which policies are transferred. As we shall see in the following section on barriers for cross-national learning, important contextual factors are related to the general political/cultural tradition of a country. In more operational terms, the relevant context is related to the *subject* of transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) set up seven policy subjects of transfer:

1. policy goals, structure and content;
2. policy instruments of administrative techniques;
3. institutions;
4. ideology;
5. ideas;
6. attitudes and concepts;
7. negative lessons.

Later, they highlight the distinction between *policy* and *programme,* - policies being “broader statements of intention and generally denote the direction policy-makers wish to take”, whereas programmes “are specific means of the course of action used to implement policies.” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 12). The contextual factors are, however, not specified by Dolowitz and Marsh. Instead they are implicitly given. To further understand what the relevant contextual factors are, one must consider the degree of transfer. Referring to Rose (1993), Dolowitz and Marsh identify five options on how to incorporate lessons into their political system:

1. copying;
2. emulation;
3. hybridization;
4. syntheses;
5. inspiration.

In their empirical comparative study of area planning in the Netherlands and England, Spaans and Louw (2009) emphasize the interdependence between national contexts and the degrees of policy transfer. Referring to Janssen-Jansen et al. (2008) they highligt three levels of increasing intensity of policy

transfer: (1) inspiration, (2) learning and (3) transplantation. They argue that due to contextual diversities, the former (inspiration) is most likely to take part between countries with different political/cultural systems, whereas the latter (transplantation), due to the high dependency on contextual similarity, is most likely to take place within the same country.

De Jong (2004) describes the most used contextual denominators as the legal, political and cultural differences. He further argues, that the most important distinction in contextual factors is between:

- formal institutions formed by legal rules;
- informal institutions formed by social practices and rituals based on cultural norms and values.

Both sides of institutions are essential parts of a planning institution and in a situation of policy transfer the tension between the formal and informal institution might come into play. Changes due to policy transfer are typically made in the formal institutions but often fail because of lack of changes in the informal institutions.

The complexity of relations between context and policy makes it challenging to be specific about these relations. Some argue that the most successful policy transfer is between 'families of nations' – with similar contextual conditions –, others criticise this statement. We will discuss this further when looking at the barriers for policy transfer.

A policy transfer continuum – voluntary and coercive policy transfer
Dolowitz and Marsh introduce a distinction between voluntary and coercive (forced) policy transfer. At the voluntary end of a continuum between the two, policy transfer is supposed to take place as a "rational response to a perceived process. So, the emergence of a problem, or of 'dissatisfaction with the status quo', will drive actors voluntarily to engage in an active search for new ideas as a 'cheap' means of solving the problem." (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 14). "Despite the assumption of rationality inherent in most studies of policy transfer, it is rare that actors are perfectly rational. Most act with limited information, or within the confines of 'bounded rationality'. At the same time, actors are influenced by their perceptions of a decision making situation rather than the 'real' situation. As such, transfer may be based upon an inaccurate assessment of the 'real' situation; in particular, it may be based upon incomplete or mistaken information about the nature of the policy and how it operates in the transferring political system or about the difference between the relevant economic, social and political consequences on the transferring and the borrowing systems. Hence, this represents a subset of transfer: transfer based upon incomplete information, etc.

Dolowitz and Marsh suggest three factors of policy failure in voluntary policy transfer:

1. *Uninformed transfer* – based upon insufficient information about the policy/institution and how it operates in the country from which it is transferred.

2. *Incomplete transfer* – not all elements crucial of making the policy or institutional structure a success was transferred, leading to failure.
3. *Inappropriate transfer* – occurs when insufficient attention was paid to the differences between the economic, social, political and ideological contexts in the transferring and the borrowing country.

At the opposite end of the continuum – the coercive transfer – we especially find transfers from international political organisations. Of special importance are organisations joined voluntarily but when joined are enforcing joint policies upon the member states. Still the states are taking part in negotiations on new policies and regulations. But when approved by the parliament rules must be obeyed by all member states.

The findings of Dolowtz and Marsh are closely connected to an instrumental rationality of policy transfer. De Jong & Edelenbos (2007, pp. 690-691) are sceptic about this, in stating three observations as starting points for their research:
1: *Learning rather than transfer*. Most of the early empirical studies, they argue, "departed from the idea that nation A borrows a policy from nation B and then adapts it to its own purposes. In many cases, however, reality is much more 'networked' and fluid and cannot be described as a functional or dysfunctional deviation from an original." Jong & Edelenbos argue that "experts acting in transnational networks and communities play a very substantial role in the spread of policy models, ideas and institutions."
In line with this observation, one is tempted to suggest that policy transfer has to be understood in terms of learning rather than transfer.

2: *Practical rather than scientific transfer*. Policy actors "are generally more open to insights they acquire from peers who have gone through similar experiences than to knowledge they could derive from scientific journals, even if the truth of the former have has ususally not been verified."

3: *Contextual rather than generic*. "The relevance of specific local contextualization in the adoption of 'universal' global best practices has become obvious. It is certainly true that international organizations are active in promoting international benchmarks and that this practice creates a visible distinction between pioneers, mid-range performers and laggards in adopting global standards for good governance. But apart from the fact that these novel policy models, ideas and institutions must be shaped to accommodate the interests of adopting local recipent actors, the technological, economic, legal-political and cultural environments in various countries and regions are also different. This implies that good practices in their originally proclaimed form are rarely suitable to all circumstances and all instutional structures (best practices as such simply do not exist), but always need to be contextualized and institutionalised to become a meaningful part of the entire set of institutional norms and practices of country or region."

In line with this last observation, De Jong and Edelenbos state that "European integration and harmonization imply an increase in the intensity of cross-national comparison and transnational exchange, but not necessarily a growth

of policy convergence among all involved planning systems. Domestic systems persist and incorporate European themes following their own institutional logics." (De Jong & Edelenbos, 2007, p. 688).

3.3 Barriers for cross-national and cross-regional learning

Barriers for policy transfer are not just related to crossing regional or national borders. At the outset of policy transfer, attention must be paid to the willingness of politicians. Thus, Dolowitz and Marsh observe that politicians tend to focus more on inherited policies, laws and programmes of their predecessors than new policies, chosen by them. They show a policy commitment to past and present policies which in turn reduces the inclination for policy transfer. "Past policies constrain agents as to both what can be transferred and what agents look for when engaging in policy transfer" Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p. 535).

Turning to the barriers for cross-national and cross-regional learning they are at least two-fold. On the one hand the more ambitious the policy transfer is, the more difficult it is to be transferred. As mentioned above this was the conclusion made by Spaans and Louw (2009), when they made the distinction between three levels of policy transfer: (1) inspiration, (2) learning and (3) transplantation.

On the other hand, barriers are generally embedded in the political/cultural national systems. Thus, Spaans and Louw (2009) argue that the degree to which policy transfer takes place depends on the contextual diversities between the countries from and to which policies are transferred. Several authors on policy transfer emphasize the importance of contextual diversities, however, ususally they do so without further investigating the concret character or parameters of contextual diversities. The general perception is that transplantation within families is most successful while transplantation across families is more difficult.

Referring to Esping-Anderson (1990; 1996) and Janssen-Jansen et al. (2008), Spaans and Louw (2009) argue that structural diversities in deep-rooted political and cultural traditions forms a decisive back-cloth of contextual diversities. Thus, Esping-Anderson (1996, p. 6) makes a distinction between the socio-democratic welfare state model (the Netherlands and the Nordic Countries), the liberal welfare state model (England) and the conservative corporatist model (Germany and France). Janssen-Jansen et al. (2008, p. 7) emphasize the diversity in policital traditions of Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Napoleonic, other continental and former communist systems.

However, the typologies of 'families of nations' change according to the issue compared in the countries. If we focus on legal frames we find the well-known differentation between the Anglo-Saxon, French, Germanic and Nordic models within the EU. If we focus on formal elements of the state organisation other clusters of nations are more relevant due to differences in party systems, patterns of interest mediation and welfare regimes: federal states (e.g. Germany), regionalised unitary states (France), decentralised unitary

states (Danmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands) and centralised unitary states (UK) (De Jong et al., 2002).

Loughlin (1999) has developed a model of families of states based on six indicators: (1) constitution; (2) state-society relations; (3) political organisation; (4) basis of policy style; (5) form of decentralisation and (6) approach to public administration. His categories are close to the legal ones: Anglo-Saxon (no state: UK), Germanic (organicist state: Germany and the Netherlands), French (Napoleonic state), Scandinavian (mixture Anglo-Saxon and Germanic).

So far it is clear that the constitution of families of nation with similar contextual conditions is not an easy exercise and in a situation of policy transfer it has to be considered what the most important issues for contextual comparisons are. This might differ e.g. from one policy area to another. De Jong (2004) stresses that some countries clearly belong to one family of states while others do not. As we can see the Netherlands are one example.

The nuances in contextual similarities and differences become important when we are to understand the process of transplantation. In spite of common legal, political and cultural characteristics important differences in practical and institutional issues might occur which explain the difficulties in transferring policy.

If we look into the specific policy area of spatial planning the categorisation from above changes again. A comparison of planning practices within the EU points to the existence of four families based on legal and administrative indicators:

- a British (UK),
- a Napoleonic (e.g. Netherlands),
- a Germanic and
- a Nordic one.

Again some countries form hybrids. For example, The Netherlands has a Napoleonic formal planning institution but a Nordic cultural value stressing decentralisation and democratisation (Loughlin, 1999).

Two discussions are related to these diversities: on the one hand it is questioned whether different political/cultural systems are converging or diverging. The mainstream argument is that globalisation and the development of communication systems greatly lever convergence between different national systems. Still, however, national welfare states show very distinct reactions to similar internal societal trends and external international developments. On the other hand the diversities between national political-cultural traditions and systems are seen as a barrier to smooth policy transfer. Therefore, policy transfer is seen as taking place in a continuum from – the most likely – inspiration, via learning to – the most seldom – transplantation.

Barriers for policy transfer are not just related to crossing regional or national borders. At the outset of policy transfer, attention must be paid to the

willingness of politicians. Thus, Dolowitz and Marsh observe that politicians tend to focus more on inherited policies, laws and programmes of their predecessors than new policies. They show a policy commitment to past and present policies which in turn reduces the inclination for policy transfer. “Past policies constrain agents as to both what can be transferred and what agents look for when engaging in policy transfer.” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 535).

3.4 Factors determining the transferability of policies, tools, and instruments?

It still makes sense to conclude that policy transfer is easier in a situation with similar contextual conditions (e.g. legal, political and cultural in a specific policy area) but there is no guarantee for success especially not when we are talking about transplantation of policy initiatives. There might be national, regional and local specificities and needs that prevent the success. Bogason (2000) suggests that a general approach to make institutional analyses and compare across different institutional settings could be:

1. to define the perception of the *policy problem* (e.g. regional integration) in the relevant institutions;
2. to define the *positions and networks* dealing with the policy problem (formal and informal roles and networks: tasks, interests, resources, competences and authority);
3. to define the *norms and values* in the institutions (e.g. rules, laws, professional and political norms and values – cultures);
4. to define *order and meaning* in relation to the policy problem. Here we find the constitution of sense making in relation to important ‘concepts’, meanings and behaviour as appropriate and ‘good’ (Bogason, 2000; see also chapter 5).

Abram and Cowell (2004, p. 224) are in the same line of thinking when they analyse the transfer of a common community planning thinking in two different countries – not from the same families of states. They stress that the processes of integration of a new planning idea from another context is a very complex process and has to be analysed from an (neo)institutional perspectives focusing on interpretations and meanings, adaption strategies, political and administrative practices etc. Even though there might be commonalities in the discourse about e.g. regional integration in different countries there might not be any policy transfer or cross-national learning. One has to consider the function and meaning that the planning idea holds in specific institutional settings. Furthermore, transplantation of policies, tools and instruments is not an objective and instrumental process. The process of policy transfer is a highly political one and influenced by political interests and struggles. De Jong (2004) suggests the following advice for successful policy transfer and in these suggestions we clearly find elements of the institutional perspective mentioned above:

1. See the transfer initiative as a proposal that is integrated in the local policy arena with its political struggles.
2. Be aware of national, regional and local specificities and needs (e.g. different perception of policy problems, networks and positions, norms and values, order and meaning).

3. Consider multiple models instead of one, create alternatives.
4. Create a sense of urgency for policy transfer.
5. Form a coalition of supporters (a policy network) and wait for a window of opportunity.

3.5 Conclusions

Policy transfer studies have shown a lack of instrumental options in the sense of 'if you want to transfer policy A from B to C, do so and so'. This lack is due to at least three problems. First, policies organised in one national context are difficult to transfer to another national context. This is the problem of the context. Adding to this is the problem of precision. The more accurate the transfer, the more it depends upon the context, and the more difficult it is to transfer. And finally, there is the problem of origin. Does the transfer originate from a supra national body trying to implement general policies in different countries – or does the transfer originate from below, from one country just inspired by policies in another country?

Figure 3.1 Continua of policy transfer



In the literature, these problems are often summarised in conceptual continua between conceptual extremes, as illustrated in figure 3.1. This figure combines the continuum between transplantation and inspiration and the continuum between coercive and voluntary transfer. At the bottom extreme – coercive transplantation – transfer is at its extreme of accuracy and at its extreme of contextual barriers to cross. At the opposite end – voluntary inspiration – transfer is taking place as a learning process during which contextual borders are eliminated as part of the learning process. Thus, the diversity of the extremes makes it reasonable to suggest that problems of policy transfer are nested in the very idea of transfer: i.e. only if you wish to transfer something, transfer problems occur.

An important question is whether we do have concepts, tools and policies so important that they have to be transplanted – as they are – from one to another context. The literature tends to favour operation at the other extreme,

inspiration. This position we want to rephrase as *implantation* rather than *transplantation*, in order to emphasize that concepts, tools and policies are going to be transferred only if they are suited for tailoring to the circumstances in the local context. This way of thinking is in line with the following quotation by De Jong and Edelenbos (2007, p. 688): “Domestic systems persist and incorporate European themes following their own institutional logics.”

In the learning perspective, borders between different contexts are opportunities rather the barriers, often explored by planners and politicians, not just as individuals, but usually as members of professional and political milieus and networks. Such networks are strong learning communities. On the other hand, they may develop as epistemic milieus not open to new ideas. Thus, if we leave policy transfer to some learning paradigm, we need to consider how to keep it vital and entrepreneurial.

RISE is ultimately about the (possibilities for) cross-national policy transfer. This chapter points out that there are two interlinked issues when it comes to such policy transfer:

1. The object of policy transfer or – phrased differently – the potential candidate tools for the toolkit.
2. The critical contextual elements influencing the nature of these tools.

It is difficult to become concrete in both respects because these issues presume an awareness of the level of uniqueness in relation to the tools as well as the policy context which produced these tools: what makes a particular type of tool interesting for others and will it fit another planning context?

Possibly helpful in relation to the first point is trying to find the core or the essence of the selected case. Drawing from the example of the Randstad case study we can bring back the phenomenon of the MIRT agenda to the following: a multilevel government centred effort/process to link decisions about large (central) government investments to the territorial characteristics of an area and the way these characteristics have been framed in existing policy documents.

Helpful to detect contextual elements which (might) explain the characteristics of a case is to make use of the literature on families of planning cultures and planning systems. Several examples have been discussed although we must also conclude that the level of abstractness is in most cases quite high due to the fact that the makers of the distinctions between families had to incorporate all countries and were seeking to avoid a large number of families. So a lot of detail is necessarily lost in the exercise.

4.0 Meta-governance and new forms of governance[3]

4.1 Introduction

Policy integration on the regional level takes place in a political and administrative environment which is becoming ever more complex. What comes out of the literature is that there are different ways to respond to this. A first response is that administrative arrangements are reorganized so there seems to be a match between territorial divisions (for instance commuting areas) and administrative divisions. Another response is that new forms of governance and meta-governance are developed which are often ad-hoc, have fuzzy boundaries and seek to integrate a limited set of policy subjects. Many non-statutory planning strategies are the result of such new forms of governance and meta-governance.

In order to analyse case studies and to contribute to the ESPON RISE toolbox it makes sense to break down the concepts of governance and meta-governance into more concrete and identifiable concepts. The term governance by itself is already good for numerous different interpretations and meanings. Meta-governance, which is generally understood as the 'governance of governance' adds an additional range of interpretations and meanings to this. Yet, governance and meta-governance refer to different sets of concepts and instruments each of which having different purposes and objectives and are executed on different levels of scale. Government is where most of the initiatives to come to regional integrative strategies start. Hence it seems appropriate to first briefly discuss the shift from government to governance and its relevance in the context of regional integrative strategy making.

4.2 Shift from government to governance

The shift from government to governance basically refers to the dispersion of decision making. It indicates – for instance – the loss of power of central government to control and steer the development of its territory. Also the shift signifies the increasing complexity of decision making due to the involvement of several or many stakeholders. In contrast to government, where decision making power rests in one hand which enables governments to *govern*, in the case of governance decision making power is spread over a range of stakeholders. Rhodes (1997, p. 660) – to take one although important example out of the literature – therefore describes the characteristics of governance as "interdependence between organisations; continuing interactions between network members; game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants; a significant degree of autonomy from the state."

Similar to notions of 'good government' notions about 'good governance' have been developed. Whereas government is regulated by formal rules and

[3] This chapter has been prepared by Bas Waterhout and Wil Zonneveld, OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment, Delft University of Technology.

regulations, laid down in acts and laws that indicate the relationship between government and the society and make clear how government should behave, such formal rules do not exist in the context of governance, where, as indicated above, rules have been developed and agreed by the participants themselves.

Governance thus has its 'problems'. Issues which are often mentioned refer to the legitimacy of decision making and the lack of openness and transparency. It is because of such issues that several attempts have been undertaken from a normative angle to more clearly define what could be understood as 'good governance'. One such attempt is the European Commission's white paper on governance promoting principles referring to openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (CEC, 2001). In case research it could be useful to analyse and characterise cases along the yardstick of, amongst others, these principles.

Figure 4.1 Matrices on good governance



Based on literature the following descriptions of the *concepts* of government and governance can be given:

- *Government*: the exercise of political authority over the actions, affairs, etc. of a political unit, people, etc., as well as the performance of certain functions for this unit or body; the action of governing; political rule and administration.[4]

[4] The Free Dictionary - http://www.thefreedictionary.com/government.

- *Governance*: a complex governing process in which a multitude of public and private actors interact to govern society (Sørensen, 2006, p. 99).

To assess different dimensions of (good) governance several dimensions can be investigated. We have identified the five dimensions as identified in the above mentioned white paper on governance in the scheme in figure 4.1. We have imaged these as continua ranging from 'low' to 'high'.

4.3 Governance and territory: hard and soft spaces

There is a clear relation between government and territory and hence the shift from government to governance is not without consequences for spatial strategy making. It is in particular the 'hollowing out' of government (and state) which has opened the way for an era of newly emergent 'spatiotemporal fixes' (Jessop, 2000; Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009). Such new spatiotemporal fixes steer away from the classical demarcated jurisdictions of government agencies.

Contrary to these 'hard' spaces, which traditionally have been the focus of integrative strategy making, these new spaces have fuzzy instead of clear demarcated boundaries and are rather soft, instead of hard, in terms of their organizational fabric. Their basis is not rooted in the government induced jurisdiction-administrative ordering of a country, but lies in their recognition as places for future development activities by networks composed of both government and private stakeholders. Whilst government still possesses of important and unique powers and resources, they rely increasingly on other non-governmental, private and societal stakeholders in developing integrative strategies for such soft spaces. Where regional integrative strategy making is attempted for soft spaces with fuzzy boundaries it is by definition that this occurs through governance and by means of multi-actor networks. The actor-relational approach as developed by Boelens, for instance, is based upon such a recognition but possibly even goes a step further by basically underlining the need for installing the right conditions for self-organization in the sense of governance without government (Boelens, 2010). Such proposals would imply the highest position on Arnstein's ladder of participation which will be discussed in chapter 5.

Does this mean that governments do not play any or only a limited role in regional integrative strategy making? In common with others we suggest not. Policy interventions are still dependent on the institutions of the nation-state, and these form the main reference for governance-beyond-the-state arrangements (Swyngedouw, 2005). However, both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of nation-state institutions are seriously constrained. The concept of a nation-state, even if it is multi-tiered, as a power to intervene in social processes is increasingly at odds with today's geographies and socio-economic processes, which extend way beyond the borders of the nation-state and, in fact, any jurisdictional border. Social processes can no longer be characterised or easily demarcated in geographical terms, let alone by borders. Many processes find their origin in local or global trends, as well as everything in between, and can hardly be dealt with at one particular

geographical scale. As a result of multiple overlapping and conflicting processes taking place at various geographical scales, our societies have become fluid or splintered (Graham & Marvin, 2001) and territories have become fragmented (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009). The idea of the nation-state having complete control over its territory may have to be consigned to history.

This means that a first step in analysing cases is to determine whether regional integrative strategy making applies to a hard jurisdictional space or, in contrast, a soft space? From there a second step, in particular in the case of soft spaces, is to establish what the main reasons (functional, institutional, market driven or other) have been to actually start the strategy making project and which stakeholders have asked for it.

The key concepts at stake here can be described as follows:

- *Hard space*: rigidly demarcated administrative territories or jurisdictions legally controlled by a government body.
- *Soft space*: spatiotemporal fixes (places) of associational (governance) networks that break away from the rigidities associated with the formal scales and have fuzzy boundaries (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009).

Again we can use matrices to assess the dimensions of governance and territory (see figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Matrices on governance and territory



4.4 Multi-level governance

In responding to societal changes and trends there has been a 'restless search' for the appropriate governance of place (Healey, 2007, p. 171). Governance practice has become so complex that it urged the inventers of the original concept of multi-level governance, Marks (1993) and Hooghe (1996), to reconsider their previous ideas, which referred to a hierarchical system of jurisdictions. In another publication (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, see also Hooghe & Marks, 2003) they distinguish between two basic types or models of governance, simply labelled multi-level governance Type I and Type II. The former refers to the original concept with non-intersecting general-purpose territorial jurisdictions arranged in a hierarchical way, while the latter views governance as a complex, fluid, patchwork of innumerable, overlapping jurisdictions. Type I governance is designed around a human

(usually territorial) community while Type II is centred around particular tasks or policy problems. Under the Type II model, it is not the jurisdictional borders that determine the development of governance arrangements, but the material object at stake. This material object can vary widely in terms of geographical scale. Type I multi-level governance is strongly related to territorial borders and jurisdictions nested in a hierarchical fashion but, as many observers once again argue (e.g. Amin, 2004; Salet, 2006; Gualini, 2006), there is no perfect 'fit' or ideal scale to address spatial issues in today's network society. Reality veers towards Type II multi-level governance.

To summarize the following description can be given:

- *Multi-level governance Type I*: coordination of decision making between non-intersecting general-purpose territorial jurisdictions arranged in a hierarchical way.
- *Multi-level governance Type II*: governance as a complex, fluid, patchwork of innumerable, overlapping jurisdictions centred around particular tasks or policy problems.

The nature and scale of governance have important consequences for spatial planning. Spatial planning took shape within the boundaries of the modern nation-state, characterised by territorial synchrony (i.e. Type I governance). Most planning systems, therefore, are based on the concept of territory as a neatly ordered space within definite boundaries. Each scale has its own appropriate instruments such as land-use plans, strategic spatial plans and general guidelines. Although this may be an exaggerated stereotype of planning 'within borders', it can be argued that post-war planning systems are based on a conception of space as a geographical entity, that could be territorially managed by means of comprehensive integrated forms of planning, or by regional economic strategies (CEC, 1997). Planning approaches that treat space and place in such absolute ways are sometimes dismissed as 'Euclidian planning' (Friedmann, 1993; see also Davoudi & Strange, 2009), or 'container' approaches that are in "(…) contrast with the focus on fluidity, openness and ultiple time-space relations of 'relational-complexity' ideas." (Healey, 2006b, p. 535).

The distinction between Type I and Type II multi-level governance is relevant to analyse and characterise the actor and stakeholder setting around regional integrative strategy making processes. It enables researchers to characterise the composition of governance networks. In so doing researchers should be aware that multi-level governance Type I is mainly an affair between different layers of government. Type I characterisations are thus reserved for those cases which are driven exclusively by government bodies, without further coordination between government bodies at the same level. Considered in this strict sense it is hardly conceivable that cases can be solely characterised as Type I or Type II. Rather, each case will carry elements of both. What matters is to point out which multi-level governance relation or relations are dominant. This can be illustrated by taking the so called MIRT territorial agenda for the Randstad South Wing as an example. As this agenda (a kind of strategic framework) is prepared by governmental actor – which would suggest Governance Type I) – some of these actors are grouped within

Government Type II arrangements (see the Randstad case study report for further detail).

Figure 4.3 Matrix on multi-level governance Type I and Type II: the example of the MIRT Randstad South Wing



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4.5 Governance networks

In time it has become more popular to speak in terms of 'network governance' rather than 'governance', since the latter concept is according to many too broad. As governance is by nature networked we prefer to use the concept of *governance networks* to focus on the relationships between the variety of actors and their relationships. This concept urges the researcher to focus more thoroughly on actors and stakeholders that are part of such networks. It also emphasizes the need to understand how and according to which principles and rules these actors and stakeholders interact with each other. In so doing, the actor network, its behaviour and products becomes the focus of research. Policy or governance networks therewith are an analytically more powerful concept than governance alone.

Based on an extensive literature review Sørensen and Torfing (2009) define governance networks as follows:

> "A stable articulation of mutually dependent, but operationally autonomous actors from state, market and civic society, who interact through conflict-ridden negotiations that take place within an

institutionalised framework of rules, norms, shared knowledge and social imaginaries; and contribute to the production of 'public value' in a broad sense of problem definitions, vision, ideas, plans and concrete regulations that are deemed relevant to broad sections of the population." (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009, p. 236).

Such governance networks may not only produce concrete policy decisions, but also change entire policy discourses, including the identity of the actors. According to Sørensen and Torfing such governance networks may assume different empirical forms in different countries, at different levels of governance and within different policy arenas. As such they might be:

- Self-grown from below or mandated and designed from above.
- Formal or informal.
- Intra- or inter-organizational.
- Open or closed.
- Tightly knit or loosely coupled.
- Short or long-lived.
- Sector specific or society wide.
- Preoccupied either with policy formulation or policy implementation (ibid, p. 237).

Whereas there is no commonly accepted theory on the way in which institutional and cultural contexts influence the form and function of governance networks, a rather generic picture can be presented regarding governance networks in Europe. Three broad traditions are identified:

1. A Northern and Western European tradition for the corporatist involvement of social partners (currently developing into broader stakeholder dialogue).
2. A Southern European tradition, whereby networks are negatively associated with lobbyism, corruption and criminal activities; and civil society participation in public governance is associated with the devolution of power to local and regional authorities;
3. A Central and Eastern European tradition where networks are negatively associated with the rule of old or new cliques, but a large effort being made to develop a legal framework for public-private co-governance (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009, p. 238).

Obviously, within the stakeholder countries of the ESPON RISE project governance networks are expected to play an important role in drafting regional integrative strategies. It is from that perspective that it could be interesting to make use of a number of indicators developed to measure the effectiveness of governance networks. Effectiveness of governance networks according to Sørensen and Torfing (2009) can be measured in terms of their capacity to accomplish the following:

1. Produce clear and well-informed understanding of the often complex and cross-cutting policy problems and policy opportunities at hand.
2. Generate innovative, proactive and yet feasible policy options that match the joint perception of the problems and challenges facing the network actors.

3. Reach joint policy decisions that go beyond the least common denominator while avoiding excessive costs and unwarranted cost shifting.
4. Ensure relatively smooth policy implementation based on a continuous coordination and a high degree of legitimacy and programme responsibility among all relevant and affected actors, including target groups, client advocacy groups, stakeholder organisations, public administrators and politicians.
5. Provide flexible adjustment of policy solutions and public services in the face of changing demands, conditions and preferences.
6. Create favourable conditions for future cooperation through cognitive, strategic and institutional learning that construct common frameworks, spur the development of interdependency and build mutual trust.

Whereas it would go too far, in the context of ESPON RISE, to assess all identified policy networks along these indicators, it could be interesting to focus on the conditions that are necessary in order to accomplish these things. It could be hypothesised that such conditions are of equal importance for successful processes of regional integrative strategy making.

4.6 Meta-governance

Within the context of analysing and characterizing cases of regional integrative strategy making it is important to analyse to what extent and how the game of strategy making is influenced by conditions and regulations imposed by higher levels of government. Whereas it is understood that governance takes place in a self-created negotiation context, this does not mean that higher levels of authority still aim to control these processes by setting limits and boundaries to the scope of decision making. The aim to influence decision making processes in governance networks is referred to as meta-governance.

Meta-governance is seen as the 'governance of governance', or the 'regulation of self-regulation' (Jessop, 2004). The purpose of meta-governance is to create some form of coordination, coherence and integration in the fragmented structures of network governance without completely undermining the autonomy, engagement and self-regulation in governance networks (Sørensen, 2006). If we combine various descriptions and definitions of meta-governance the following picture emerges:

> "Meta-governance is a way of enhancing coordinated governance in a fragmented political system based on a high degree of autonomy for a plurality of self-governing networks and institutions. (…) [M]eta-governance is an indirect form of governing that is exercised by influencing various processes of self-governance." (Sørensen, 2006, p. 100) "Meta-governance is therefore an indirect means of performing 'regulation of selfregulation', both at the macro level (e.g. Jessop, 2002) of societal governance and at the micro level of network management (Klijn & Edelenbos, 2007)". (Sehested, 2009, p. 248).

The concept of meta-governance provides an analytical tool to further analyse processes of network governance. In the light of the apparent limitations of

both hierarchical and horizontal networks of power it was Scharpf (1994) who developed an account of social coordination based on the inter-actions which occur between hierarchical structures and networks of self-coordination. In so doing it becomes possible to understand: (1) political hierarchies as arenas within which the negotiations and political struggles associated with governance are played out, without necessarily ascribing a deterministic logic to the exercise of hierarchical power; and (2) how interdependencies between hierarchical intervention and local political coordination are structured. This works in two ways: hierarchical power is realised in and through local political practice, but at the same time effective local coordination capacity is enhanced by virtue of their embeddedness within hierarchical structures.

The implications of the above can be described as follows:

> "[M]eta-governance differs substantially from the concept of governance. The fundamental difference between governance and meta-governance is that while the former draws attention to the processes that dislocate political organization from government and the state, the latter focuses explicitly on the practices and procedures that secure governmental influence, command and control within governance regimes." (Whitehead, 2003, p. 8).

Table 4.1 Mechanisms for government office control and management of Single Regeneration Budget partnerships in the West-Midlands region (Source: Whitehead, 2003)

Government Office operations	Governmental techniques
1. Strategic frameworks and guidance:	• Bidding guidance. • Regional regeneration strategies. • Re-drafting SRB bid submissions. • Financial control of annual SRB fund release.
2. Monitoring and assessment:	• Quarterly review statements. • Annual reports. • Milestone checks. • Outputs measurement (key indicators). • Management system audits. • Information technology and SRB databases. • Delivery plans. • Delivery statements. • Calling in of individual projects.
3. Fear and discipline:	• Competitive bidding. • Red and Yellow Cards. • Financial claw-back. • Designation of an accountable body. • Project appraisal.

Table 4.1 shows a number of meta-governance mechanisms as exercised by the English government in the context of urban regeneration in the West Midlands. More in general Sørensen (2006, p. 101) identifies four distinct ways in which meta-governance may be exercised. They are:

1. *Hands-off framing of self-governance*. This about shaping of the political, financial and organizational context within which self-governance takes place. This form of meta-governance can be characterized as hands-off

because the meta-governor is not in direct contact with the self-governing actors. This also counts for 2.

2. *Hands-off storytelling*. This type of meta-governance is exercised by shaping interests through the formation of the meanings and identities that constitute the self-governing actors. Meta-governance through storytelling represents a forceful means to influence self-governing actors and thus to promote unitary strategies to problem solving.
3. *Hands-on support and facilitation*. This type of meta-governance is obtained through offering support and facilitation to self-governing actors. This form of meta-governance is hands-on in the sense that the supportive and facilitating meta-governor interacts directly with the self-governing actors.
4. *Hands-on participation*. This means the participation of the meta-governor in processes of self-governance. Hence, a meta-governor can seek to obtain influence on the outcome of self-governance through direct participation. To do so, however, the meta-governor must give up any authoritative position and participate according to the specific self-constituted rules of the game that exists in a given self-governing environment (Sørensen, 2006, pp. 101-103).

On the basis of the discussion above we may conclude that in general sovereign rule is being replaced by alternative forms of governing. It is not based on detailed top-down control but on a plurality of indirect ways of influencing and or coordinating the actions of self-governing bodies (Sørensen, 2006). This leads to the following issues for further research and reflection:

- The identification of influences on regional integrative strategy making of higher tier government bodies without them being present or part of the governance network. This is basically looking at strategy making taking place place under the shadow of hierarchy.
- The perception of hierarchical conditions as positive or negative for the outcome of the regional integrative strategy making process.
- The embeddedness of the process of regional integrative strategy making in a wider organizational setting which imposes, for example, deadlines, procedures, guidance or other influencing conditions on the network governance process.
- The use of instruments such as contracts, result management, management by (political) objectives, and financial frameworks (see Sehested, 2009) during processes of strategy making.

5.0 Collaborative planning, legitimization and partnership[5]

5.1 The communicative and collaborative turn in planning

Literature chosen for this review suggests two levels of conceptualisation. One level relates to collaboration and communication as an overall ‘turn’, a

[5] This chapter has been prepared by Lars Larsson and Robert Sörensson, Centre for Regional Science, University of Umeå.

change from general and established discourses into other (or perhaps complementary) discourses on the same level.[6] As for the conventional view of planning, Innes (1998, p. 53), focusing on information in planning, concludes: ”experts develop information in response to questions from decision makers or to solve problems that decision makers have identified”. In this view an instrumental rationality guides the production and use of scientifically grounded information, which is provided by professionals and experts. The information in this traditional view is used to produce spatial plans, which are ideally “blueprinted”/transformed into built form on the ground (Healey, 2003). This conventional view has been challenged widely; in the case of Patsy Healey through reference to Habermas theories on communicative rationality (Healey, 2003). The proponents of a *communicative turn* in planning not only focus on the role of communication in planning, rather they argue that communication and collaboration are at the very heart of planning. As a consequence, planning needs to be re-thought and re-organised, and a new communicative ethic ought to be more clearly elaborated (Innes, 1998, p. 60).

Booher and Innes (2002) places this communicative turn within the context of an informational society, where technological, economic and social changes produce more networked ways of dealing with reality. Not surprisingly then, the second level of conceptualising focuses on planning practices, suggesting that “what planners do most of the time is talk and interact” (Innes, 1998, p. 52). Rather than considering information and knowledge as detached and objective facts:

> “information influences planning and public action by becoming embedded in the thought, practices, and institutions of a community, and thereby influencing actions. (…) [I]nformation frames, or in other words, limits the available choices in the first place. It points the way to and defines the nature of the reality that decision makers confront. Information acts more as a lens than as a bottom-line finding” (Innes, 1998, pp. 54-55).

To establish these kinds of changes, information needs to fulfil certain criteria, it “does not influence unless it represents a socially constructed and shared understanding created in the community of policy actors” (Innes, 1998, p. 56). Shared understandings are developed through a variety of communicative processes where multiple kinds of information is shared and negotiated. Even though many commentators relate these insights to Habermas, Booher and Innes (2002) and Healey (2010) find inspiration for this *collaborative planning* rooted in Giddens’ theory on structuration.

As a consequence, planning can no longer be considered an instrumental exercise for those holding the political and economic (hegemonic) power only (see e.g. Arnstein, 1969; Booher & Innes, 2002; Healey, 2003). Researchers stress various aspects of this conclusion and its consequences for planning practices. A common strand is to argue for enhanced communication and a

[6] Since collaboration necessarily includes interaction and sharing of information, reference is also being made to the existence of an information society (Innes, 1998).

contextualisation of conventional planning. Once context is allowed to influence planning other actors, interests and structures need to be taken into account more comprehensibly. They need to be included in communicative processes through collaborative planning.

5.2 Connections between government and the civil society

Integrating strategies is a political and administrative endeavour, integrating them also in action needs a new and more nuanced understanding of power (see below) along with new forms of interaction and communication. Innes (1998) suggests that only a small – but necessary – part of information and communication should be of the technical kind. She adds participants' experiences, stories they tell, images and representations used in stories and intuition as relevant sources of information and forms for communication. This approach opens up for criticism, and responding to that she develops a communicative rationality as a foundation for collaborative planning. Such rationality is needed in order to support communicative actions in competition with information based on scientific rationality (Innes, 1998, p. 60):

- All important interests must be represented at the table, they ought to be equally informed and have the same capacity to act on behalf of their organisations.
- Therefore all must be equally empowered in discussions.

Once empowered, the power of the argument is the important dynamic and consensus should be sought.[7] From there, various co-operative arrangements can be set up, taking development ambitions and local specificities into account. Leach et al. (2002) enhance the understanding of stakeholder partnerships through comparison with three other forms of collaboration. These are: (1) advisory committees, (2) public hearings, and (3) negotiated rule making.

An advisory committee covers a specific project or programme conducted by a public agency or a private enterprise. The participants are interest groups, technical experts, and/or public agencies, selected by the sponsor agency. The committee may address any or all of the stages of the policy cycle over an extended, but not indefinite, period of time.

A public hearing covers a specific project proposed by an agency or private developer. The participants are interest groups, citizens, one or more permit-issuing agencies, and the meetings are open to the public. The hearing only takes place during the planning stage of the specific project and timing is often driven by statutory deadlines. It splits up after the plan is finalized.

Negotiated rule making can be used as a form of collaboration when a specific regulation is proposed. The participants are affected interest groups that are selected by the rule-making agency. It is only active during the rule-making stage and splits up after the rule is set.

[7] To assess speakers' claims and arguments, ask: Do they speak sincerely and honestly? Is he or she in the legitimate position to probe a certain argument? Can the argument be backed up? Does he or she speak comprehensibly? Is the statement factually correct?

Partnerships do in comparison to other forms of participatory policy making combine a broadly defined issue with participation by multiple levels of government for an (potentially) indefinite duration of time. Furthermore, the broad scope and duration allows partnerships to define the complete policy cycle of problem definition, policy adoption, implementation and assessment.

5.3 Spatial strategies and levels of public participation and collaborative planning

It is quite a challenge to set up a routine or measuring procedures with the aim to identify exact levels of participation. Some authors suggest typologies and criteria that can be used to identify important aspects of participation, but they do not provide scales or indexes. Rather, criteria are used in qualitative ways, with the most established being Arnstein's (1969) *ladder of participation*. Her ladder of participation is clearly normative since citizen participation and high levels of citizen power are a desired good as a part of an emancipatory project. The redistribution of power enables the have-not citizens, previously excluded from political influence, to be deliberately included. It is a strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programmes are operated, and benefits are distributed. Participation in planning without redistribution of power is an empty and confusing process, which allows the power-holders to claim that all sides have been involved, but makes it possible for only some to benefit – it maintains status quo.

Arnstein's typology includes eight levels of participation. They are presented through a ladder metaphor, where each step corresponds with increasing levels of citizens' power. First Arnstein identifies (1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy. These two rungs depict levels of *non-participation* as these steps substitute for genuine and real participation. Here people are not invited to participate in the planning process or in conducting programmes, rather power-holders 'educate' or 'cure' the participants.

The rungs 3 to 5 cover different *degrees of tokenism*, i.e. symbolic measures of participation, that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice by (3) Information and (4) Consultation. Under these conditions citizens lack the power to assure that their views will be heeded by the powerful – no assurance of changing the status quo. At rung (5) Placation, a higher level of tokenism is identified where the rules put have-nots in an advisory position, while the power-holders still retain the right to decide.

At the top of the ladder there are three *degrees of citizen participation* in planning and decision making. A Partnership (6) enables the citizens to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power-holders. When Delegated Power (7) and/or Citizen Control (8) is achieved, citizens obtain the majority of decision making seats, or full managerial power.

Relating to the RISE project, the emancipatory aspects of planning may seem less important as there is a strong emphasis on the efficiency in delivering strategic planning. However, efficiency in planning and policy is partly

dependent on the quality of decision making trajectories in the sense of the integration of the interests of stakeholders. That is because stakeholders can have blocking power (for instance through appeal procedures) or can count on sympathy on the political level (political representatives). So Arnstein's more developed descriptions of each level could be of use to identify levels of participation. In that respect collaboration essentially involves a greater emphasis on varied and relevant forms of communication, as presented above.

5.4 Barriers to the legitimization of strategies

Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones (2000, p. 114) identify the probably most important obstacle or barrier to legitimization of strategies – power. Each of the four regions involved in the RISE project are situated in democratic states, which means that none of the strategies analysed are non-democratic or illegitimate as such. Instead power can be considered a distorting factor in communicative action among stakeholders. Innes' (1998) layout of a communicative rationality identifies the need for each actor to legitimately have their say in discussions and in communication. Margerum (2002, p. 238) calls this a "process of shared decision making – usually through a group of stakeholders prepared to share information and build consensus".[8] In this process, Margerum (2002, pp. 242-251) identifies aspects that can produce obstacles to consensus building:

- Selection and composition – limited inclusion and vague representation.
- Context – societal-level dynamics, technical complexity, historical barriers.
- Operation – lack of resources, management by consensus processes.
- Organisations and interests – political and organizational cultures (lack of commitment, lack of guidance), organizational disincentives (unclear representation).
- Ideology – ideological barriers, differing perceptions of problem.
- Power and capacity – operational capacity, power disparities.

Here, only the aspects are mentioned, but reference is also made to ways to deal with these difficulties. In integrative strategy making trajectories for managing obstacles can be provided and developed. However, power and its unequal distribution are always present. Actors with political mandates, those with larger economic resources and those traditionally and discursively included are in positions to distort communication.

A complementary approach to structuring collaborative processes and thereby possibly overcoming barriers, is the actor relational approach drawing on urban regime theory and associative democracy. Boelens (2010) suggests a seven step operational working scheme:

1. Interpreting the problem by determining the focal actors and unique core values.
2. Actor identification and actor analysis.

[8] Margerum (2002) suggests three phases – problem-setting, direction-setting and implementation. The two former are the consensus-building processes.

3. Opportunity maps and development possibilities.
4. Bilateral talks and round tables.
5. Business cases and pilots.
6. Regime development and general plan outlines.
7. Democratic anchoring in special districts.

The key difference between this approach and for instance a government taskforce or co-operative public-private ventures is that from the beginning the focus, in the words of Boelens, is outside-inward, instead of inside-out. It starts from a problem definition, an involvement ventured by stake- and shareholders in the business and/or civic society. Space and planning is not considered as a container or platform for action, but as an assemblage which emerges step by step in the relationship between actors and factors of importance. It starts with leading actors with the capacity and incentive to invest in their local environment, and therefore embedded out of pure self interest in the interests of other networks and institutions. All in all it should be clear that with this approach we are right at the top – rung 8 in fact – of Arnstein's ladder of public participation.

5.5 Partnerships dealing with the making and implementation of spatial strategies

Basically Boelens' approach is about governance without government. If actors still see a role for government and government agencies the next issue is what kind of partnerships between government and private actors are possible. Rather than imagining the theoretically *im*possible partnership alternatives, we start with their formation and resourcing as being grounded in contextual factors. Any contextually negotiated form of partnership is then initially possible.

One example of this is Teisman and Klijn's (2002) suggestion of three forms of private involvement in spatial development projects, which differ with respect to the role of government, process characteristics, role of private actor, and action taken. The three forms are: (1) a traditional contracting out scheme, (2) the combination model, and (3) the partner model.

In the traditional *contracting out scheme* the government specifies what is needed, thereafter follows a tendering procedure leading to contracting out. The role of the private actor is to carry out the production process of the specified project, and the finished job is handed over to the government. A characteristic of the *combination model* is that governments and private parties is involved in decision making at an early stage, but still develops separate ways for public and private decision making. The government defines its global aims, next ensues an early tendering procedure that picks the best private proposal even though a definitive public decision is not available. The private actors shape the proposal in interaction with public decision making units. In the final step the project realization is provided by private companies. The *partner model* builds on a joint platform set up by governments and private parties in which all actors participate on a risk sharing basis. Together they form a joint principal relation to parties who

tender for part of the project, and there are joint schemes for production and exploitation.

5.6 Conclusions

The RISE project focuses on territorially relevant policies, plans and strategies in the public domain, so policies, plans and strategies drawn up under the supervision of governments and governmental agencies. Under various banners we have discussed what literature says about the involvement of actors outside government. For most authors power sharing is the most central concern. We have come across various distinctions to ass the level of power sharing. The most well-known typology has been developed by Sherry Arnstein in the late 1960s, an era of public turmoil about decision making, content as well as processes and procedures. As spatial planning, policies and decision making in many cases often directly influence the daily living environment this domain was leading in the general discussion about participation (the dominant term in the 1960s and 1970s) and collaborative planning (the dominant term during the last two decades).

In this chapter on collaborative planning, legitimization and partnership we have also discussed literature which is not primarily focused on the legitimate nature of governmental plans, strategies and actions but also literature questioning the effectiveness of these plans, strategies and actions. The actor-relational approach as proposed by Boelens (2010) is partly based upon novel ideas about democracy but is for another part based on a recognition that decisions taken by societal actors – whether an individual or a company – have a territorial impact far larger than any government action or plan. To ignore that will make any public strategy blunt.

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